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MOTION THAT JUSTICE JIM JONES BE DISQUALIFIED FROM 
SITTING ON THIS APPEAL 
Justice Jim Jones' long time law clerk Yvonne Dunbar joined APPELLEES lawfirm a 
short while ago and it is Telford's belief that this action tainted the fair consideration of Appellant's 
motion to augment the appellate record before Justice Jim Jones given Justice Jones violated 
the express mandates of IAR 30 (a), which provides: 
Any party may move the Supreme Court to augment ... the clerk's 
record ... but the moving party must establish by citation to the record 
or transcript that the document was presented to the district court. 
Justice Jim Jones improperly denied APPELLANT's motion to augment this appellate record 
with the records which were concealed from the clerk's record; all of said records which were 
inculpitory against APPELLEES. Telford argued in her motion to augment the appeal record 
(before briefing was commenced), that her affidavits in the clerk's record made reference to the 
exhibits in the attached Addendum which Telford contends were deliberately gutted from the 
clerk's record to Telford's substantial injury. Furthermore, Telford provided justice Jones with the 
transcript of the October 9, 2012 hearing where Telford complained once again about clerical 
misconduct relating to her court files. The hearing transcript is attached to Holli's Addendum as 
exhibit "1" thereto and shows that Holli submitted original declarations into the record with 
attached exhibits, but that the clerks set aside Holli's original affidavits, not placing a file stamp 
on these documents, and which has now caused Telford's affidavits not to be considered. Read 
Hearing transcript at exhibit "1" to the attached Addendum for Telford's complaint about clerks 
gutting her trial record to prejudice Telford's appeal. 
Nevertheless in the transcript, Judge Dunn prejudicially did not allow Plaintiff's 
exhibits admittedly attached to Plaintiff's original affidavits to be admitted into the court record, in 
spite of Judge Dunn's October 3, 2011 Order referring solely to Telford's affidavits and attached 
exhibits when disposing of the Telford's claims. Justice Jim Jones should have corrected the 
abuse of discretion by Judge Dunn and admonished the clerk. Instead, Justice Jones condoned 
this official misconduct - which has allowed the APPELLEES to continue to perpetrate a fraud 
upon this court . Telfordi therefore now asks that Justice Jones be prohibited from sitting on the 
panel deciding this appeal based on an apparent bias against TELFORD. 1 FURTHERMORE, to 
achieve justice in this appeal, Holli asks that the panel overturn Justice Jim Jones order denying 
augmentation and consider the exhibits in the attached Addendum so that Appellees may not 
continue to perpetrate a fraud upon this court. 
1. Moreover, immediately after Justice Jones conclusively denied Appellant's motion to 
remand, Justice Jim Jones ordered Holli to forthwith submit her Opening brief, leaving Holli little 
to no time to prepare her brief, in light of the gutted record. 
iii 
OBJECTIONS TO APPELLEES STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant Holli Telford hereby objects to various parts of Appellees "Statement of 
Facts" which blatantly mischaracterizes the facts and evidence presented to the trial 
court below. Furthermore, Justice Jim Jones when he singly heard Appellant's motion to 
augment this appeal record based on District Court clerk Diane Skidmore concealing 
pertinent trial records below, violated IAR 30 with respect to part of the rule that provides: 
(a) Any party may move the Supreme Court to augment ... the clerk's 
record ... but the moving party must establish by citation to the record 
or transcript that the document was presented to the district court. 
Holli argues that she can cite to the incompetent clerk's record created by clerk 
Diane Skidmore and to parts of the October 9, 2012 hearing transcript attached as exhibit 
"1" to the Addendum hereto, and show how inculpitory records against the Appellees 
were intentionally concealed from in 
order to obstruct this appeal and Holli's entitlement to proceed on her claims against the 
defendants as a matter of law in the state of Idaho. Holli will redress each objection in 
turn, and in conclusion, ask this court to enter a default sanction against Appellees for 
the numerous misrepresentations they made to this court in their response brief. 
Before Holli attacks the Appellees mis-representations, Holli wishes to address 
the Appellee's efforts to corruptly taint this appeal by referring to the void contempt orders 
against Holli Telford Lundahl in their footnote 2, page 1 of their Response Brief: 
First and foremost, this court lacks jurisdiction to consider these contempt 
orders because they were neither presented too, nor passed upon by the trial court 
below. Secondly, the contempt orders are presently before another court for 
determination as to their validity, albiet against a relative of Holli's. The Constitutional 
defects in these contempt orders remain the same no matter who the contempt orders are 
applied against, accordingly Holli attaches as exhibits "2" and "3" to the Addendum 
herein, her relative's "electronically recorded motions" seeking to declare 2 of the primary 
contempt orders upon which all others are predicated, void ab initio. 
THE CONTEMPT ORDERS CITED TO BY COUNSEL ARE 
VOID AB INITO AND THEREFORE CANNOT SUPPORT ANY 
CLAIM THAT HOLLI IS A SERIAL VEXATIOUS LITIGANT 
1 
On February 20, 2013 in re Idaho Supreme Court appeal no. 39497 - 2011, 
Appellant Holli orally argued before this Court the constitutionality of Idaho Court 
Administrative Rule 59, the vexatious litigant statute. Hollli argued that the rule as 
applied to her, effectively sanctioned a "Star Chambers Court". Specifically under this 
administrative Rule : there was no court file or record ; there was no docket record, 
there was no transparency to monitor this alleged official proceeding; the notice 
procedures under the rule were constitutionally defective because the State was 
entertaining an independent action under the rule and service of the OSC (which 
constituted a complaint under Idaho law), should have required personal service within 
the state of Idaho; the hearing procedures provided under the rule should have been 
mandatory and not permissive; an ADJ cannot base his contempt order on a 
discretionary jurisdictional ruling which as a matter of law under rule 41 must be 
dismissed "without prejudice" and thereby meet the definition of "adversely and finally 
determined against the litigant'', and : if the ADJ bases his ruling on other federal and 
state orders finding a litigant vexatious, the court must first ensure that underlying order 
is not void ab initio and subject to collateral attack. 
Not only did Holli attack the constitutionality of Rule 59 as applied to her, she 
also attacked the jurisdiction of the Idaho Supreme Court to hear the proceeding on the 
merits in light of the fact that ADJ Nye had been disqualified without cause, ADJ NYE had 
been disqualified for cause, ADJ Nye never acquired personal jurisdiction over Holli by 
valid service of process, and the fraud committed in the trial court by Oneida County 
District Court Clerk Diane Skidmore in gutting the entire lower court record as instructed 
by ADJ NYE, nullified in whole the entire administrative proceedings. 
Additionally, Holli argued in her briefs that the Idaho Supreme Court was 
required to remand her the case back to an impartial tribunal to hear the merits of Holli's 
collateral attacks on the referenced federal and state contempt orders - because the 
Idaho Supreme Court could not sit as a fact finding body without committing 
structural error. Structural errors are fundamental defects in the trial mechanism that 
affect the entire "framework within which the trial proceeds." Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 
U.S. 279, 310 (1991). "Where an appellate court acts as a fact finding body, structural 
error occurs". Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 652-653, 66 S. Ct. 740, 90 L. Ed. 916 
(1946); Accord in Barr v. Gratz, 4 Wheat. 213, 220; The Abbotsford, 98 U.S. 440, 445; 
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Railroad Co. v. Fraloff, supra, 31; Terre Haute & Indiana Ry. Co. v. Struble, 109 U.S. 381, 
384, 385; Fishburn v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 137 U.S. 60, 61; Ayers v. Watson, 
137 U.S. 584, 597 ("An Appellate Court cannot decide facts which are in the province of 
the court or jury below." ); United States v. Shugart, 25 F.3d 1054 (7th Cir. 05/06/1994) 
(An appellate court is not a fact-finding body.) 1 Accordingly, Holli was not required to 
provide the Idaho Supreme court with her motions attacking the void contempt orders, 
unless they were relevant to the "for cause bias" of ADJ NYE. 
Moreover, the contempt orders are not only being unconstitutionally applied 
against Holli, but they are also being unconstitutionally applied against relatives of Holli -
who were clearly not named parties in the actions resulting in the void contempt orders. 
For example, the Idaho Federal contempt order cited by counsel, i.e. Holli Lundahl v. 
NAR Inc., 434 F. Supp.2d 855, 857 (D. Idaho 2006) and the Utah Supreme Court 
contempt order, 2003 UT 11, were recently applied against a relative of Holli's in a 
collection action pending in the Wyoming federal court. Marti Lundahl procured from 
Holli, the identical motions Holli filed with ADJ NYE respecting two of the primary void 
contempt judgments ( but which ADJ NYE directed District Court Clerk Diane Skidmore 
to gut and purloin from the vexatious litigant record), and Marti changed these motions 
slightly to reflect defenses by a third person. 2 Attached as exhibits "2" and "3" to the 
Addendum hereto, are 2 of these motions which show how the Idaho federal contempt 
1. Viewed another way, the Court cannot pass on questions of fact. See Hormel v. 
Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557 ( 1941 )( "A reviewing or appellate court may not consider questions 
of law neither pressed or passed upon below, where injustice might otherwise result). Accord, 
Young v. United States, 394 F.3d 858, 861 n.2 (10th Cir. 2005) ("[The] general rule [is] that a 
federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed upon below."). "Permitting 
appellate courts to decide facts would allow the appellate courts to sit as advocates and 
constitute structural error." Dickinson v. Porter, 31 N.W.2d 110, 126 (Iowa 1948). Examples 
include: "proceeding before a biased judge", see Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); 
2. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, fn 5 (1989) : Persons who have no right to 
appeal from a final judgment -- either because the time to appeal has elapsed or because they 
were never parties to the case -- may nevertheless collaterally attack a judgment on certain 
narrow grounds. If the court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter, or if the judgment is the 
product of corruption, duress, fraud, collusion, or mistake, under limited circumstances it may be 
set aside in a collateral proceeding. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§ 69-72 (1982); 
Griffith v. Bank of New York, 147 F.2d 899, 901 (CA2) (Clark, J.), cert. Denied, 325 U.S. 874 
(1945). This rule not only applies to parties to the original action, but also allows interested third 
parties against whom the judgment is being enforced, to collaterally attack the 
judgments. 
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judgment, the 9th circuit contempt judgment, the Utah Supreme Court contempt judgment 
and the NAR attorneys fees judgment are all void ab initio. 
Also in several of the cases cited by APPELLEE's counsel, Holli is a 
defendant or respondent in the cases while Holli was in bankruptcy. See Los Angeles 
Homeowners Aid v. Holli Lundahl; and Lundahl v. Quinn. Any disposition in those cases 
would have been void ab initio as in violation of the automatic stay. The Petition before 
the US Supreme Court is a forgery signed in Holli's name, and furthermore, shows on it's 
face that no notice was given before entry of the contempt judgment. Finally in Lundahl 
v. Hawkins, this judgment was predicated solely upon the void Utah Supreme Court 
Contempt judgment and hence is void if the underlying judgment is void. 
Finally, counsel asserts in his footnote, that Holli was declared incompetent to 
stand trial in her criminal case 2:06 CR 693 by reference to exhibit "4" attached to Holli's 
Addendum. In fact, Holli was temporarily held incompetent to stand trial for medical 
reasons. Specifically, a Utah jail nurse criminally manipulated Holli's blood pressure 
readings to reflect normal - in order to support a claim that Holli was faking her 
cardiovascular injuries sustained in 1995 when Holli was assaulted at the hands of Eli 
Lilly and company and Lilly's co-compliciters. 3 On June 23, 2008, Holli was taken to a 
federal court hearing to discuss her physical health. A number of witnesses familiar with 
Holli's health problems were in the courtroom. At this hearing, this jailhouse nurse 
testified that Holli suffered from hypochondriasis because Holli did not have any 
hypertension or atrial fibrillation (Side effects of Holli's drug and assault induced heart 
attack on September 27, 1995 at the HCA hospital in Orange County, California. Refer 
back to exhibit "4" of the attached Addendum for reference to this hospital.). Holli stood 
up at the close of the Nurses' testimony and called the nurse a blatant perjurer. Holli also 
demanded to have her blood pressure taken electronically in open court. The Judge 
ordered the Marshals to removed Holli to the hallway because of her outburst. Holli's 
blood pressure was electronically measured by the US Marshal- a former paramedic. 
The US Marshal returned back to the courtroom and reported Holli's blood pressure at 
190/115. The Judge subsequently ordered that Holli be direct (life) flighted to the 
Federal Medical Center "FMC" in Carswell, Texas. The Court immediately remanded 
3. In addition to manipulating Holli's blood pressure readings, this nurse also bate and 
switched Holli's heart medications ordered by Holli's primary doctor causing Holli the suffer a CVA 
almost one month before the June 23, 2008 hearing. 
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Holli to the custody of the BOP for this purpose. 4 
A subsequent examination by a Government subsidized cardiologist, was 
taken. Attached hereto as exhibit "5" is the cardiologist's redacted report on Holli. He 
diagnosed Holli with Diastolic Congestive heart failure, severe hypertension and S4 
gallops associated with atrial fibrillation. The BOP conclusively determined Holli as 
physically disabled via cardiovascular disease through reports issued by multiple 
independent specialty medical providers on contract with the BOP. The Secretary of 
Health and Welfare also made her separate affirmative determination that Holli was 
permanently physically disabled through assault related conduct in 1995, resulting in 
cardiovascular disease. In United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Company, 
384 U.S. 394 (1966), the U.S. Supreme Court held that "(w)hen an administrative 
agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact 
properly before it, res judicata and collateral estoppel bars are properly imposed 
against any attempt to subsequently attack the final administrative decision. 
When the Prosecutor got confirmation of the final "agency determinations" 
regarding Holli's physical and mental health 5 , and after Judge Downes in an interlocutory 
3. The docket record in re USDC - Utah case no. 2:06-CR-693 shows that the 
Wyoming Judge several times throughout Holli's 3 year criminal litigations - directed the BOP 
and it's Medical arms, here the FMC in Carswell Texas, to determine Holli's health status resulting 
from the assaults inflicted at the HCA hospital located in Orange County, California on September 
29, 1995 and thereafter. The BOP in conjunction with the SSA did determine Holli's health status 
under the sole discretion of their own contracted physicians - given Holli was detained against her 
will. 
5. During the criminal litigation, Holli repeatedly denied having been examined by 
a sole practitioner psychologist Vicky Gregory. Holli claimed that she was on the phone in her 
pod with several persons in an intercom phone call when her phone call was interrupted because 
of a visit by a "Vicky Gregory". Holli informed the court as noted through court records, that she 
was transferred to the programs pod to meet with Vicky Gregory and when Holli learned of the 
purpose of Gregory's visit, to countermand the competency reports twice issued by the 
Psychology Department at Carswell Texas, Holli refused the examination, returned to her cell, 
and resumed her phone call with family members and friends. 
After Judge Downes issued his November 2008 decision, the Prosecutor 
contacted the witnesses Holli was in phone contact with on August 22, 2007 during the time Vicky 
Gregory had allegedly examined Holli for the period of 1 % hours. The Prosecutor discovered that 
Gregory's testimony was false. In addition, Gregory claimed in her [fabricated] report that Holli 
had gotten volatile with Gregory during the alleged 1 % hour examination and thus had to be 
physically removed from the interview room. Such an aggressive maneuver by an inmate at the 
jail would have resulted in disciplinary action against the inmate. Given there was no incident 
report made either orally or in writing against Holli, the Prosecutor concluded that Vicky Gregory 
had lied in her report to benefit the complaining witness Eli Lilly. 
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order entered in November of 2008 tried to USURP the specialized decision making 
authority of the BOP and SSA by self imposing his own rule regarding Holli's competency 
adverse to the "twice-made" agency determinations, and after the Prosecutor had 
investigated Holli's charge that Vicky Gregory never examined Holli and had fabricated a 
report against Holli, and because the Prosecutor could find no evidence that Holli had 
committed any of the crimes charged by Lilly or Judge Tallman in the Idaho federal 
contempt judgment, the Prosecutor exercised his executive authority and voluntarily 
moved to dismiss all criminal charges and actions against Holli without prejudice -
as if the criminal cases had never been brought . The Prosecutors actions were 
intentionally taken to moot all of Judge Downes' prejudicial and "now proven false" 
interlocutory orders finding Holli to be a hypochondriac and/or suffering from a 
persecutory complex involving Eli Lilly. 6 
Accordingly based on the aforesaid record, APPELLEES may not cite to any 
"now determined false findings" made by Wyoming federal judge William Downes during 
Holli's former criminal litigations, to taint this appeal. 
OBJECTIONS TO THE PATENTLY FALSE STATMENTS 
OF FACT MADE BY APPELLEES 
1. APPELLEES falsely assert that Holli attempted to buy the Texas 
Property. Response Br. @ 1. 
Objection: This statement is patently false. Holli did purchase the 
Texas property. See exhibit "6" attached to Addendum hereto. All of the records in 
exhibit 6 were presented to the District Court at C.R., Vol. I, pp. 141-142, Aff. Of Telford, 
3. When the charges were voluntarily dismissed without prejudice, the 
dismissal order mooted every single interlocutory order entered in the criminal case as if 
the interim orders had never been entered. See WRIGHT v. WRIGHT, 22994 (APP. 1997), 
No. Docket No. 22994 (Idaho App. 05/08/1997) (A plaintiff's voluntary dismissal of an action can 
be seen as having the effect of an absolute withdrawal of the plaintiff's claims and leaving the 
defendant as though the defendant had never been a party citing Cook v. Stewart McKee & Co., 
157 P.2d 868, 870 (Cal. Ct. App. 1945) citing 5 JAMES WM. MOORE, et al., FEDERAL 
PRACTICE Section 41.05[6] (2d. Ed 1982); Also see Rawlinson v. Wallerich, 132 P.3d 204, 2006 
WY 52 (Wyo. 04/20/2006) (voluntary dismissal without prejudice rendered the case "a nullity, as if 
the suit had never been filed"); Accord in Williams v. Clarke, 82 F.3d 270, 273 (8th Cir. 1996); 
Beck v. Caterpillar, Inc., 50 F.3d 405, 407 (7th Cir. 1995) ("suit voluntarily dismissed rendered 
moot every interlocutory order because case treated as if never filed.) ; Steel Co. v. Citizens for a 
Better Env., 523 U.S. 83, 100 n.3 (1998) 
6 
para(s) 9 - 11 referring to attached exhibits 3, 4 and 5. (District Clerk Diane Skidmore 
gutted the exhibits from Holli's Affidavit. Holli complained about this gutting act at the 
hearing to augment the record. Refer back to exhibit "1" attached to the addendum, 
Transcript of the 10-9-2012 hearing, pages 6-9.). Moreover, Judge Dunn considered all 
of these records in his October 3, 2011 Decision as shown at C.R. Vol. 11, pp. 303-304, 
footnotes 18-36.) Therefore the records in exhibit "6" to the Addendum attached hereto, 
are properly before this court. 
Moreover, all affidavits submitted by HOLLI in C.R., Vol. I, pp. 126 - 170 
were in support of her cross motions for summary judgment against the Defendants, 
AND NOT ONE OF HOLLI'S AFFIDAVITS WERE OPPOSED BY THE APPELLEES. 
See Sprague v. City of Burley, 710 P.2d 566; 109 Idaho 656 (ID, 1985) (We affirm the 
district court's ruling granting partial summary judgment to the City because "a party 
defending a motion for summary judgment may not rest on its pleadings, but must offer 
affidavits or other evidentiary materials which demonstrate that an issue of fact remains." 
Theriault v. A.H. Robins Co., 108 Idaho 303, 698 P.2d 365, 368 (1985); First Piedmont 
Bank and Trust Co. v. Doyle, 97 Idaho 700, 703, 551 P.2d 1336, 1339 (1976). l.R.C.P. 
56(e) states: When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided 
in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his 
pleadings, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must 
set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does 
not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
Here, because Sprague's affidavit failed in any way to respond to or controvert Messley's 
statements with regard to the City's officer training policy, the district court properly 
entered an order of summary judgment as to the City. 
In this case, because APPELLEES failed to oppose Holli's rebuttal and 
direct affidavits claiming and proving HOLLI purchased the property, then APPELLEES 
are barred from doing so in these proceedings. Finally, Judge Dunn's order at C.R. Vol. 
11, p. 301 admits that Holli had purchased the property through the findings: "After Plaintiff 
had advised Smith County of the error she was directed to the property that Smith County 
actually owned and that she had purchased. The Parcel Plaintiff purchased was 
significantly different than anticipated." 
2. Appellees claim that HOLLI failed to properly serve the remaining non-
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appearing Defendants and as a result HOLLl's claims against these defendants were 
dismissed without prejudice. Response Br. @ 1. 
Objection: Raised as an issue in this appeal, is whether HOLLI had 
the right to invoke the long arm service statute under the Idaho consumer Protection Act 
as a service procedure for a summons and complaint. See Opening Brief, pp 31-32. 
HOLLI disputes service by certified mail constituted improper service upon the defaulting 
defendants. 
3. Judge Dunn found that exercise of personal jurisdiction over the 
Defendants would violate Constitutional Due Process. 
Objection : Judge Dunn made such finding because the real property 
subject of this action could not be ported to Idaho. See Opening Brief pp. 27 paragraph 4 
and 29 paragraphs 2-3. However, HOLLI sought the deed to the real property as 
promised on pages 4-5 of exhibit "6" attached to the Addendum hereto. The paper 
Deed to the property was portable. 
4. Telford attempted to submit a bid on real property. 
Objection: Page 1 of exhibit 6 to the attached Addendum shows 
Holli did submit a bid, that Holli's bid was approved and that Holli was sold the 
property. 
5. The property bid on was struck off to Tyler School District. Res.Br. @ 2. 
Objection: This is a false statement. The property bid on was struck 
off to Smith County Trustee. See C.R. Vol. I, p. 36. 
6. Telford submitted the bid by providing a written paper copy of the bid to 
the Smith County Assessor's office. 
Objection: Telford sent her bid in to the Smith County Assessor's 
office by certified mail. Telford was later asked to resubmit a new bid based on the 
county's erroneous listing of the situs address to the property. C.R. Vol. I, p. 34. 
7. Holli's sealed bid indicated a Texas address for Holli citing to C.R. 
Vol. 1, p. 134. Response Breif @ 2. 
Objection. Holli maintains that the envelope found at C.R. Vol. 1, p. 
134 is a forgery and not from Holli. Moreover C.R. Vol. I, pp. 34, 146; C.R. Vol. II, pp 
283 - 284, and pg. 1 of exhibit "6" attached to Addendum hereto, all show Holli's 
address and the origin of the purchase funds to buy the subject real property as being 
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Malad City, Idaho. Furthermore, Holli does not possess a phone line carrying a Texas 
phone number and Appellees exhibit A @ C. Vol. Supp. p. 127 is a self generated 
document by Smith County carrying an incomplete Texas phone number of 469, stop. 
8. Plaintiff never recieved the Deed for the Property, 
Objection: As part of a fraudulent scheme by the Defendants, 
Holli was deprived of the deed. See Opening Brief pp 24-27. 
9. Throughout the bidding process, Telford made a number of visits to 
Texas in February 2011, April 2011 and May 2011. 
Objection : The bidding on the subject property commenced 
on March 1, 2011. The February check shown at C.R. Vol. I, p. 146 and bearing Holli's 
Idaho Address was sent well in advance of this property being offered via the 
internet. Accordingly the bidding process had not yet begun. Holli was announced 
the winner of the bid on March 31, 2011. Affidavit of Kim Vogt, C.R. Vol. I, p. 134, 
para. 4. Hence the bidding process commenced March 1, 2011 and concluded 
March 31, 2011. "Holli therefore was not in Texas "throughout the bidding 
process." Furthermore, C.R. Vol I, p. 128, paragraph 10, admits that Holli did not visit 
Texas until April 30, 2011 to commence rehabilitation work on the property, almost one 
month after Hali had been advised that she owned the property through an irrevocable 
sale. 
10. Telford recieved a number of telephonic communications from Smith 
County presumably informing Telford that she had won. In fn. 8, the Appellees contend 
that because Telford failed to cite to the record proof of these phone calls, that they 
should be disregarded. 
Objection: C.R. Vol. 1, p. 149 shows at least 4 phones made to 
Telford's Idaho residence on April, 4, 2011 (a monday) and one on April 8, 2011 
discussing the letter Lois Mosley executed in Lundahl's favor. This letter is found at 
exhibit "6" in the attached Addendum, page 1 of that exhibit. 
11. Telford visited the State of Texas on April 30, 2011 through May of 
2011, to take possession of the property despite the fact that no Deed had been 
received. 
Objection : The selling officer for the Smith County Assessor's ofice 
Lois Mosley informed Holli that she could "possess the property as the new purchaser" 
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and that Holli "could also make improvements to the property." C.R. Vol. I, p. 141, 
paragraph 11 and exhibit "6", pg 1 attached to the Addendum herein, paragraph 3. 
Furthermore, Holli had been promised delivery of the Deed through the mail by Smith 
County's other attorneys, the Law offices of Linebarger, Goggan, Blair and Sampson. 
See exhibit "6" attached to the Addendu hereto, pgs 4-5. Finally, to date Smith County 
has always retained the purchase funds on the real property, C.R. Vol. 11, pp. 283 and 
284 - pursuant to the modified bid contract. C.R. Vol. I, p. 34. 
12. On May 6, 2011, Plaintiff ... attempted to provide a substitute bid (in 
the form of a letter) as oppose to a sealed bid. As this letter was not a sealed bid, it 
could not be accepted. 
Objection: Holli submitted a nun pro tune modified bid, not a 
lettered bid. See C.R. Vol. I, p. 34. However, the sale was over. The property had 
been sold. The sealed bidding process was MOOT. This issue was directly discussed 
with the selling officer Lois Moisley on May 6, 2011 where Holli and 4 other persons 
appeared at Smith County Assessor's office to address the sale defect. Holli as well as 
the other 4 witnesses observed Lois Mosley directly discuss the listing defect with the 
Smith County Assessor Gary Barber. Lois Mosley instructed HOLLI to "resubmit 
another bid nun pro tune to a day before the bidding closed and bid the assessed 
value of the property only." C.R. Vol. I, p. 142 paragraph 14. Holli did resubmit 
another bid. See C.R. Vol. I, p. 34. 
13. Although Telford was the only bidder on the property, her bids were 
never accepted by Smith County. 
Objection: The only written notice that the cournty had not accepted 
Holli's bid or purchase of the property came from the July 6, 2011 affidavit of the County 
Assessor - well after Holli served the Assessor with the lawsuit. C. Supp. R. p. 125. Of 
interest is that 6 days, after the Assessor executed his perjured affidavit denying Holli 
owned the real property which had now been improved by more than $250,000, the 
property was allegedly redeemed by the former defaulted owners and Smith County 
Judge Joel Baker accepted the redemption. Smith County Judge Joel Baker was the 
statutory agent who recieved service of process of the underlying Idaho lawsuit on June 
4, 2011. (See C.R. Vol. I, pp. 103 - 104 for return of service), See exhibit "7" 
attached to the Addendum hereto for certified copy of this void Redemption Deed. On 
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October 3, 2011, Judge Dunn referred to this redemption deed in his Order when 
Judge Dunn found: "After Plaintiff had incurred substantial costs improving the 
land, Plaintiff was notified that the former owner had redeemed the property and 
that Smith County was revoking the sale." The Redemption Deed was attached to 
Holli's Affidavit filed into the record on August 1, 2011. The Deed has been purloined 
from the record by the District Court Clerk Diane Skidmore. Because Judge Dunn 
referred to this deed when it entered his October 3, 2011 decision, this Redemption 
Deed is properly before this court. This court should take judicial notice of who authored 
the void Redemption Deed; none other then the Defendants herein attorney Tab Beall 
under the rubric of his lawfirm, the Law Office of Purdue, Brandon, Felder, Collins & Mott. 
In footnote 9 of their response brief, APPELLEES conceal the execution of this 
Redemption Deed so that they can avoid liability for their participation in the criminal 
scheme to steal $250,000 + in monetary assets from Holli. 
14. Telford never paid for the property at issue. Telford cites C.R. 258-
259 of the record to support her contention that she paid a deposit on the property. The 
money transferred to Smith County ... was to purchase of a manufacture home citing 
C.R .p. 144, para. 18. 
Objection: Paragaraph 18 of the Telford Affidavit states : "I had 
placed a manufactured home on the property which I had purchased from Smith 
County." The reference is to purchasing the property from Smith County, not the 
manufactured home. Holli purchased the manufactured home sitting on the property 
from a dealer in Waco Texas. Attached as exhibit "8" is the purchase reciept and wire 
notice for the double wide manufactured home that is presently on the property. Williams 
is a reference to a former owner. As can be noted by the reciept, the manufactured home 
was purchased one year before Holli purchased the Smith County real property. 
15. Barber does not remember ever talking to Plaintiff during the periods 
outlined in Plaintiffs complaint. 
Objection: Plaintiff did not allege in her complaint that she ever 
talked to Barber. Rather Plaintiff attested in her affidavit that Barber instructed Lois 
Mosley, the selling agent, to instruct Holli to prepare a modified bid on the correct 
property sold to Holli. C.R. p. 142, Vol. I, paragraph 14. Which Holli did. C.R. Vol I, p. 
143, paragraph 15. 
16. No personal service of the summons was made on Barber. 
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Objection: As soon as Judge Dunn issued his order on July 18, 
2011 asserting that the complaints must be personally served under the Idaho Consumer 
Protection Act, instead of by certified mail, Holli sought to preserve this issue on appeal 
as to the defendants who made no appearance at all, and Holli caused each specially 
appearing defendant to be personally served. At C.R. , Vol II, pp 288-290, an Amended 
return for Personal Service on Defendant Gary Barber was filed. The Texas process 
server, Sarah Garner, attests under penalty of perjury that she personally served Gary 
Barber on September 14, 2011 @ 2:00 p.m at his place of work, the Summons and 
verified Complaint. C.R., Vol. 11, . 290. 
17. Smith County Count is a Political subdivision and has essentially no 
general contacts with the state of Idaho. 
Objection: Holli's personal jurisdiction claims against all 
defendants hereon are targeted under the "Specific jurisdicition" rule, not the general 
jurisdiction rule. Moreover, on page 14 of her Opening Brief Holli succinctly outlined 
why Smith County does not bear the cloak of a government entity when acting in a 
commercial capacity to execute contracts and sell property. Footnote 1 very clearly 
shows that the State of Texas withholds all government immunity from county entities in 
such situations as the case at bar. 
18. The facts regarding Beall and Purdue Brandon are similar, and show 
how inately rediculous it was to include them in this suit. These defendants . . . have 
essentially no general contacts with the state of Idaho. 
Objection: Holli's personal jurisdiction claims against Beall 
and Purdue Brandon are also targeted under the "Specific jurisdicition" rule, not the 
general jurisdiction rule. Attached as exhibit "7" to the ADDENDUM hereto is the 
certified copy of the redemption deed which Beall and Purdue Brandon authored no less 
than 45 days after they had been served with the summons and Complaint underlying 
action. They colluded with the county judge to strip plaintiff of more than $250,000 in 
portperty assets tied to the property, knowing full well that plaintiff was seeking specific 
performance on the sales contract, that plaintiff had improved the property, that the 
defaulted owners had by passed their redemption period, and that they were committing 
a crime through extortion under color of law by authoring and sustaining the execution of 
the void redemption deed in collusion with the County Judge Joel Baker. 
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19. The law offices of Purdue Brandon have not been properly served. 
Objection: As soon as Judge Dunn issued his order on July 18, 
2011 asserting that the complaints must be personally served under the Idaho Consumer 
Protection Act, instead of by certified mail, Holli sought to preserve this issue on appeal 
as to the defendants who made no appearance at all, and Holli caused each specially 
appearing defendant to be personally served. At C.R. , Vol II, pp 294-296, an Amended 
return for Personal Service on Defendant LAW OFFICES OF PURDUE BRANDON was 
filed. The Texas process server, Sarah Garner, attests under penalty of perjury that she 
personally served this law office on September 14, 2011 @ 2:00 p.m at 305 S. 
Broadway, Tyler TX 75701, by serving the the Summons and verified Complaint. upon 
the office manager Stephan Golden. C.R., Vol. 11, . 296. Plaintiff Holli followed up with a 
mailed copy of that service. Accordingly, this law office has been properly served under 
Idaho rule for personal service on a business entity who does not have a registered agent 
of service in the state of Idaho. 
OBECTION TO APPELLEES PROCEDURAL FACTS 
The Appellees claim that Telford did not file a motion to amend the Complaint 
until after final judgment. In an affidavit filed by Telford as C.R.,Vol.111, p.438, 
paragraphs 8-9. Telford attests that at the first hearing conducted by Judge Dunn on 
September 7, 2011, Telford tried to amend her complaint to add additional RICO 
allegations deriving from the criminal prosecution. Judge Dunn stated in open court that 
it would not hear Holli's new allegations irrespective that the case was only 3 months old. 
Judge Dunn also refused to allow Holli to amend her error in stating a Utah Fraudulent 
Communications claim instead of an Idaho RICO claim so Holli argued her Idaho RICO 
claim under IRCP rule 15(b) conforming her claims to the new evidence presented to the 
court. See Paragraph 10 and fn. 4., p. 438. Several times thereafter, Holli continued to 
ask the court orally to allow her to amend her complaint, and the court continued to reject 
Holli's pleas for amendment because he had no intention of sustaining jurisdiction over 
the action, irrespective that it may have existed. Holli filed a written motion as C.R. 
Vil.Ill, p. 458. APPELLEES implied assertions that Holli did not attempt to amend until 
after final judgment are and were therefore false. 
ARGUMENT 
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On page 17, paragraph 2 of their Response Brief the APPELLEES properly 
identify that Holli was seeking the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the Defendants 
"for acts giving rise to Telford's causes of action." This type of jurisdiction is referred to as 
specific jurisdiction. 
1. Five Of The Issues Raised In Appellant's Opening Brief 
Address Two Components Of The Idaho Long Arm 
Statute l.C. Section 5-514 And Therefore Holli Has Not 
Waived Any Issue Of Jurisdiction 
APPELLEES argue that Telford has waived her argument or Issues re personal 
jurisdiction under the Idaho long arm statute by virtue of her failure to site to the statute 
number, l.C. 5-514 (the Idaho Long Arm Statute) in her analysis. Response Brief@ p. 
13. This is an absurd argument as it would place form over substance in the 
pleading averments. 7 Five of Telford's Issues on appeal clearly address two 
components of the Idaho Long Arm Statute, ie the doing business clause and the tortious 
injury clause. 
HOLLI pleaded 8 issues on appeal : 
The first issue deals with the due process requirements under the long arm 
service statute of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act and requires this court to set forth a 
first impression rule as to whether Congress intended that the word "Notice" in the statute 
was intended to cover service of a Summons and Complaint by certified mail, or whether 
personal service had to be accomplished under this act to acquire in personam 
jurisdiction over the seller in violation of the act. 
The Second and Fourth Issues assert that the Defendants committed fraud, 
deception and false promise against an Idaho resident during a consumer transaction 
7. See Anderson v. Crapo, 589 P.2d 957; 99 Idaho 805 (ID. 1978) (Appellants 
Crapos argue at the outset that the trial court erred in not granting their motion to dismiss the writ 
of habeas corpus on the grounds that respondents Andersens failed to provide an answer to the 
return on the writ. They argue that without such an answer the return to the writ stands as the 
complaint and, since its allegations are deemed admitted, the writ must be dismissed. This 
argument exalts form over substance since it is standard procedure to treat the petition itself as 
the answer to the return when the petition fully serves to traverse the allegations of the return and 
when no further affirmative pleading appears necessary. Cole v. Cole, 68 Idaho 561, 573, 201 
P.2d 98, 106 (1948).). Followed in In re Weick, 127 P.3d 178, 142 Idaho 275 (Idaho 2005) 
(Attempting to place form over substance with regards to noticing requirements.). 
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dealing with real estate and that plaintiff was largely monetarily damaged and continues 
to be damaged in the state of Idaho. The Fourth Issue asks the court to direct turn over 
of the portable Deed to prevent further ongoing damages, or to create a constructive 
trust over the properties and determine the amount of Plaintiff's conversion damages. 
The Idaho long arm statute has a "tortious injury" clause which provides for jurisdiction 
over any person that injures an Idaho resident. 
The Third Issue deals with forming a contract in the state of Idaho for 
purposes of completing a business transaction.; clearly a prong under the doing business 
clause of the Idaho Long Arm Statute. 
The Fifth Issue asks this court to determine whether the personal 
jurisdiction statute for crimes applies to the Idaho RICO statute where one element of the 
crime is committed in Idaho and part of the injuries are felt by the Idaho resident within the 
state. 
Telford's Sixth, Seventh and Eighth issues deal with procedural due process 
questions and whether the trial court abused it's discretion in not allowing Telford to 
amend her complaint to plead attempted extortion through illicit use of the criminal 
process to defeat Plaintiff's civil claims and criminal conversion via extortion under color of 
law in blatantly stealing Holli's and other Idaho citizen's properties in violation of the Texas 
Property Tax codes. 
Accordingly, Holli did not waive any jurisdictional argument against the 
defendant. 
2. HOLLI STATED BOTH TRANSACTIONAL AND TORTIOUS 
INJURY DIRECTED AT AN IDAHO RESIDENT 
APPELLEES subsequently assert that "even assuming that Telford argued 
jurisdiction under Section 5-514, she still could not show an act which would invoke this 
section." APPELLEES correctly state that two prongs of the Idaho long arm statute apply, 
ie. the doing business clause and the tortious injury clause. 
APPELLEES argue that because Barber, Beall nor Purdue were the 
sellers of the property in question, Smith County was, that they cannot be held liable 
under the doing business clause of the Idaho Long Arm statute. 
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Telford did not argue that these persons were liable to her under the doing 
business clause. She expressly argued that they were liable to her under the tortious 
injury prong of the Idaho long arm statute. See Opening Brief pp 23-26. 
APPELLEES next argue that none of the defendants committed any tortious 
acts against Telford. Specifically, ''Telford can point to no action committed by Barber. 
Attached as exhibit "7" to the the Addendum attached hereto is the Redemption Deed 
that was gutted from the trial record and referred to in Judge Dunn's October 3, 2011 
Order. C.R. Vol. II, p. 304, reference to fn. 33. This Redemption Deed is crticial to the 
inquiry of whether the Defendants tortiously and criminal attempted to injure Telford and 
those situated with Telford. See Aff. Of Ferron Stokes C.R. Vol. Ill 446-447, and Aff. Of 
Mike Slicker, C.R. Vol. Ill, pp 444 - 445. 
In the Clerk's Supplemental Record, pp. 122-125 is the Affidavit of Gary 
Barber. C Supp R.., p.124. At paragraph 15, Barber admits that the first bid Telford 
submitted to Smith County@ $12,001.00 "was more than seventy-five per cent of the 
value of the taxes owed on the property." See C.Supp.R. p. 130 for Telford's original 
bid. Hence, the $4200 modified bid made by Telford pursuant to Lois Mosley's 
instructions, see C.R, Vol. I, p. 34, more than compensated Smith County for the back 
taxes owed on the property Holli purchased and would have given Smith County an 
additional $1200 in transaction funds. 
Paragraph 18 of Barber's affidavit states "Prior to Ms. Telford's bid being 
accepted, the property was redeemed pursuant to Texas Law." 
Texas law provides: Texas Property Tax Code: 
Sec. 34.21. Right of Redemption, provides: 
(f) If the owner of the real property makes an affidavit that the owner has 
made diligent search for the purchaser at resale, and has failed to find the 
purchaser, ... that the owner and the purchaser cannot agree on the amount 
of redemption money due, ... the owner may redeem the land by paying 
the "required amount" as prescribed by this section to the assessor-
collector for the county in which the property described has been 
redeemed. 
Accordingly, under Texas Law Barber is the person who received the 
redemption fees referred to in the Reemption Deed attached as exhibit "7" to the 
Addendum. Furthermore, according to Barber's own testimony, the redemption fees due 
on the property would have been no more than $3,000. ( If Telford's original bid was 
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$12,001, and Telford paid more than 75% over the amount of redemption taxes due on 
the property as attested to by Barber, than the actual redemption fee would have been 
$3,000.). 
It is admitted that no affidavit was ever filed with Barber to redeem the property 
as required under Sec.34.21 (f) and Barber's affidavit wholly omits reference to any such 
affidavit. C.R. p. 405. Furthermore, on May 6, 2011, Barber was aware that Telford 
construed herself as the purchaser of the property in question, because in 
evidence submitted by Barber himself, (ex. D attached to Barber Affidavit), C. R. 
Supp. 137, in the first paragraph, Telford asks for clerification on which property 
Telford purchased (emphasis added) at the tax sale. Also submitted by Barber was 
the internet advertisement on the Tax Sale. C.Supp. R., p. 133. Item number 197 shows 
the property in question. After listing the account no., this record shows that the property 
was deeded back to the County in cause no. 22, 107-C. The Deed was recorded with the 
Texas court on September 10, 2010. O.B. p. 17. This record also shows that the first 
sale on that property took place on November 2, 2010 and the property was not sold, but 
rather struck back to Smith county. Hence the March 1, 2011 sale where Telford placed 
a deposit on the transaction (refer back to C.R. Vo. 11, p.283), was a resale. 
In C.R. Vol. I, p. 140, paragraph 10, Telford talks about the faxed letter Mosley 
executed and delivered to Telford as referenced in C.R., Vol. I, p. 141, paragraph 11. 
(Exhibit "5" in the July 18, 2011 Telford Affidavit was the letter by Lois Mosley. This letter 
was gutted from the clerk's record and is exhibit "6'' to the Addendum attached hereto.). 
In paragraph 10 of Telford's affidavit (C.R. p. 140), Telford attests that both the Smith 
County sales officer Lois Mosley and Telford concurred that Texas Tax Code section 
34.05 controlled the resale of the property: The relevant section read as follows: 
The acceptance of a bid by an officer conducting the sale is conclusive 
and binding. On conclusion of the sale, the officer making the sale 
shall file and record each deed under this subsection and after 
recording shall return the deed to the grantee. 
Accordingly, since the subject sale was a resale of the struck off property, 
and since the sale admittedly concluded on March 31, 2011, (see Aft. Of Kim Vogt 
C.R. Vol. , pp. 134-135, paragraph 4, whom testified that she appeared at the Smith 
County Tax office at the close of the sale on March 31, 2011 and heard Lois Mosley 
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announce Telford as the winning bidder), then Smith County taxing sales officer 
Lois Mosley had no option but to file and record a deed in Telford's favor. Contrary 
to Barber's Affidavit, under Texas law Telford's bid was accepted at the 
conclusion of the sale on March 31, 2011. These laws and arguments are made in 
the opening brief at pp. 15 - 20. 
According to the foregoing, Barber had no right under Texas Law to reject 
Telford's bid more than 2 months after the sale had concluded on March 31, 2011 and 
Telford was publicly announced as the winner. 
In addition, when Barber accepted redemption fees from Paul Kelley Jr., 
Barber violated Texas law. As aforesaid, Texas Property Tax code Sec. 34.21. Right 
of Redemption requires the filing of an affidavit : 
(f) If the owner of the real property makes an affidavit that the owner 
has made diligent search for the purchaser at resale, and has failed to 
find the purchaser, that the purchaser ... that the owner and the 
purchaser cannot agree on the amount of redemption money due, ... 
the owner may redeem the land by paying the required amount as 
prescribed by this section to the assessor-collector. 
It is uncontested that the owners had already been served with Telford's 
Idaho lawsuit some 33 days before they allegedly submitted redemption fees to Barber on 
July 6, 2011. (See C.R. Vol. I, pp 63-73, with attention to verification for certified receipt 
tracking confirmation. C.R. Vol. I, p. 71.). Hence, the redeemed owner knew full well 
where to contact Telford in any attempt to redeem the significantly improved property. (It 
should also be noted that both before and after the double wide manufactured home was 
placed on the texas property, the defaulted owners came onto the property inquiring into 
Telford's improvements and Telford informed the defaulted owners that she had 
purchased the property at a tax sale several months earlier and now owned the property.). 
In spite of having actual notice of how to contact Telford, the defaulted owners 
never contacted Telford to discuss redemption fees, a necessary condition to the 
required Affidavit. Furthermore the Affidavit is jurisdictional and in it's absence, no 
redemption can take place. Hence Barber's failure in his affidavit to refer to the defaulted 
owner's affidavit, is fatal to Smith County's entire defense that the property had been 
redeemed. The redemption therefore was void ab initio. 
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In addition, the Deed to the county was first filed of record on September 10, 
2010. On Pages 17-18 of Telford's Opening Brief, Telford details at length that the 
owner had no right to redeem the Texas property because he had not performed all 
required redemption acts within 180 days of September 10, 2010, which would have 
been March 9, 2011, while the property could still be withdrawn from the resale. The 
deed attached as exhibit "7" to the Addendum hereto is dated July 12, 2011, more than 4 
months after the redemption period had passed under Texas law. Accordingly, aside 
from failing to obtain and file the jurisdictional affidavit, no redemption rights were 
accorded the owner as a matter of Texas law. 
Barber played a pivotal role in stealing more than $250,000 in residential 
assets from Telford and the redemption Deed attached as exhibit "7" to the Addnedumis 
critical to proving all Defendant's fraud. Without Barber receiving the redemption fees, 
no property Redemption could have been executed. Furthermore, the county benefited 
monetarily from the transaction. As attested to by Barber in his affidavit filed in the Idaho 
Court on July 6, 2011, C. Supp. R., p. 124, paragraph 15, the back taxes owed on the 
property were $3,000 (% of the bid amount Holli initially offered). All Kelly would have 
been required to pay to redeem the property would be the back taxes of $3,000. The 
Redemption Deed attached hereto shows that Kelley paid $12,608.36 to get the property 
back. This means that the County charged Kelly an additional $9,600+ over an above 
the redemption fees. What the County in fact did was revoke the sale from Telford and 
resell the property to the defaulted owner. 
Barber's affidavit filed in the Idaho district court asserting that the property was 
validly redeemed under Texas law, was therefore perjured and constituted theft by 
extortion under Idaho law. Since Barbers' fraudulent extortion actions occurred within 
the 4 corners of the state of Idaho and for purposes of obstructing justice in an Idaho 
lawsuit, this court has personal jurisdiction over Barber and his employer Smith County 
under the servant - master theory. Moreover, the fact that APPELLEES induced Judge 
Dunn to dismiss the Idaho action WITH PREJUDICE under a jurisdictional theory, shows 
that the Smith County defendants corruptly intended to bar Telford from ever raising her 
theft, extortion and conversion claims against the Smith County defendants in any 
subsequent forum under the doctrine of res judicata. 
As to Defendants Beall and Purdue Brandon, these Defendants authored the 
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void Redemption Deed - knowing that they were engaging in a criminal conspiracy to 
steal properties from Telford and other Idaho residents so invested. A reference to the 
Redemption Deed at exhibit "7' attached to the Addendum, shows that it was authored 
by Purdue Brandon and forwarded back in the mails to the office that Beal controls in 
Tyler Texas. It is Telford's contention that Beall orchestrated the criminal scheme to steal 
the properties from Telford and others, joined the County Judge Joel Baker in his scheme 
to give it "judicial credibility" and then colluded with the Oneida County District Court 
clerk Diane Skidmore to "gut" this record from the file. Refer back to the October 9, 
2012 hearing transcript attached as exhibit "1" to the Addendum hereto showing Telford 
complaining again about the gutting of records from Telford's court files. 
It is also Telford's contention, that counsel for Appellees and the Texas 
attorneys and lawfirm, colluded with the Oneida County prosecutor to illegally search and 
seize Holli's Idaho home on August 10, 2011, for the purpose of stealing and destroying 
Holli's original paper and electronic evidence in the Smith County and Oneida County 
cases - Holli had pending. See C.R. Vol. II, pp. 220 - 256 for Holli's Mandamus Writ 
to Judge Dunn to order the Sheriff's office to return Holli's files, records and evidence for 
her case against Smith County; a petition which Judge Dunn Rejected. 
In addition, because APPELLEES counsel engaged in collusion to conceal the 
deed attached hereto, and because counsel has withheld the existence of this 
Redemption Deed from this court in APPELLEES response brief, this court should 
sanction counsel as well as Appellees for committing a fraud upon this court and 
automatically grant Telford default sanctions. This Court should also direct Telford to 
submit an affidavit of monetary damages she has suffered as a result of the Defendants 
criminal conduct. 
3. UNDER TEXAS LAW, SMITH COUNTY IS CONSIDERED A 
PERSON PERFORMING PRIVATE COMMERCE FUNCTIONS. 
SMITH COUNTY DID CONDUCT A BUSINESS TRANSACTION 
WITH AN IDAHO RESIDENT IN WHICH SMITH COUNTY 
REALIZED A PROFIT THUS SUBJECTING SMITH COUNTY 
TO THE JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT UNDER 5-514 
APPELEES argue that Smith County is not liable to plaintiff because they are 
a government entity who is not subject to the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. 
In Opposition, Telford asserts that Smith County's government status is not 
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relevant because Smith County was engaged in performing private commercial functions 
and therefore is liable as a private party would be. Addressing Smith County's liability 
would be be a first impression question for this court. 
Nevertheless, Smith County next argues that if Smith County is liable, they 
conducted no business transaction in Idaho. Smith County asserts that the bid process 
was still ongoing when Telford appeared at the County Assessor's office on May 6, 2011 
to raise issue as to which property Telford had purchased. 
As Aforesaid, the bidding process had been closed almost 5 weeks by the 
time Holli appeared that the Assessor's 
office. Furthermore, the Assessor Barber's own evidence indicates that Telford 
appeared as an established purchaser - inquiring into which property she had actually 
purchased. (See ex. D attached to Barber Affidavit), C. R. Supp. 137, in the first 
paragraph, Telford asks for clerification on which property Telford purchased 
(emphasis added) at the tax sale. 
Smith County further asserts that Barber rejected Telford's bid. Telford 
adopts in whole here entire argument against Barbar's claims supra, p 15-19, as if fully 
set forth herein - because Barber was acting as the chief employee of the county at the 
time he acted and clearly established a practice to violate Telford on the County's behalf. 
Holli also asserts that the gravamen of the injury by Smith county occurred 
after Holli sued Smith County and served Smith County Judge Joel Baker with Smith 
County's Process. The record shows that a conspiracy then developed to assert that the 
property was a residential property because Telford had placed a double wide 
manufactured home on the property and made it into a residence. Opening Brief, pp. 21 
- 26. However under the Texas Tax Code Section 34.21, Paul Kelley Jr. the heir of 
Paul Kelly Sr, the latter deceased for more then 12 years, could not claim a residential 
exemption to the property because there must have been a competent residence 
structure on the property which was used as a full time residence at the time the property 
was foreclosed to Smith County on September 10, 2010, not after Telford developed the 
property into a residence. See Opening Brief at pp. 20, fn. 5 and 22 fn. 8. 
Furthermore according to the court records, even the record produced by the 
assessor himself, C Supp. R., p. 128, the property was owned by the Smith County 
Trustee, whom is the party Telford served in the lawsuit (See C.R. Vol. I, pp 103 -106, 
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and note that the summons named "Smith County Trustee" as defendant.). The smith 
County Trustee appeared in this action as Smith County, not the school districts. See 
C.Supp.R. p. 60 showing special appearance under the name SMITH COUNTY, not the 
school districts. Moreover, at no time while this case proceeded before the district 
court did SMITH COUNTY argue that the school districts were the true parties in interest,' 
therefore this court must strike SMITH COUNTY's argument that they are not the true 
party in interest in the case proceeding before this court. 
Smith County then argues that Telford cannot show that Smith County realized 
a profit from the transaction and therefore no business was conducted. Telford adopts her 
argument supra that : 
. . . the county benefited monetarily from the transaction. As attested to by 
Barber in his affidavit filed in the Idaho Court on July 6, 2011, C. Supp. R., p. 
124, paragraph 15, Telford's (initial) bid was more than seventy-five per cent of 
the value of the taxes owed on the property. Telford's initial bid was $12,001. 
C.Supp. R., p. 130. Therefore the back taxes owed on the property were 
$3,000. All Kelly would have been required to pay to redeem the property 
would be the back taxes of $3,000. The Redemption Deed attached as exhibit 
"7"to theAddendum shows that Kelley paid $12,608.36 to get the property 
back. This means that the County charged Kelly an additional $9,600+ to 
make money on the transaction to Telford's injury .. 
The County therefore earned a windfall of $9,600. on the transaction after Paul 
Kelly Jr. paid the true redemption fees (back tax fees of $3,000.). Accordingly, Smith 
County did conduct business in Idaho and did profit from the transaction. See In 
McGee v. lntern'I Life Insurance Co., 355 US 220, 222- 223 (1957) : The US Supreme 
Court held that entering into a single contract with a forum resident subjected the 
defendants to the plaintiff's forum even though no property belonged to the insurance 
company in California, no other policies were issued in California and the insurance 
company had no offices or agents in California.). 
4. APPELLEES COMMITTED TORTIOUS INJURY IN THE 
STATE OF IDAHO AND WHICH THEY DIRECTED AT 
AN IDAHO CITIZEN 
APPELLEES admit that BLIMKA, 143 Idaho at 725, 152 P3 at 596 affirmed 
that internet advertisements that reached the forum were sufficient to sustain jurisdiction 
arising from conduct pertaining to that advertisement. Response Brief@ 18. But 
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APPELLEES assert that Blimka does not apply because Telford viewed the advertisement 
in Texas, dispatched to Texas to inspect the property (impliedly before the sale), bid on 
the property from Texas, and then went to Texas to take possession of the property. 
Response Brief @ 18, para. 3. THERE JS ABOSLUTEL Y NO EVIDENCE IN THE 
RECORD TO ESTABLISH ANY OF APPELLEES CONTENTIONS. 
Appellees cite to the affidavit of Greer for the contention that Telford found the 
advertisement concerning the property in Texas. The affidavit of Greer says no such 
thing. Greer testified that Holli was interested in bidding on Texas tax properties and in 
pursuit of that interest, filled out a preliminary statement while in Texas on a unrelated 
matter on February 8, 2011. The property had not even been posted for sale on the 
internet until March 1, 2011, at which time Telford immediately dispatched to her bank to 
wire the deposit funds. See C.R. Vol. II, p 283 for wire verification. Also note that the 
bank letter indicates that the deposit funds were in drawn from the loan proceeds 
identified in Telford's letter of credit which was produced as evidence by Barber in his 
affidavit at C.Supp.R. 132. So Telford could not have found the advertisement on the 
property while in Texas on an unrelated matter in early February of 2011. Rather Telford 
was at her home in Idaho when she viewed the advertisement, prepared and executed 
the bid contracts and then sent them to Texas. Moreover, on page 16 of Appellees 
Response Brief, paragraph 2, Appellees ADMIT that Telford "filled out the paper 
documents, and sent the documents to Texas." Hence, Appellees are bate and 
switching their own argument to obstruct this appeal. 
Telford admits that she did bid on the property but the deed was illegally 
withheld from Telford in violation of Texas Tax Code section 34.05 controlled the 
resale of the property: The relevant section read as follows: 
The acceptance of a bid by an officer conducting the sale is conclusive 
and binding. On conclusion of the sale, the officer making the sale 
shall file and record each deed under this subsection and after 
recording shall return the deed to the grantee. 
Hence the reason Telford sued Smith County for specific performance to turn 
over the deed. Smith County in the interim induced Telford to improve the property to 
the tune of $250,000. See C.R., Vol. I, p. 141, paragraph 11 and exhibit "6'' attached to 
the Addendum to the reply brief for Lois Mosley's letter. 
Finally, Telford possessed the property when she became owner of the 
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property. 8 When Telford dispatched to the property in May of 2011, it was to improve her 
property - not possess it. 
Appellees cite to Acichika as the relevant jurisdictional case and which 
describes the seller's connections with the forum state as only incidental. Acichika is 
not similar to the case at bar. 
First, the buyer in Acichika did not attach his Idaho properties as 
security for the various loans Telford obtained to improve the Texas 
property for purposes of resale. C.R. Vol. Ill, p.406, para.9. 
Second, an Idaho lender executed an $85,000 mortgage on the double wide 
manufactured home and has converted that mortgage to a reverse mortgage with 
increasing principle, interest and penalties. See Aft. Stokes, C.R.,Vol. Ill, pp. 446-447, 
para(s) 2-5. A lien has now been placed against Telford's Idaho home to pay for these 
security interests owned by Stokes and because the defendants have not stolen and 
confiscated Telford's Texas properties on the reported basis that Smith County beat 
Telford in the Idaho Litigation. See Aft. Slicker, C.R. Vol. Ill, pp 444-445. 
Third, Telford expended additional savings from her local bank to excavate 
the property for the placement of a double wide manufactured home, C.R. Vol. I, pp 107 
-110; Telford paid a deposit on the property, C.R. Vol. II, p. 283. 
Fourth, Telford extended additional loan fees of $18,000.00 for infra 
structure work on the property. C. Supp. R. p. 132. 
Fifth, Telford purchased a double wide manufactured home one year earlier 
and which required a down payment of $65,000 to pay the difference between the 
mortgage and the sale. See exhibit "8" attached to Addendum for the purchase receipt 
and wire transmittal notice on the double wide manufactured home that is presently on the 
property. 
All loans have defaulted as a result of theft of the properties as identified 
by the Slicker Affidavit, C.R. Vol. Ill, pp. 444 - 445, and as a result thereof, plaintiff's 
Idaho home has been attached as security to pay off the loans carrying an approximate 
principal balance of $235,000 to date. 
8. Constructive possession is a legal theory used to extend possession to situations 
where a person has no hands-on custody of the object. Most courts say that constructive 
possession, also sometimes called "possession in law," exists where a person has knowledge of 
the object plus the ability to control or use the object, even if the person has no physical 
contact with it. United States v. Derose, 74 F.3d 1177 [11th Cir. 1996]). 
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Yes indeed, the facts in the Akichika case are not even remotely similar to 
the instant case. Therefore, given all defendants had a hand in the tortious injury inflicted 
upon Telford, they are all liable to Telford under the Idaho Long Arm Statute. Appellees 
have wholly omitted these injuries from their Response brief. 
Additionally, the Appellees have analyzed their phone contacts to the Idaho 
forum to the Akichika case rather than the Blimka case. Telford maintains that Blimka 
controls. Appellees stole Telford's phone devices out of her home during the seizure on 
August 10, 2011 and never returned them. See copies of some phone records filed in the 
case before the seizure as C.R. Vol. I, p. 149. Furthermore, when Appellants computers 
were finally returned, Onieda county had blocked Telford's navigation abilities and gutted 
Appellants hard drives of it's memory. See C.R. Vol. II, p 214-215. Telford sought a writ 
from judge Dunn but this was rejected as aforesaid. See C.R. p. 220. Nevertheless, the 
only communication that took place in Texas is when Telford appeared in Texas more than 
33 days after she had purchased the property, to inquire into which property she had 
purchased. Otherwise all phone calls were directed to Telford at her Idaho residence. 
See Taylor v. Phelan, 912 F.2d 429, 433 n.4 (10th Cir. 1990) ("So long as it creates a 
substantial connection, even a single telephone call into the forum state can support 
jurisdiction."); 
With respect to the use of a passive or active website which Appellees 
argue on pages 20-21 of their brief, Telford moves to strike this argument because the 
Appellees did not raise this argument in the lower court. Judge Dunn while acting as an 
advocate for appellees improperly raised this defense. Nevertheless, the website was 
active because all the materials to draw down and expedite the sale were posted on 
Smith County's website as in Blimka. "A website is not passive where it provides a 
means to purchase goods or products or services." See Holland America Line Inc. v. 
Wartsila North America, Inc., 485 F.3d 450 (9th Cir. 2007) CompuServe, Inc. v. 
Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996) (posting information over the internet for 
purpose of selling products is not a passive website and meets the express aiming 
requirement to impose jurisdiction where the sales have an impact.). In the instant 
case, smith county's website was fully active, all one had to do is draw down their self 
authored contracts, provide the consideration for the bid which included deposits and /or 
letters of credit, and send the bid in. Accordingly, Smith County's website was interactive 
and promoted their sales nationally. 
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5. APPELLEES HAVE FAILED TO COMPETENTLY ADDRESS 
AND JURISDICTIONAL ARGUMENT RE TELFORD'S RICO 
CLAIMS OR CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT CLAIMS 
Appellees have not addressed any of Telford's jurisdictional arguments under 
Telford's Idaho RICO Act or the Consumer Protection Act, other than to say the Telford 
cannot prosecute a crime. However the RICO act may be enforced by private parties 
acting as attorney generals as decisioned by the US Supreme Court in Rotella v. Wood, 
528 U.S.549 (2000). Nevertheless, the Appellees have conceded to this court addressing 
Telford's Issues nos. 1,2,5 and 8 as first impression questions. 
6. EXERCISING JURISDICTION OVER APPELLEES WOULD 
NOT VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE 
APPELLEES deny that Telford made any argument going to the due process 
prong of exercising jurisdiction in the state of Idaho in Telford's Opening Brief. This is 
again a misrepresentation. See pp. 33 -42 of Telford's Opening Brief talking about the 
scope of due process contacts with the forum state under CPA; under contracts; under 
loans; under equity claims such as specific performance and /or constructive trusts; and 
under the criminal personal jurisdiction statute as applied to a RICO claim 
APPELLEES then attempt to limit their contacts by stating that Telford traveled 
to Texas to research the property and to submit a bid. Response Brief @ 24. These 
facts are patently false. Telford did not travel to Texas to research the property. The 
record shows that Telford had already purchased the property by the time she 
traveled to Texas to improve the property 35 days later after the sale terminated. 
The County Assessor admitted this fact in his own evidentiary submissions made to the 
Idaho Court approximately 33 days after Barber had been sued. Furthermore, As 
admitted in Appellees own Response Brief, Telford submitted the bid from the state of 
Idaho. See Response Brief. p. 16 paragraph 2. 
The Due process analysis depends on the type of contacts with the forum. See 
Yahoo Inc v. La Ligue Contre Lw Raciseme Et L'Antisenitiseme, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th 
Cir. 2006) (We treat "purposeful availment" somewhat differently when addressing tort 
and contract claims.. In tort claims, we inquire whether a defendant "purposefully 
direct[s] his activities" at the forum state, applying an "effects test" that focuses on the 
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forum in which the defendant's actions were felt, whether or not the actions themselves 
occurred within the forum. See Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 803 (citing Calder v. 
Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984)). By contrast, in contract claims, we inquire whether 
a defendant "consummate[s] [a] transaction" in the forum, focusing on activities such as 
delivering goods to or executing a contract in the forum state. Both anaylsis' must be 
conducted to determine if one or the other will sustain jurisdiction 
In terms of the effects tests, numerous courts have held that where the 
plaintiff becomes subject to an obligation as a result of a transaction, that jurisdiction is 
proper in the forum where the obligation is situated. Loan obligations created in the 
forum state to fund contracts creates contacts in the forum state where the payments 
on the loans are expected to generate. Rynone Mfg. Corp. v. Republic Indus., Inc., 96 
S.W.3d @ 640, (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002.) ("Calling a Texas resident in Texas to solicit 
a loan is a purposeful contact with Texas under a contracts anaylsis.) See also Pro 
Axess Inc. v. Orlux Distribution Inc., Nos. 03-4179, 03-4189 (10th Cir. 2005 ) 
( Exercising personal jurisdiction where a contract that was presented through the 
internet by a French defendant was signed in Utah and committed Plaintiff to 
monetary obligations in Utah in perfomance on the contract.); Vreeken v. 
Lockwood Engineering, BV 218 P.3d 1150, 148 Idaho 89 (Idaho 2009) (loans 
obtained locally for business purposes result in contact with forum.) same Hsu v. Liu, 
Case no.07-1046 (Texas Supreme Court 2007). 
Also see fraud claims in general. See Gates v. Collier, 378 F.2d 888 (9th 
Cir. 1967) (With respect to that portion of Collier's claim which is based on fraud, § 377 
of the Restatement recites that " When a person sustains loss by fraud, the place of 
wrong is where the loss is sustained, not where fraudulent representations are made."); 
United States v. Pascucci, 943 F.2d 1032, 1035 (9th Cir. 1991) (Jurisdiction lies where the 
plaintiff's assets are depleted through the wrongs commited by the defendant); Sinatra 
v. Nat'I Enquirer, Inc., 854 F.2d 1191, 1195 ( 9th Cir. 1988 ) (exercising personal 
jurisdiction over a Swiss Clinic that misappropriated Frank Sinatra's name through a 
series of advertisements claiming recommendation by high profile California resident.); 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Neaves, 912 F.2d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 1990) (fraudulent letter 
sent to plaintiff in forum state was express aiming. Also see Calder v. Jones, 465 US 
783, 789-90 (1984) (We take this opportunity to clarify our law and to state that the "brunt" 
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of the harm need not be suffered in the forum state. If a jurisdictionally sufficient 
amount of harm is suffered in the forum state it does not matter that even more 
harm might have been suffered in another state. ). Also see Blimka v. My Web 
Wholesaler LLC, 152 P.3d 594, 143 Idaho 723 (Idaho 2008) (Blimka argues that the 
district court properly exercised personal jurisdiction over the defendants with respect to 
the fraud claim pursuant to Idaho Code§ 5-514(b), and with respect to the contract claims 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-514(a). Since we conclude that jurisdiction existed on the 
fraud claim, both with respect to My Web and DePalma, and because the fraud claim 
supports all relief granted in the judgment, we need not address the issue of jurisdiction 
over the contract claims. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984) 
and Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984). In this case, the allegedly 
fraudulent representations were directed at an Idaho resident and the injury 
occurred in this state when Blimka departed with funds as a result of the fraud. 
Plaintiff paid large sums of money for defective goods that were mispresented to 
Blimka. Thus, we hold that Blimka's allegation of fraud was sufficient to invoke 
the tortious acts language of Idaho Code § 5-514(b) with respect to both 
defendants. Morover, because the defendants purposefully directed their allegedly 
false representations into Idaho and the plaintiff suffered a pecuniary loss as a result of 
these false representations, the exercise of personal jurisdiction is presumed not to 
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice under the Due Process 
Clause. See, e.g., Brainerd v. Governors of the Univ. of Alberta, 873 F.2d 1257, 1260 (9th 
Cir. 1989). Idaho has an ever-increasing interest in protecting its residents from 
fraud committed on them from afar by electronic means.). Citing Calder et al v. 
Jones, 104 S. Ct. 1482, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) ("the fact that the actions causing the 
effects in California were performed outside the State did not prevent the State from 
asserting jurisdiction over a cause of action arising out of those effects .. .the brunt of the 
harm was suffered or is being suffered in the forum state,. .. thereby invoking jurisdiction 
in the forum where the "effects" of the out of state conduct is felt." World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-298 (1980); Restatement (Second) of 
Conflict of Laws§ 37 (1971). 
Based on the damages alone which now place Telford's Idaho home at risk for 
foreclosure, there is no doubt that Idaho is the forum where Plaintiffs claims should be 
properly heard. 
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7. THERE EXISTS LACK OF CLERITY IN IDAHO RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 4(i) 
See State v. Yzaguirre, 163 P.3d 1183, 144 Idaho 471 (Idaho 05/25/2007) 
(In determining its ordinary meaning "effect must be given to all the words of the statute if 
possible, so that no word will be rendered void, superfluous, or redundant." State v. 
Mercer, 143 Idaho 108, 109, 138 P.3d 308, 309 (2006) (quoting In re Winton Lumber 
Company, 57 Idaho 131, 136, 63 P.2d 664, 666 (1936)). 
At pages 4-6 of plaintiff's amended opposition, plaintiff made the following 
argument citing Rhino Metals, Inc. v. Craft, 193 P.3d 866, 146 Idaho 319 (Idaho 
0912412008 ) : "If a party wishes to insist upon the objection that he is not in court, 
he must keep out for all purposes except to make that objection. Pingree Cattle Loan 
Co. v. Charles J. Webb & Co 36 Idaho 442,446,211 P. 556, 557 (1922) (quoting from 
Lowe v. Stringham, 14 Wis. 222, 225 (1861). Rule 4 (i) provides in part that "If, after a 
motion under Rule 12(b)(2), (4), or (5) is denied, the party pleads further and defends the 
action, such further appearance and defense of the action will not constitute a voluntary 
appearance under this rule. Here, the defendants would not be pleading further in the 
action because they merged their rule 12(b)(6) petitions with their rule 12(b)(2),(4) and (5) 
petitions and argued all petitions on their merits in the first instance. 
The defendants assert that another provision of rule 4(i) permits them to merge 
all defenses in one motion and thereby not make a general appearance. 
The issue presented is whether this merger of motions is a grant to argue all of 
the defenses on their merits at once in the jurisdictional motion, or merely a grant to 
preserve the other defenses. Plaintiff contends that it is mere grant to preserve other 
defenses otherwise the defendants would render superfluous the other provision under 
rule 4(i) , to wit: 
"If, after a motion under Rule 12(b)(2), (4), or (5) is denied, the party pleads 
further and defends the action, such further appearance and defense of the 
action will not constitute a voluntary appearance under this rule. 
Judge Dunn did not address this conflict in the rule in his October 3, 2011 
Decision. This Conflict therefore should be settled by this court. 
8. APPELLEES ARE NO ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS FEES 
BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT NEVER REACHED THE 
THE MERITS OF THE CLAIMS AND BECAUSE TELFORD 
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a 
HAS PRESENTED A NUMBER OF FIRST IMPRESSION 
QUESTIONS 
a case where no final judgment was entered on the merits of the claims 
thus leaving plaintiff free to pursue her claims in another forum did not warrant attorneys 
fees. Puckett, 158 P.3d at 941, 946. See also Rohr v. Rohr, 800 P.3d 94, 99 (Idaho 
1 
was clear error 
no. 7 in Telford's 
Telford's claims, no ,.,.,..,,, .......... '""' 
this court that 
no than 4 
Noreen v. Price Development Co. Limited Partnership, 135 Idaho 816, 25P.3d 
129 (Idaho App. 2001), the Noreen Court denied Attorney Fees under l.C. § 12-121 
and l.R.C.P. rule 54(e)(1) on direct trial of the case and on appeal on the grounds that 
when a party presents a question of first impression for decision to a court, such 
proceeding cannot be construed as frivolous. Here, Noreen presented a first impression 
question as to the ramifications of a violation of the Assumed Business Names Act. 
Last but not least, itis the defendants/Appellees who have committed a 
maassive fraud upon this court using the Idaho courts to commit this fraud. It is the 
Appellees who should be sanctioned in this action by entry of a default judgment in 
Telford's favor. Telford requests that this be done. 
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TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING DATED OCTOBER 9, 2012 
JUDGE DlJ~"'N : Rumor has essentially taken ... she hasn't really officially quit her position 
yet But, her arrangement with the Idaho Supreme Court is that she only 
works on Monday mornings until next week and then I'll have a new full 
time court reporter, next week. But I do not have a full time court reporter, 
I do not have the option of bringing in another court reporter today, and as 
a result of that and by order I'm directing that this hearing proceed without 
official court reporting, but it is being electronically recorded for future 
possibility of a transcript if needed. So I'm just advising the parties of that 
fact under the administrative rules. I am entering that order today. Any 
objection either one of you wish to make on the record relative that issue. 
Ms Telford. 
MS. TELFORD : No 
JUDGE Du~'N : Mr. Adams. 
MR. ADAMS : No your honor. 
JUDGE Du~N : Alright . So, what we have. Um the Plaintiff, Ms. Telford has filed certain 
objections indicating that she wishes the record in this case to be added too 
Under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, the Defendants have also 
filed an objection to the clerk's record asking that certain things be 
included and thatother things be deleted. They filed that motion July 19th . 
The Plaintiff filed heres on July 251h. And then on August 6, 2012, the 
Plaintiff filed an objection to the Defendant's Objection. That is, that part 
of the Defendant's motion seeking to have certain things excluded from 
the record. Now, I'm just going to tell you what I think at the outset, and 
then you can, and then I'll let you make whatever additional argument you 
want. My initial thoughts after reviewing all of the motions from both 
sides is that, I really don't know what arguments are going to be presented 
to the Supreme Court. Do I think all of these records are really relevant to 
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the issues on appeal? Probably not. Uh. I think it's unlikely. But one 
thing I do know is that the Supreme Court has a lot more help than me and 
they got a lot more clerks and people working for them, and they're going 
to be able to sort this out. I'm not worried about confusion of the record. 
They're going to be able to sort out what's relevant and what isn't relevant 
to the issues that ultimately they decide on. An uh, so I'm not really 
worried about that. My inclination, just out of an abundance of caution, 
is just to let both of your have in the record whatever you want. That's my 
inclination. Having said that, so you know what my previous position is. 
I want to say that I have already made up my mind for sure, but I'm going 
to let both of you argue if you wish. But thats my inclination already, so 
that you don't get up there and want to argue something from the record 
that isn't in the record. And the Supreme Court's going to decide if what 
you want to argue is relevant or not . I think a lot of it might be irrelevant 
when it comes down to the final analysis. But that's my inclination. So 
having said that, Ms. Telford your the plaintiff, you filed a motion as 
well, you go ahead make whatever argument you wish. 
MS. TELFORD : Yea. I brought the record that Diane sent me in the mail. And I flagged 
one particular record which does not have the exhibits that were on the 
original record. I brought my computer today, so that you could see that 
I saved it as a pdf file on my computer. And I wanted to bring it up to 
the court and open it up ... the properties on the pdf file on my 
computer indicate that this document was emailed too Diane and 
opposing counsel, because I save the gmail to counsel as well. In 
October ... 
JUDGE DUNN: October 2012? 
MS TELFORD: 2011, 
JUDGE DUN"'N: October 2011 okay, 
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MS. TELFORD: It was re-emailed because one of the charges in the criminal case was 
that I had forged Diane's notary to this document. So I redid the 
document and re-emailed it to both counsel and Diane. And the 
document that she has submitted to me in the clerk's record has a 
number of exhibits, critical exhibits missing from the document 
that was emailed to her. 
JUDGE DUl\'N : Okay. 
MS TELFORD : So I want to, if the court wants to see that, I'll bring my computer 
up to the court . .. 
JUDGE DlJ~1N : I'm not going to look at your emails. The question I have for you is that 
despite what that records shows that you have in front of you, my 
question is ... did you review the original clerk's file to determine 
whether or not the document you claim the you submitted by email, 
contains all of the exhibits that you think have not been included. 
MS. TELFORD: No. But I did discuss with Diane a document, the July Document 
which exhibit "?"attached to that document was a bunch of 
photographs. And we had discussed that last year. This document is 
the one I am referring to that was dated in July, so I know it had these 
other exhibits attached to it and her record on appeal does not have 
those exhibits in it. 
JUDGE DUNN : And what particular exhibits are you talking about that you think 
have not been included and what was the date of the filing? 
MS. TELFORD : Well the original filing was the July l 81h declaration. 
JUDGE DUNN: Of what year? 
MS. TELFORD : 2011. 
JUDGE DlJ1'.1N : Okay. 
MS. TELFORD : And it had 17 exhibits attached to it. The seventh exhibit attached to 
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MS. TELFORD : And it had 17 exhibits attached to it. The seventh exhibit attached to 
it was a bunch of photographs of damages. 
filDGE DUNN : Well let me just ask this question. 
MS. TELFORD : I'm not so much concerned with that particular exhibit, but 
exhibits ... the last exhibit she put into the record is exhibit 3 that 
is attached to that declaration. And it had 17 exhibits. Exhibits 4, 
5, 6, which are on my computer pdf document as being sent to 
both counsel Adams and Diane ... 
filDGE DlJN'N : What was the date again? 
MS. TELFORD: It's the July 18th declaration. 
filDGE DlJN1N : July 18th ... (looking through the court file) 
MS. TELFORD : It was signed on July 18th , but I don't know what date it was 
recorded. Let me see what date she has on the . . . stamped date 
she has on the document. August 1st is the stamped date she has on 
the document in the clerk's record that was provided to me. I 
actually considered emailing this document to Diane again so that 
she could have it on her email. .. 
filDGE DUN1N: So it's not an affidavit of Holli Telford ... 
MS. TELFORD : It is an Affidavit of Holli Telford ... 
filDGE DUNN : in Opposition to Smith County's Motion To Dismiss And Motion 
For Summary Judgment . .. 
MS TELFORD : Hold on. It's an Affidavit of Holli Telford In Opposition to 
Defendant Smith County, and the date on it is August 1st_ Thats 
Smith County, Gary Barner, blah, blah, blah. 
filDGE DL1NN : So your signature subscription is sworn to July l81h 2011? 
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MS. TELFORD : Yes and attached to that document is 17 exhibits. Thats what I'm 
questioning is that the attachments have been deleted from the 
record. 
WDGE DUNN : Well there are three exhibits attached to that affidavit in the 
official court file. 
MS. TELFORD : Well then, the other records have been removed then. 
WDGE DU1'J'N : Well let's not make accusations. 
MS TELFORD: Well, Sir I'm going to make the accusations 
JUDGE DlJNN: No you're not going to make the accusations 
MS. TELFORD : because I know I filed it that way and I saved it pdf. 
JUDGE DlJ~'N : Wait a minute. You can make whatever accusations you want. 
I'm not going to make judgments today as to your accusations. 
So your wasting your time. If your going to simply accuse 
somebody of taking documents out of a court file. You have 
no proof of that. I'm not accepting that. I simply telling you 
that. .. I'm telling you whats in the court file right now. 
MS. TELFORD : Okay. I do have proof. 
WDGE DUNN : Whats in the court file has three exhibits attached. 
MS. TELFORD : I do have proof because I have the actual record that was 
emailed to Diane. And it has all exhibits attached to it. And 
in addition, if you go into the clerk's affidavit it goes up to 11 
exhibits attached to it. On the last page, the signature page 
talks about exhibit "11 ", page 7 of the affidavit talks about 
exhibit "10". So the Affidavit refers to 11 exhibits. So if 
you look at page 8, page 7 of that affidavit its referring to 
exhibit "9" its ref erring to exhibit "IO''. So if you've only got 
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three exhibits attached to it, where are the rest of the exhibits? 
JUDGE DUNN : Can you tell me whether or not, an order had been entered at 
the time that this was submitted , you say was approximately 
July 181h and it's filed stamped August 1'1, which allowed you 
to make filings by email? 
MS. TELFORD: Your honor didn't disclude me from doing that until after I was 
arrested on the second felony charges. Because that was a 
material defense in my criminal case, which by the way ended 
up getting the criminal case dismissed with prejudice because 
one of my defenses was severe prosecutorial misconduct with 
record tampering. 
JUDGE DlJ]\'N : Well. Answer my question. \Vas there an order entered which 
allowed you to make filings by email at the time you submitted 
this affidavit. Yes or no. 
MS. TELFORD : You did not enter the order disallowing the filing of emails 
until after I was arrested in November. 
JUDGE DlJJ\'N : Well, then answer this question. Do the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure allow you to make filings my email ? 
MS. TELFORD : They allow service by email under rule 5. 
JUDGE DlTN'N : Do they allow filings into the court record by email without 
a court order? 
MS TELFORD : It just says service. So whether or not you want to include 
that as service upon the court, is a broad term. But it says 
that service under rule 5 can be done electronically. 
JUDGE DlJJ\'N : Well tell me this. What exhibits do you claim are material to 
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your appeal, that you think have not been included in the 
record. 
MS. TELFORD : The ones that have not been, not think - I know, that have 
not been included in the record is, a redemption deed that 
was executed by Judge Joel Baker in Texas after this case was 
filed. It was prepared and authored by the law offices of 
Purdue, which is one of the defendants in the action, uh 
Purdue, Brandon, Felder and Collins, to obstruct my access to 
the property and to basically support the theft claim that I 
advanced later on in the case after I found out that they had 
stolen everything. That Deed is not in there. The letter from 
Lois Mosley indicating that I could go onto to the property 
and improve it and that her sale to me was final and 
conclusive, is not in there. There are over, one, two, three, 
four, five, six, seven, right, nine emails that were sent to me 
that are not included in there and I brought the paper record to 
those. There is an email from the law offices that were 
handling the sale which is Linebarger, Googan, Blair and 
Sampson indicating that they were going to send me the 
deeding documents. Those are critical records because one of 
the arguments I am making up on appeal is that this court 
acquired jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction over all of the 
defendants as part of a RICO conspiracy to deprive me and 
others of assets that were depleted in the state of Idaho. I 
contend those documents are extremely relevant and I do have 
like I said, photocopies that I ran off just before I appeared to 
the court today. Those should be in the record. 
JUDGE DlJ1'.1N: Well and I do note in the file, it's not a filed document. I do note 
that there is placed in the file. A document which is similar to your 
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affidavit file stamped August 1 si, 2011 which apparently you had 
brought to the clerk. There's a note provided by the clerk. No, 
there's a note from ... attached to this document is a copy of a note 
from somebody ... do you know who wrote that (Judge Dunn talking 
to clerk Skidmore) 
SKIDMORE: Yea, One of the other clerks ... 
JUDGE DUNN : One of the other clerks wrote a note and attached it to this document, 
I dont know when it was supplied, stating this is a copy Holli L 
brought in to be switched with your faxed copies, and I dont know 
when this was submitted. This is a duplicate of the affidavit to 
which certain exhibits are attached, and frankly, many of the 
things you have identified as supposedly, that were supposed to 
be to that, are attached to this. There are some photographs and 
a written statement signed by Jamie Flores, and there is the supposed 
check you made to Gary Barber, and there is a letter of approval 
from America First, there are a couple of emails from Debra 
Milling, there is the letter from Lois Mosley .. . 
MS. TELFORD : Is the email from Debra Milling . .. does it say this document will 
becoming from Charlene Fugler at our office and you can 
acknowledge that you have received the document? 
JUDGE Dffi'.<'N : Yes. 
MS. TELFORD : Okay. That's the deeding documents. Okay that's in there. The 
letter from Lois Mosley is in there. How about the emails? 
JUDGE DlJ1\TN : Well, these are what you submitted. These are documents that you 
apparently provided. Only the faxed document has the official file 
stamp. This is the one you say you sent by email. 
MS. TELFORD: mumbled. Do you have this deed. This Deed should have been in 
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there as well. (mumbling) 
TIJDGE DlJ1\1N : Bunch of photographs, ... I know what you want. (quits looking in 
the record ). Alright. Mr Adams, and response to this particular 
issue. 
MR ADAMS : Yes your honor. Originally, I did not file an objection to Ms. 
Telford's request that the record be augmented. I thought she was 
referring to documents that had been actually filed with the court . I 
thought she was asking that the official record from the record be 
augmented. (Mum bing) If shes asking for additional documents that 
are not officially in the record, I do have an objection. Because I dont 
know what your talking about. I just wanted to make sure that I had 
what the court had. If I am missing something, I apologize because I 
thought she was just asking for an official update from the court. I'm 
concerned that we are going to have documents in front of the 
Supreme Court that are not officially filed in this court. My 
contention is that if that's what she wants to do is add additional 
records, I think the proper way to do that would be to do a motion for 
augmentation of the record before the Supreme Court as opposed to 
just an objection to this point. Because it sounds like she not asking 
for the documents officially in the court record but for additional 
records to be added. If I'm wrong, if she's just asking for 
augmentation of what was officially filed into the record, I dont want 
to argue about it, I just want to move forward. Im fairly confident 
about the content of the official record because I would always check 
with Diane and make sure I got my records. So I dont want to argue 
about that. If its something new than I do object. It should probably 
be done a different way., your honor. One other comment, with 
respect to filing by email, there has never been a latter from the 
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court authorizing filing by email. Nonetheless, were past that point 
and its not worth bring that up now. 
JUDGE DlJNN: Remind me, I havent look for that, uh the date of the order when I 
entered allowing filing by email. 
MR. ADAMS : There was no order to that extent. I'm actually looking at the 
repository right now and I dont see anything saying filing by email 
can be allowed. Like I said, I think we're past the point of arguing 
about that is worthwhile. I prefer to get the record settled and just 
move forward. 
JUDGE DUN'N: I agree. You say I entered an order allowing filing by email, when 
was that? 
MS. TELFORD: Your honor. I'm sure Diane remembers you telling her that, because 
she told me I couldn't email anymore documents to her. 
JUDGE DUNN: Do you remember not allowing it? (Talking to Diane.) 
MS. TELFORD: You were not allowing anymore documents to be emailed to the court. 
SKIDMORE : I dont remember. 
JUDGE DlJN'N : Okay. Very well. 
MS. TELFORD: Your honor, I did copy the gmail that I had sent to counsel. And as 
you know to copy something from an original file using pdf 
software, theres no way that can be forged. (PDF software does not 
allow alteration to the presenrd pdf file.). So I did copy the gmail with 
counsel receiving the documents, again that were earlier filed as the 
July documents. So these documents were sent to counsel that I am 
seeking to augment in the record. So if they dont have a stamp on it 
and the stamped document in the court's file missing the exhibits 
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is the only one that goes up to the Supreme Court, part of the 
procedure for augmenting a file to the Supreme Court is that you've got 
to prove that the document was filed with a stamp on it in the lower 
court. So if the document that I hand delivered to the clerk has more 
exhibits attached to it than the file stamped document, and theres no 
stamp on it, then I couldn't use that document to augment it to the 
Supreme Court. So this court is going to have to decide that issue now 
because these documents by the court's own admissions were 
submitted. And as well, there was an audiorecording on Lois Mosley 
because I recorded her phone conversations. That was submitted to the 
court and also submitted to counsel as an attachment by email. 
JUDGE DlJl'."'N : Well, my ruling is this. I'm a new ruling. The ruling is that the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure do not allow filing by email. And that as a 
result of that an attempted filing of documents by email is not 
permitted and is not part of this clerk's record. And so, you can have 
any document. .. Heres my ruling. Any document you want thats in 
the official clerk's record, that is file stamped as having been filed 
and received by the clerk can be included in the clerks record on 
appeal. No other document will be allowed. 
MS. TELFORD: Your honor. I would object ... 
JUDGE DlTh"'N : Thats my ruling. 
MS. TELFORD : under rule 10. Because if the document has been grafted, or lost or 
however want to phrase it from that file, to obstruct my case, then 
I'm entitled to have that document re-introduced into the record. 
JUDGE DlJ1~"'N : Take it up with the Idaho Supreme Court. 
MS TELFORD : I want a copy of this CD. And I would also like to ask the court at 
the county's cost to provde a transcript of this CD. 
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JUDGE DlJNN: Your motion is denied. So that anything that is not in the official 
clerks record with a stamp on it, will not be included in the clerk's 
record . Any document that either party wishes to have included in the 
clerks record, which has been filed in the clerks record and which is 
not included in the clerks record, than that will be allowed. 
MS. TELFORD: Okay, how about the document that doesn't have a date stamp on it. 
JlJDGE DU1'1~ : Would you please let me finish Ms. Telford. Any objection. Mr. 
Adams. I'm simply going to make a ruling. Based on the statements 
you've already made, any objection that has been made by the 
defendant to documents or requests that they be removed from the 
clerks record, will not be removed. They will be allowed to be 
included. 
MS. TELFORD : Your honor. How about the document that was not date stamped that 
has the additional exhibits that we just earlier discussed. But its not 
date stamped. It needs to be date stamped. 
JUDGE DU1'1~: Why does it have to be date stamped. You simply brought it to the 
court ... 
MS TELFORD Because I cant augment it in unless she does a supplemental record 
and introduces that in a supplemental clerks record and numbers it, 
because it's not date stamped. So I cant go up to the Supreme 
Court and ask them to supplement it into the supreme court record 
because it has no date stamp, but it's in the clerk's file with the 
documents claimed missing. I personally believe that everything 
should be filed electronically because it prevents court officials 
from messing with files. 
JUDGE DUNN : Well it's coming. 
MS. TELFORD : And I hail the day it does because PACER in the federal system 
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makes it a lot harder to commit fraud by an attorney, and if 
pro se ECF filing, a court official. And she has the CD recording 
that was sent to counsel and to her and I need that entered into the 
record too, so that the CD can be submitted to the Idaho Supreme 
Court as well on contacts with Lois Mosley for voice identification 
purposes. Lois Mosley was the selling officer of the property 
in question in Texas. I need a stamp in order to augment into 
the Supreme Court. 
JUDGE DlJNN : I'm looking at rule 30 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
ATTY ADAMS : I am too your honor. 
JUDGE DlJNN : And what it says is the parties may move the Supreme Court, to 
augment or delete from the clerk or agency record, must be 
accompanied by a statement setting forth the specific grounds and 
attaching a copy of any document sought to be augmented to the 
original motion, with two copies of the motion, which document must 
have a legible filing stamp of the clerk indicating the date of it's filing 
or the moving party must establish by citation to the record or 
transcript that the document was presented to the district court. Thats 
the rule that applies here. And that motion has to go to the Idaho 
Supreme Court. I dont see anything here that requires this court to 
rule on that preliminarily. 
MS. TELFORD : It does state that it has to have a stamp on it correct. 
JUDGE DUNN : It says that it has to have a stamp on it or, listen, or the moving party 
must establish by citation to the record or transcript, that the 
document was presented to the district court. So you've got to 
establish either a file stamp or citation to the record. There is no. 
MS TELFORD : Well... 
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JUDGE Dill\TN: You've got to let me talk. Please quit interupting me. There is no 
way that I can have the clerk file stamp something that nobody knows 
when it was brought in. I can file stamp it today, do you want that. 
I'll allow that, then you can present it to the Idaho Supreme Court and 
make whatever argument you wish as to why you think the record 
should be augmented with these documents. But nobody knows when 
this so called document was filed. This document was allegedly 
presented to the clerk as a substitute for some document that is 
officially file stamped and does not have the same number of exhibits. 
There is no way I know when this was done. So I cant file stamp it at 
some past date that no one knows when it was. I cant do that. If you 
want to try and augment this record, with this document, fine we'll file 
stamp it today and you can make your argument before the Supreme 
Court. I don't care what you do relative to that and they can make their 
decision. They make the decision as to whether the official clerk's 
record is or is not augmented. I don't make that decision. 
MS. TELFORD: Can I testify when I came in and brought that document. Because 
I didn't fax the pictures because they wouldn't have been competent 
images. 
JUDGE DlJl\TN: You can submit an affidavit supporting your request to augment this 
record. 
MS. TELFORD: Okay, I'll submit that by tommorrow morning. 
JUDGE DlJNN : But as for the ruling today, my obejctive here and my authority is to 
determine whether or not anything that is officially in the clerk's record 
and has a file stamp should be added or deltered from the clerk's record . 
My ruling on that issue today is, that anything either side wants that is 
officially part of this record may be included in the clerk's record. 
Anything that is an objection or any request that anything be deleted 
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from the clerk's record is denied as to both parties. That's my ruling. 
MS. TELFORD : Your honor, one last thing on that matter. I can attest to the court today 
that since the criminal proceedings were terminated, I have not been 
in the court or at the clerks office with exception on three or four 
occassions where I was making payments on the restitution fee which I 
am presently proceeding with a federal habeas corpus on, or not 
restitution fees, but the fines in the criminal delay case. So I have not 
brought in any records for this case since before I was arrested in 
November of 2011 because I was on a restricted bond which provided 
that I could not contact anybody in this county, otherwise I would be 
thrown back in jail where they deprive me of my blood pressure 
medications and I suffer another stroke. Be that as it may, I have not 
filed anything in this record. So with that in mind, that representation 
made to the court in mind, that document with the clerks handwriting 
on it had to have been in the record before I was arrested on November 
21, 2011, in preparation for the hearing that was supposed to be 
conducted in this case on November 21, 2011, because that hearing was 
taken of calander because I was arrested by Semrad right aside the 
courtroom door in appearance for that hearing. 
JlJDGE DlJ1,i"'N : So whats your point. 
MS. TELFORD : My point is that the document, you don't know when the document was 
submitted. It had to have been brought in, or when it was submitted to 
the clerk, it had to have been submitted before that date. 
JUDGE DUNN : Well thats your argument. Make your argument to the Idaho Supreme 
Court because I can't augment the record with a document that has not 
been officially filed. I don't have the authority to do that. 
MS. TELFORD : Well you said I could file an affidavit of augmentation and your going 
to file stamp it today right. 
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JUDGE DUNN I'm going to file stamp it when it's filed. I'm not going to fi)e stamp it, 
the clerks going to file stamp it when it's filed. That's not today. Its 
whenever you said you were going to do it. You said you would do it 
by tommorrow. 
MS. TELFORD : Okay. rn file the affidavit of augmentation and I'll attach the missing 
exhibits to my affidavit. 
JUDGE DUNN : Just file your affidavit. Whatever argument you want. Make your 
argument to the Idaho Supreme Court because they can augment the 
record, and if they chose to do so, then they chose to do so. That's not 
my decision. My role today is to decide what goes into the clerk's 
record and what doesn't as of today. 
Tra~scriber's Certificate 
I, STEVEN FRITTS, bonded transcriptionist and notary for the State of Utah, 
in and for the County of Salt Lake, DO HEREBY CERTIFY ON MY BOND that I am 
authorized to take and give oaths in the state of Utah, that I received the electronic 
recording of the hearing of the proceedings herein described, which was heard on 
October 9, 2012, before the Honorable Stephen Dunn, Sixth Judicial District Judge for 
the State of Idaho in and for the County of Oneida, that I transcribed said tape into 
typewriting, and that the within and foregoing constitutes and is a full, true and correct 
copy of the transcript of said evidence and proceedings, said transcript consisting of 
Seventeen (17) pages. 
IN WllNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal this 
3ro day of January, 2013. 
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AMERICAN BANKERS INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF FLORIDA, INC 
Defendants 
Case No. 2012· CV .. 280-S 
Plaintiffs Motion For A Declaratory 
Decree Finding The March 17, 2004 
Utah District Court NAR Attorneys 
Fees Judgment And The April 3, 
2003 Utah Supreme Court Civil 
Contempt And Attorneys Fees 
Judgment, Both Entered Against 
Holli Lundahl VOID As A Matter 
Of Law And To Vacate Same 
To be heard by an impartial tribunal 
This Court Has Sua Sponte Jurisdiction To Vacate VOID 
Judgments That Encumber A Record 
COMES NOW Plaintiff and files this motion for declaratory decree finding the 
March 17, 2004 Utah District Court NAR Attorneys fees Judgment and the April 3, 2003 
Utah Supreme Court Civil Contempt and Attorney Fees Judgment referenced in this 
court's February 27, 2013 OSC, void as a matter of !aw, and to thereby vacate these 
judgments under this court's sua sponte inherent powers to not permit void judgments to 
encumber a record. 
The Wyoming Supreme Court held in re Emery v. Emery, 404 P.2d 7 45 (Wyo. 
08/09/1965) : "The provisions of WY Stat § 1-325, are irrelevant when the Plaintiff 
seeks to vacate a wholly void for lack of jurisdiction, 30A Am.Jur., § p. 
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659. The power of a court to vacate a void judgment regarded as inherent and 
independent of any statutory authority. A Court will not permit a void judgment 
to encumber a record and will vacate the ineffectual entry thereof on application at 
any time. 49 C.J.S. Judgments§ 267, pp. 480-481. A void judgment is not binding. 
It confers no rights and equitable relief is mandated to prevent harm 
resulting from the fact that the judgment appears or purports to be valid. 
A.LI. Restatement, Judgments,§ 117, p. 565 (1942). 
Attached hereto as exhibit "1" is an authenticated copy of the Void NAR 
judgment Attached hereto as exhibit "2" is an authenticated copy of the Void Civil 
Contempt Judgment entered by the Utah Supreme Court. Both void judgments are now 
being filed with this Court to attack impending contempt charges against Plaintiff. 
INTRODUCTION 
Void Judgments Are Subject To Collateral Attack Under 
The Declaratory Judgment Act If They Are Prima Facially 
Void And They Are Presented For The Purpose Of Inflicting 
Harm Against A Party To The Case 
The State of Texas recently decided a case where the Plaintiff in the action 
collaterally attacked a void judgment in an offensive maneuver in re Wagner v. D'Lorm, 
315 S.W.3d 188 (Tex.App. Dist.3 2010). Here, the Defendant had obtained a void 
judgment against the Plaintiff in another court. Plaintiff brought a declaratory judgment 
act case in the jurisdiction of his choosing to collaterally attack the void judgment. The 
Defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff's action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 
asserting that because plaintiff did not seek relief before the court that rendered the 
judgment, Plaintiff could not seek collateral relief in a foreign court. The Court of appeals 
rejected the Defendant's claim and granted Plaintiff full relief. The analysis of that court 
was as follows: 
Appellant Ronald R. Wagner sued appellees Roberto D'Lorm and 
Edward P. Dancause in Travis County district court seeking a 
declaration that a default judgment previously obtained by D'Lorm and 
his attorney, Dancause, against Wagner in a Zapata County district 
court was void. D'Lorm filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting that the trial 
court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to declare void the judgment 
another district court. Wagner moved for summary on 
claim. trial court granted O'_Lorm's to the 
2 
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jurisdiction and denied summary judgment for Wagner, finding summary 
judgment "improper" for jurisdictional reasons. 
In a single issue on appeal, Wagner asserts that the trial court 
erred in granting D'Lorm's plea to the jurisdiction and in denying his 
motion for summary judgment because the Zapata County default 
judgment was void and, therefore, could be collaterally attacked in 
another court We will reverse the trial court's order and remand the cause 
for further proceedings. 
Analysis: 
in his sole point of error, Wagner asserts that the trial court erred 
when it granted D'Lorm's plea to the jurisdiction and denied his motion for 
summary judgment. Wagner contends that he mounted a valid collateral 
attack on the Zapata County judgment by alleging facts showing that the 
judgment was void because the Zapata County court lacked jurisdiction over 
him as he was not named a party to that suit. Wagner asserts that "because 
the [Zapata County] judgment is and was void ... it could be collaterally 
attacked in any court." D'Lorm counters that Wagner failed to properly 
emp!oy the options available to him to challenge the Zapata County 
judgment. Citing McEwen v. Harrison, 345 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1961 ), D'Lorm 
contends that Wagner should have filed a bill of review in the Zapata 
County district court that rendered the default judgment. Because 
Wagner failed to file a bill of review in Zapata County during the time 
allowed, D'Lorm asserts that he has "waived any rights to attack the 
[default] judgment." 
The Travis County Di$trict Court's Sl!Qj_ect-Matter Jurisdiction 
In this appeal from the grant of D'Lorm's plea to the jurisdiction on the 
pleadings, our task is to decide whether Wagner has pleaded sufficient 
jurisdictional facts to invoke the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction, using a 
liberal construction of his pleadings. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226. In his 
petition, Wagner alleged that the Zapata County default judgment is void 
because he was not named as a party to the prior lawsuit resulting in a 
judgment against Wagner. 
A judgment is void, and thus may be collaterally attacked, if the 
rendering court had "no jurisdiction over a party or his property, no jurisdiction 
of the subject matter, no jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment, or no 
capacity to act as a court." Austin lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Sierra Club, 495 
S.W.2d 878, 881 (Tex. 1973); see also Browning v. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d 336, 
346 (Tex. 2005) (same); Mapco, Inc. v. Forrest, 795 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex. 
1990) (orig. proceeding) (same). Ely v. United States Coal & Coke Co .. 243 
Ky. 725, 49 S.W.2d 1021; McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 37 S.Ct. 343, 61 
L.Ed. 608 (1917). L.R.A 1917F, 458; Restatement of the Law of Judgments, 
§§ 6, 8, and 117; 1 Freeman on Judgments, §§ 226, 228, and 339. For a 
court to have personal jurisdiction over the defendant, the defendant must be 
amenable to the jurisdiction of the court and the plaintiff must have invoked 
that jurisdiction by valid service of process on the defendant. Kawasaki Steel 
Corp. v. Middleton, 699 S.W.2d 199, 200 (Tex. 1985). This Court has also 
held that a judgment may be collaterally attacked because of "fundamental 
error." Dep't of Transp. v. T. Brown Constructors, !nc., 947 S.W.2d 
3 
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659 (Tex. App.--Austin 1997, pet. denied). Fundamental error occurs where 
"the record shows the court lacked jurisdiction or that the pub!ic interest is 
directly or adversely affected as that interest is declared in the statutes or the 
Constitution of Texas." Pirtle v. Gregory, 629 S.W.2d 919, 920 (Tex. 1982). A 
court's rendition of judgment against a party not named in the suit is 
fundamental error. Mapco, Inc. v. Carter, 817 S.W.2d 686, 687 (Tex. 1991 ). 
Here, Wagner pleaded that he was neither named as a party nor 
served with process. If true, that would mean that the Zapata County district 
court committed fundamental error by rendering judgment against Wagner 
because he was not a party, see id. The default judgment rendered against 
him would be void and subject to collateral attack. See Austin !ndep. Sch. 
Dist., 495 S.W.2d at 881. The phrase "jurisdictional power" means 
"'jurisdiction over the subject matter, the power to hear and determine 
cases of the general class to which the particular one belongs."' 
Middleton v. Murph, 689 S.W.2d 212, 213 (Tex. 1985) (quoting Deen v. Kirk, 
508 S.W.2d 70, 72 (Tex. 1974)). 
D'Lorm asserts that, because the Zapata County court had subject-
matter jurisdiction in that case and the time for filing an appeal from that 
judgment has expired, Wagner's only remedy "to attack" the judgment was a 
proceeding in the nature of a bill of review. We disagree. The purpose of a 
direct attack is to change the former judgment and secure the entry of a 
correct judgment Austin lndep. Sch. Dist., 495 S.W.2d at 881. Here, Wagner 
does not seek to "correct" the Zapata County judgment, nor does he seek to 
"change" it and secure entry of a "correct judgment" in lieu thereof. Wagner 
brought his attack in a different court from the one that rendered the 
judgment under attack. Wagner's attack here is properly classified as 
collateral, not direct. This Court has held that, in a collateral attack, the 
challenger must show in the record that the judgment was obtained without 
jurisdiction. Narvaez v. Maldonado, 127 S.W.3d 313, 317-18 (Tex. App.--
Austin 2004, no pet.). Alfonso v. Skadden, 251 S.W.3d 52, 55 (Tex. 2008) 
("'In order for a collateral attack to be successful the record must affirmatively 
reveal the jurisdictional defect."' (quoting White v. White, 179 S.W.2d 503, 506 
(Tex. 1944))). See also Browning, 698 S.W.2d at 363 (appeal from declaration 
rendered by one court declaring judgment of another court void is collateral 
attack); Empire Gas & Fuel Co. v. Albright, 87 S.W.2d 1092, 1096 (Tex. 1935) 
(attack on judgment of one court in another court is collateral attack); 
In light of the foregoing, we hold that Wagner's pleadings were sufficient 
to give the trial court subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate his claims for 
declaratory relief. The court therefore erred when it granted D'Lorm's plea to 
the jurisdiction. We sustain that portion of Wagner's issue on appeal. 
We hold that the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction to hear and 
consider Wagner's declaratory judgment suit. We therefore reverse the 
district court's dismissal order and remand the cause to that court for further 
proceedings. 
Likewise, with respect to contempt/injunction orders unconstitutionally obtained. 
The Court held in Baker v. Gen Motors Corp, U.S. 222, 234-36, n 9; 118 
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S Ct 657; 139 L.Ed.2d 580 (1998) ("if the st.ate injunction order was not 
constitutionally obtained, full faith and credit cannot be accorded that judgment in 
the forum where that judgment comes at issue. Accord in Chapman v. Krutonog, 
No. 8214451 (Cal.App. Dist. 2010); Advanced Bionics Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc. (2002} 29 
Cal 4th 697, 708 . Void judgments are never given credit. Prather v. Loyd, 86 Idaho 45, 
50, 382 P.2d 910, 915 (1963) ("[a] void judgment is a nullity, and no rights can be 
based thereon; it can be set aside on motion or can be collaterally attacked at any 
time."). Other courts have also held that full faith and credit applies equally to equity 
decrees as it does money judgments. McElroy v. McElroy, 256 A.2d 763 (Del.Ch.1969); 
Higginbotham v. Higginbotham, 92 N.J. Super. 18, 222 A.2d 120 (App.Div.1966); Miller v. 
Miller, Supra ; Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 102 (1971); 50 C.J.S. 
Judgments § 889 h. (1947). "Full faith and credit extends to foreign equity decrees or 
money judgments which order an in personam payment of money or conveyance of 
property to another. Varone v. Varone, 359 F2d 769 (7th Cir.1966); Rozan v. Rozan, 49 
Cai.2d 322, 317 P.2d 11 (1957); Ivey v. Ivey, 183 Conn. 490, 439 A2d 425 (1981); 
Weesner v. Weesner, 168 Neb. 346, 95 N.W.2d 682 (1959); Higginbotham v. 
Higginbotham, supra; Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws§ 102 comment d (1971) 
While the judgments at issue here are not against Plaintiff, both the Defendant 
and this court are seeking to enforce them against Plaintiff as an alter ego of Holli. 
Irrespective that the concurrently filed affidavit of Marti Lundahl establishes as a matter of 
fact and law that Holli and Marti are different persons, it is Plaintiff's position that the void 
judgments directed against Holli should be declared void so as not to impact plaintiff any 
further in this or any other proceeding in which plaintiff may become a party. Furthermore, 
the age of the judgments being attacked bears no consequence. See United States v. 
One Toshiba Color TV, 213 F3d 147, 157 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting if a final judgment is void, 
"no passage of time can transmute [it] into a binding judgment".). 
Uncontroverted Facts Rendering Both Judgments Void Ab lnitio 
1. ln March of 2002, a dispute arose concerning a $100 balance due on 
the Respondent's collective family's dental account - when the dental service (installing 
a cap) had not been completed. The dentist assessed the Lundahls, a 30% 
surcharge on the debt - in violation of the usury laws. A check was tendered to 
5 
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dentist for $100, the actual amount of the dental bill. The Lundahls refused to pay the 
30% surcharge. The dentist sent the check to a collection agency, NAR Inc., who 
assessed Kelli Lundahl another 30% collection fee. The actions of the dentist and NAR 
inc violated both the usury laws of the state of Utah, Utah's Consumer Protection Act, 
and the Federal Unlawful Debt Collection Practices Act 
2. On March 9, 2002, North American Recovery Services Inc. aka "NAR", 
through their attorney Olson caused the Lundahls to be served with a dunning letter and 
a small claims complaint, both documents which demanded $597.21 to avoid the small 
claims action and ruination of Kelli Lundahl's credit. (See exhibit "3" attached for dunning 
letter and complaint.). Kelii had 20 days to respond. 
3. Ten days later, on March 19, 2002, Kelli asked Holli to deliver a check to 
NAR for the full amount demanded in the complaint in order to mitigate any damages to 
Kelli's credit which was paramount to a pending commercial transaction. On the bottom 
of the check, Kelli wrote that the check was being paid under duress because of extortion 
threats made against Kelli's credit. Holli personally delivered the check to OLSON at 
Olson's law offices in Salt Lake, which also was the offices for NAR Inc. (See exhibit "4" 
attached for this check bearing the disclaimer and the canceled side of the check 
showing that the check was negotiated on March 19, 2002, as soon as it was tendered to 
Olson on behalf of his business NAR Inc.). At the time of delivery, Holli obtained a 
promise from Olson to dismiss the state small claims action as moot The check 
cleared Olson/NAR's account on March 21, 2002. 
4. Instead of dismissing the complaint, 6 days after Olson had negotiated 
the payment on behalf of his company NAR, Inc. (North American Recovery Services, 
Inc.). Olson authored and filed a certificate of default against Kelli Lundahl on March 27, 
2002 without notice, and 30 minutes later appeared before the judge ex parte and 
obtained a default judgment for three times the whole amount claimed in the 
complaint and in the dunning letter. (Refer back to Ex. "3" attached for the dunning 
letter and complaint.). The Default judgment claimed $671.69 against Kelli Lundahl and 
$444.60 against John Behle, the latter who did not owed no debt 
and was never served any process. (See exhibit "5" attached for default and default 
judgment.). 
5. NAR subsequently reported default judgment Kelli's credit 
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report in the amount of $1, 116; thus interfering with Kelli's pending commercial 
transaction. (See Exhibit "6" attached for this false report made against Kelli's credit 
report.) Kelli learned of the false reporting when she was denied credit in her pending 
commercial transaction. 
6. Kelli subsequently filed a motion to vacate the default judgment based: 
(a) on fraud upon the court by attorney Olson, (b) because the judgment was void for lack 
of a case or controversy at the time the judgment was entered, and (c) because the 
default judgment was for three times the amount pleaded in the complaint in violation of 
URCP rule 54(c). On May 29, 2002, Judge Fratto vacated the default judgment but did 
not sanction his friend attorney Olson for the fraud that was comitted. (See exhibit "7" 
attached for vacation order.). Olson nevertheless kept the false report on Kelli's credit 
report thus s ustaining an unlawful debt collection violation as a matter of law. 
7. Kelli shortly thereafter, sued NAR for violations of the Fair Debt 
Collection Practice Act and Utah's Consumer Protection Practices Act. At time Kelli 
filed her counterclaim, Kem paid a separate filing fee and jury fee. Keili caused the 
counterclaim to be immediately served upon NAR through it's registered agent, Attorney 
Olson. 
8. After Attorney Olson received service of Kelli's complaint, Olson 
appeared before the clerk's office on June 17, 2002, removed Kelli's Counterclaim 
from the court's file and then filed a motion to dismiss the collection case with prejudice 
as settled between the parties. The face of the motion bore no notice to the Lundahls 
nor was it signed by Kelli Lundahl. {See first part of exhibit "8" attached} The next 
day, Attorney Olson again met ex parte with Judge Fratto and colluded with this judge to 
sign an order to dismiss the case with prejudice - completely disregarding notice and 
hearing rules for the state of Utah. Moreover, Kelli was wholly unaware of any motion to 
dismiss the case and had never negotiated to settle any claims against NAR. (See 
second part of exhibit "8" attached for the order dismissing Kelli's case with prejudice on 
June 18, 2002, without Kelli's knowledge.). 
9. Kelli learned about the dismissal when she appeared at the clerks' 
office to file an amended counterclaim with Holli as the assignee of al! claims. Kelli filed 
another motion to vacate the dismissal order based upon yet another fraud upon the court 
by atty Olson. Kelli also asked that Fratto be recused for twice violating the of 
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conduct for judges. Judge did recuse and the NAR case was re-assigned to 
Judge Lubeck. On June 6, 2002, Judge Lubeck issued an order which raised concern 
about file tampering given the removal of Kelli's counter-complaint from the court's file. 
Judge Lubeck vacated Judge Fratto's dismissal order and instructed Kelli to file another 
copy of her counter-claim complaint with the court. (See exhibit "9" attached for Lubeck's 
order vacating the dismissal order and instructing the clerk to reconstruct the court file with 
Kelli's missing pleadings.). Attorney Olson was never disciplined for his conduct 
irregardless of Kelli's numerous petitions that he be so disciplined. 1 Kelli assigned all 
claims to Holli as another ob!igor of the debt and because the chose in actions in Kelli's 
counter-claim complaint were assignable under the law. 2 
10. After Judge Lubeck's order reinstating the case, attorney Olson 
arranged to have the case unilaterally transferred to another judge, Judge Quinn, who 
was ver1 good friends with O!son.3 After the transfer to Judge Quinn's court, Olson 
grafted Holli's Amended counterclaim from the court file leaving Kelli's reconstructed 
counterclaim complaint as the operative complaint 
1. It is well-settled that courts have the authority to direct investigation into an 
attorney's license where necessary to protect the public. See id.; In re Ruffalo , 390 U.S. 
544, 550 (1968) Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957); Ex parte Wall, 107 
U.S. 265, 288-89 (1882). 
2. Chose in actions are generally assignable. Capps v. FIA Card Servs., 
N.A., Docket No. 35891 (Idaho Supreme Court Oct. 2010). McCluskey v. Galland, 95 
Idaho 472, 474-75, 511 P.2d 289, 291-92 (1973). An assignment may be done in such a 
way to be construed as a complete sale of the claim. 6 Am.Jur.2d Assignment § 147 
(1999). An assignment of the chose in action transfers to the assignee and divests the 
assignor of all control and right to the cause of action, and the assignee becomes the real 
party in interest. McCluskey, 95 Idaho at 474, 511 P.2d at 291. Only the assignee may 
prosecute an action on the chose in action. Id. Assignment" is defined as "the transfer of 
rights or property." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 115 (7th ed. 1999). American 
Jurisprudence, Second Edition, defines "assignment" as: a transfer of property or some 
other right from one person (the 'assignor') to another (the 'assignee'), which confers a 
complete and present right in the subject matter to the assignee. See also England v. 
Mg Investments, Inc., 93 F.Supp.2d 718 (S.D. W. Va., 2000) (Fair Debt Collection Practice 
and RICO claims are assignable and the assignee takes subject to all the defenses and 
al! the equities which could have been set up against the instrument in hands of the 
assignor at the time of the assignment.") 
3. See Repub!ic Royalty Co. v. 931 S.W.2d 338, 342 (Tex. App.-Corpus 
Christi 1996) ( ... "cases should not be transferred once a lawsuit has been randomly 
"'"'<01 "'''"'n to a particular court. Fina Oil & Chem. Co. v. Alonso, 941 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. 
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When Holli !earned about the grafting of her amended complaint, she filed a 
mandatory intervention motion under rule 24(a) given all claims before the court had been 
assigned to Holli. Hom supported her intervention motion with a stamped copy of her 
First Amended Counterclaim which had been purloined from the record by NAR's counsel 
after the transfer from Judge Lubeck's court. 
11. NAR summarily opposed Holli's intervention motion by self servingly 
asserting that Kelli had not assigned her claims. In her response, Hom provided the 
court with Kelli's assignment contract dated June 11, 2002. 
12. When the correct amount of time had passed, Holli then filed two 
separate notices to submit for decision to Judge Quinn. Judge Quinn ignored Holli's 
notices to submit for decision. Accordingly, Holli filed a mandamus writ as authorized 
under Utah law pursuant to Barnard v. Murphy, 852 P.2d 1023 (Utah App. 1993) 
commanding Judge Quinn to address her notices to submit for decision. 4 
13. In the interim, Judge Quinn compelled the assignor Kelli to appear at 
App.-Corpus Christi 1996, no writ). Allowing arbitrary transfers "undermine[s] the random 
assignment system within the courts and encourage[s] improper forum or judge shopping by the 
parties" ... "); See also McCuin v. Texas Power & Light Co., 714 F.2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1983){vio!ation 
of the random selection process .... renders the entire process null and void as Congress intended 
the random selection process "to be absolute to avoid any bacterium of impugnment" ). 
4. See Barnard v. Murphy, 852 P.2d 1023 (Utah App. 1993) (We grant the writ and 
direct judge Murphy to act on Barnard's notices to submit for decision.). "Mandamus is the 
highest judicial writ and is issued only when there is a specific right to be enforced, a positive duty 
to be performed, and no other specific remedy.n Littlefield v. Williams 343 S.C. 212, 540 S.E.2d 81 
(2000); Willimon v. Greenville, 243 S.C. 82, 132 S.E.2d 169 (1963). A party seeking mandamus 
relief must show that (1) the trial court had a legal duty to act, (2) there was a demand for 
performance, and (3) there was a refusal to act Wang v. Chertoff, 2009 U.S. Dist LEXIS 23146 
(D. Idaho Mar. 23, 2009); Stoner v. Massey, 586 S.W.2d 843, 846 (Tex.1979). The Idaho Supreme 
Court has held that mandamus is the proper remedy for one seeking to require a pyblic officer to 
carry out a dearly mandated ministerial act which is not discretionary. Cowles Pub!'g Co. v. 
Magistrate Court, 118 Idaho 753, 760, 800 P.2d 640, 647 (1990). Numerous courts have held that 
where an official fails or refuses to rule on or decide matters before the court, mandamus is proper 
to compel the official to perform his duties under the !aw. See Nadarajah v. Holder, 569 F.3d 906 
(9th Cir. 2009) (Mandamus petition filed in the Ninth Circuit granted to compel the district court to 
decide a petition that had been pending.); Sedighi v. Holder, No. 07-1881, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
56875 (D. Or. July 2, 2009) (The court found that agency officials did not adjudicate plaintiffs' 
applications and ordered them to do so under its mandamus authority.); Chowdhury v. Siciliano, 
No. 06-07132 (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2008) {Mandamus proper to direct Magistrate to perform 
ministerial duties); Elkhatib v. Bulger, No. 04-22407, 2006 U.S. Dist LEXIS 60485 (S.D. Fla. 
Mar.14, 2006) (mandamus granted to compel adjudications of claims before the court as in 
violation of the procedural rule of speedy disposition of claims.). 
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the summary judgment hearing to argue the claims belonging to Holli. By law, Judge 
Quinn should have either dismissed action without prejudice or stayed the action until 
Holli was installed as the true party in interest. See Stank v. Jones, 404 P.2d 964, 17 
Utah 2d 96 (1964) (Only the assignee may prosecute assigned chose in actions.). 
Loporto v. Hoegemann, 1999 UT App 175 (1999). 
14. On January 12, 2003, Holli filed a mandamus Writ with the Utah Supreme 
Court on the grounds that Judge Quinn refused to act on Holli's notices to submit for 
decision re Holli's intervention motion. Judge Quinn was immediately served with this 
mandamus writ. 
15. On January 31, 2003, Holli filed chapter 13 bankruptcy. Thereupon, the 
NAR lawsuit immediately became an asset of Holli's bankruptcy estate subject to the 
automatic stay. See 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B) (2006). The debtor's estate includes "all 
legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property," "wherever located and by whomever 
hefd. Id.§ 541(a)(1). 5 
16. To moot this writ, on February 14, 2003, Judge Quinn entered a final 
judgment in the state NAR action which addressed Hollis notices to submit for decision by 
joining Holli to the state litigation as the assignee thereto and thereafter sua sponte 
dismissing Hollis counter - claims with prejudice without allowing Holli the opportunity 
5. "The stay applies to all attempts to obtain control over causes of action that 
areproperty of a bankruptcy estate." 3 Collier on Bankruptcy~ 362.03[5], at 362-20, 21 (Lawrence 
P. King ed., 15th ed. 1997) . See Young v. Repine, No. 06-20807. July 22, 2008 (5th Cir. 2008) 
(The legal conclusions applied were: "Civil contempt proceedings are conducted to exact usually a 
monetary penalty against the alleged contemnor. The monetary penalties reduce the value of 
estate assets in the bankruptcy estate and are construed as an attempt to obtain control over 
causes of action that are property of the bankruptcy's estate. As such, any non-bankruptcy court 
contempt proceeding which seeks to create a debt against the debtor or to diminish the value of 
estate assets, is strictly prohibited by the automatic stay of the bankruptcy code." In re Chaparro 
Martinez, 293 B.R 387 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003); Foster v. Heitkemp, 670 F.2d 478 (5~~ Cir. 1982) 
(The automatic stay provision remains in effect as concerns all acts attempting to gain control over 
property of an estate. Any action endeavoring to obtain control over property of an estate ls void.). 
Thus, "[a]ny action in which the judgment may diminish" an asset of the bankruptcy estate "is 
unquestionably subject to a stay under this subsection." Concurring ln re Johns Manville Corp., 33 
B.R. 254, 261 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983)) ; In re Gruntz, 202 F.3d i 074, i 082 (9th Cir. 2002) ; And In 
re Atkins, 176 BR 998, 1006 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1994). The automatic stay as applied to a 
bankruptcy estate does not terminate until a final order has issued by a judge sitting in his 
bankruptcy jurisdiction which disposes of the bankruptcy estate. 
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adversarily litigate her claims. 6 Judge Quinn's action caused Holli's Mandamus Petition 
to the Utah Supreme Court to be rendered moot See LOS ANGELES v. LYONS, 461 
U.S. 95 (1983) (A Judge's or party's actions can cause intervening moot-ness to the 
claims before the court. When the actions moot the process, the process cannot be 
deemed as frivolous.). Judge Quinn's actions also invoked the protection of the 
bankruptcy code given Holli's new status as an assignee defendant and counterclaim 
plaintiff. 7 
17. Holli filed a timely rule 59 motion to attack the state judgment for due 
process violations and additionally sought to amend her counter-complaint to allege new 
allegations. Holli also filed a motion to dismiss the Utah Supreme Court Writ proceeding 
based on intervening mootness and because Holli was in chapter 13 bankruptcy. ( See 
exhibit "11" attached for the motion to dismiss the Supreme Court Writ proceeding filed by 
Holli.). Shortly after Holli made the foregoing rule 59 filings, Holli removed both the 
state court action and the Utah Supreme Court writ action (which had not yet been 
officially dismissed) to the bankruptcy court under the bankruptcy removal statute. This 
6. See Cowen and Co. v. Atlas Stock Transfer Co., 695 P.2d 109, 114 (Utah 1984) 
(Judgments may be assigned); Same in Taylor v. American Fire And Cas. Co., 925 P.2d 1279 
(Utah App.1996); Eiu Guam v. Long Term Credit Bank of Japan, 322 F.3d 635 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(where judgment has been assigned, assignor lacks standing to prosecute any post judgment 
proceedings.); And International Transaction v. Emotelladora Agra!., 347 F.3d 589 (5th Cir. 2003) 
(Where judgment has been assigned, assignor lacks standing to prosecute any post judgment 
matters going to the competency 
of the judgment.). 
7. See In re Seven Seas Petroleum, Inc., 522 F.3d 575 (5th. Cir., 2008) (The filing 
of a bankruptcy petition creates an estate that is comprised of, among other things, "a!I legal or 
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case." 11 U.S.C. § 
541 (a)(1 ). The phrase "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property" has been 
construed broadly, and includes "rights of action" addressed in lawsuits. See 1 David G. Epstein 
et a!., Bankruptcy § 3-i 4, at 162 (1992) ("Section 362(a)(3) stays all actions, whether judicial or 
private, that seek to obtain possession of property of the estate, or property from the estate, or to 
exercise control over property of the estate. The trustee or debtor ln possession takes control of all 
property of the estate. No entity, including a federal or state court, may exercise control over 
the causes of action in an estate which represent direct injury to the debtor, unless and until 
the trustee or debtor in possession files an affirmative petition seeking specified action, or unless 
the court grants an order lifting the automatic stay pursuant to specific !imitations set forth in the 
code.). "The stay applies to attempts to obtain control over causes of action that are property of the 
estate. 3 Collier on Bankruptcy~ 362.03[5], at 362-20, 21 (Lawrence P. ed., 15th ed. 1997); 
!n re Chaparro Martinez, 293 B.R 387 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003); Foster v. Heitkemp, 670 478 
(5th Cir. 1982). 
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removal stripped the courts of all further subject matter jurisdiction. 6 As shown in 
exhibit "12" attached, the NAR case was assigned Bankruptcy removal case number 03-
02317. The case wou!d later be withdrawn to the district court under it's bankruptcy 
jurisdiction and assigned case no. USDC-Utah 2:03-CV-1083. 
18. Nevertheless, on April 13, 2003, the Utah Supreme Court acting without 
subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, in wholesale violation of due process, ex 
parte and without notice, entered a void civil contempt judgment against Holli directing 
her to pay double attorneys fees and costs to the NAR litigants. 9 (See last page of exhibit 
"2" attached, bracketed section for this order.). 
19. Furthermore, as shown on the face of the Utah Supreme Court contempt order, 
there was no OSC issued nor served upon Holli to advise Holli of any pending contempt 
proceeding before the Utah Supreme Court ; aside from the fact that the order exceeded the 
four comers of the writ petition itself. 10 
8. See National Steam-Ship v. Tugman, 106 US 118, 1 S Ct 58, 27 L.Ed 87 
(1882) (After removal, the duty of the state court was to proceed no further. Every order thereafter 
made by that court was coram non judice, void.). 
9. The Writ action was directed against Judge Quinn, not NAR. Hence any 
attorneys fees incurred in the Writ action would have been incurred by Judge Quinn who mooted 
the Writ action before any substantive response was made. Nevertheless, in Cooter & Gell v. 
Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990): the Supreme Court held that Rule 11 does not authorize a 
district court to award an attorney's fee incurred in appellate proceedings. (a) The language of 
Rule 11 limits sanctions to district court procedure only. Furthermore-- the Advisor/ Committee 
Note suggests that Rule 11 cannot be used for awarding sanctions for appellate proceedings. 
Rule 38 must be employed by the appellate courts to award attorneys fees on appeal, and the 
Appellate court is charged with the duty to make an attorneys fees award.) 
10. For example, the contempt judgment addresses the alleged merits of more 
than 21 petitions filed by Holli over a 9 year period in the Utah Appellate Court system, the 
majority of which sought appellate orders directing the lower courts to order the Utah Public 
Safety Director to renew Hollis Utah driver's license - which the Utah Department of Public 
Safety refused to renew for the sole purpose of retaliating against Holli for suing the department 
for 5th amendment takings claims. The refusal to renew Holli's driver's license caused Hom to 
be repeatedly prosecuted for driving without a license in possession in more than 16 criminal 
prosecutions over this 9 year period. Each criminal prosecution terminated in Holli's favor based 
on the unlawful refusal to renew Ho!l!'s drivers license without just cause. However upon the 
termination of each criminal case, the traffic judges still refused to direct the public safety director 
to renew Hollis driver's license so that Holli could avoid future criminal prosecutions. When Holli 
appealed the favorable dismissals because she stood to be prosecuted in the future on the same 
criminal charge, the Utah appellate courts summarily dismissed Holli's appeals for lack of 
jurisdiction as moot irrespective that Holli stood to be prosecuted in the future. See See CraV1iford 
-EL v. Britton, 523 US 592, 118 S. Ct 1584, '140 L.Ed.2d 759 (1998) (Held: "official retaliation 
occurs when one is prosecuted, threatened with or the object of a bad faith 
and legal as a resu!t of their First amendment rights.). 
12 
Case 2:12-cv-00280-SWS Document 19 Filed 03/18/13 Page 13 of 77 
20. After all matters had been removed to the bankruptcy under 
the bankruptcy removal statute, Holli again sought to attack the competency of the void 
orders entered in the NAR state court litigation. For example, on July 22, 2004, Holli 
filed a second motion in her removed bankruptcy case no. 03-CV-1083 as Pacer Doc. 
no. 28, seeking permission to amend her complaint to allege violations of the automatic 
stay by the NAR litigants. Refer back to exhibit "12" attached. On July 27, 2004 as 
Pacer Doc. no. 29, Holli filed a second motion for declaratory judgment to decree the 
2/14/03 state court judgment (exhibit "10" attached hereto) and the 4/13/03 Utah 
Supreme Court judgment (exhibit "2" attached hereto), "void as a matter of law". (Again 
Refer back to exhibit "12", the court docket showing these filings) 
21. The Bankruptcy court docket attached as exhibit "12" hereto shows that 
the NAR litigants did not respond to Holli's declaratory judgment motions. The docket 
further shows that the federal judge 25 days later mooted NAR's motion to enter a federal 
pre-filing injunction against Holli - after reading Holli's motion's to decree the state orders 
void which purported to support the issuance of a federal pre-filing injunction order. The 
court reasoned that it was going to dismiss the federal action for jurisdictional reasons -
which would allow the parties to pursue their claims in another forum. 11 However of 
greatest jurisdictional importance is that on September 1, 2004, the federal judge entered 
an order dismissing the removed state case on jurisdictional grounds and subsequently 
mooted or denied as moot the remainder motions pending before the court as PACER 
DOC. 38. Subsequently, the federal Docket shows that the federal court simply dosed the 
case ; thereby permanently stripping the state court of jurisdiction over the original cause. 
22. The federal docket shows that the state NAR case was removed to the 
Utah Bankruptcy court in early 2003 and then withdrawn to the District court the same 
year. The docket shows that the parties actively litigated matters before the federal 
court until dismissal of the case on 9-1-2004, and further, that Holli appealed the 
dismissal order which sent her out of the jurisdiction, without avail. A reference back to 
11. This court purports to do the same thing the federal judge in Utah sought 
to do in Hollis bankruptcy case, i.e. send Plaintiff Marti out of this forum to pursue her 
claims in another forum - by granting the Defendants motion dismiss for improper 
venue ; a ruling that plaintiff will directly attack on appeal. 
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the void attorneys 
entry date of March 1 
judgment entered against Holli (exhibit "1" attached), shows an 
2004 in same state case which had been removed to the 
federal bankruptcy court in 2003. Accordingly, the attack record provided by Marti 
herein, shows on it's face that the March 17, 2004 state court NAR attorneys fees 
judgment entered against Holli is void on it's face for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as 
the state case wherein the judgment was entered had been removed to the bankruptcy 
court in 2003 and never remanded back to the state court at any time. There are also 
other defects apparent from this judgment to include: (1) Failure to acquire personal 
jurisdiction over Holli given the OSC was served by mail on a massage parlor which was 
not affiliated with Holli in any way (*** note that the federal docket record lists Holli's 
address as cache county jail in Logan, Utah - given the NAR litigants were prosecuting 
Holli for the unlawful practice of law as mentioned in the Utah Supreme Court contempt 
judgment at page headnote paragraph 7 (bracketed) in exhibit "2" attached. As 
have other prosecutions, this prosecution also failed. (2) The attorneys fees judgment 
was a blatant violation of the automatic stay attaching to Holli's estate assets because 
Holli's estate was not closed until 2 years later on January 4, 2006 as shown in exhibit 
"13" attached. (3) The state trial court had no authority to enter an attorney's fees 
judgment which was admittedly acquired during an appellate proceeding, and (4) Holli 
was not provided with a constitutionally impartial tribunal. 
23. Likewise, .the Utah Supreme Court civil contempt judgment also 
suffered from multiple jurisdictional defects. By the time the civil contempt order had 
issued, Judge Quinn had mooted the basis for the Mandamus writ petition which was 
filed to compel judge Quinn to act on Holli's numerous notices to submit for decision. On 
February 13, 2003, the trial judge entered an order subject to Holli's notices to submit 
See exhibit "10" attached. Therefore, the Utah Supreme Court's civil contempt judgment 
entered several months later constituted an unconstitutional advisory opinion in a case 
where there was no Hve case or controversy at the time it was entered. 10 
---·---···------. ---
10. In addition, Judge Christine Durham, who authored the void opinion, 
owed stock interests in the attorney lawfirm representing NAR litigants through 
merging stock interests of her former !awfirm and !aw partner Paul Moxley. 
Judge Durham an interest in covering up the misconduct of , this 
should not have been al!lowed to sit on the writ case. 
14 
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24. Also, the Utah Supreme Court civil contempt judgment (exhibit 2 
attached hereto) mentions nowhere on it's face that the Utah Supreme issued an 
OSC to Holli thus giving Holli notice of contempt sanctions to be imposed against Holli. 
This failed notice rendered the Utah Supreme Court Judgment void for lack of the 
notice required under URAP rule 38. 11 
25. In addition, the Utah Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to conduct any 
civil contempt proceedings against the bankrupted debtor Hom because the legal and 
equitable claims subject matter of the collection action and Hollis counter-complaint were 
property of Holli's bankruptcy estate, and the contempt judgment on it's face sought to 
collect monies from Holli by way of attorneys fees. (Refer back to footnotes 5 and 7 
supra.). 
Finally, because the collection action and a!! related proceedings had 
been removed to the bankruptcy court and never remanded back to the state court, the 
Utah Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to enter any rule on the removed matter. 
27. In late 2005, NAR knowing full well that their 2004 attorneys fees 
judgment was patently void, !iened this judgment against Holli and Marti's Idaho 
residence. Attached hereto as exhibit "14" is the county recorder's certified record 
showing this lien. A federal action was brought to attack the validity of this lien and the 
underlying attorneys fees judgment and Utah Supreme Court civil contempt Judgment as 
USDC-ldaho case no. 05-CV-127. The resulting Judgment entered in this Idaho action is 
attacked under separate cover. 
Plaintiff Marti Lundahl now appears before this court as a prejudiced party -
given the defendant seeks to impose contempt sanctions against Marti as based on void 
contempt orders entered against Holli. Marti seeks declaratory judgments decreeing both 
the Utah Supreme Court civil contempt judgment and the NAR attorneys fees judgment 
void ab initio for lack of subject matter and persona! jurisdiction, for usurpation of federal 
-----·---------------------
11. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U 384 ( 1990) (Rule 11 does 
not authorize a district court to award an attorney's fee incurred in appellate proceedings. 
(a) The language of Ru!e 11 limits sanctions to district court procedure only. Furthermore--
the Advisory Committee Note suggests that 11 cannot be for awarding 
sanctions for appellate proceedings. Rule must employed by the appellate courts 
to award fees on appeal. ). 
15 
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bankruptcy power non existent in the state court, and for due process violations in the 
rendition of these related judgments. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Nar's Attorneys Fees Judgment Dated March 17, 2004 ls Void Ab 
lnitio : (1) For Lack Of Subject Matter Jurisdiction In The State 
Court When The Judgment Was Entered; (2) For Lack Of 
Personal Jurisdiction Because The NAR Litigants Never Properly 
Served Holli With The State Court Process; (3) For Due Process 
Violations In Entering The Attorneys Fees Judgment; And (4) 
For Usurpation Of Federal Power 
(1) The Utah State Court Lacked Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
To Enter The Attorneys Fees Judgment Against Holli 
Because The State Case Had Been Removed To The 
Bankruptcy Court Under The Bankruptcy Removal Statute; 
Thus Stripping The State Court Of All Jurisdiction 
The US Supreme Court has long held in Granny Goose Food Inc. v. Teamsters, 
415 US 423, 435-438 (1974) that after removal to a federal court, a state court loses 
jurisdiction over the subject matter; furthermore after removal, a judgment entered by a 
state court may be set aside, modified or otherwise corrected by a federal court on 
equitable grounds. After removal, the federal court sitting in it's bankruptcy jurisdiction 
has exclusive jurisdiction over the removed claims. See Gen. Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore Ry., 
260 US 261, 267 (1922) (after removal, the power to alter, correct, modify or otherwise 
dispose of the case passes to the federal court); In re Birting Fisheries, Inc., 300 B.R. 
489 (9th Cir. B.AP. 2003) (Bankruptcy court had exclusive jurisdiction to collaterally attack 
state court order and review for conflict with either confirmed chapter 11 plan or 
Bankruptcy Code.); In re General Carriers Corp., 258 B.R. 181 (9th Cir. B.AP. 2001) (Only 
federal court sitting in its bankruptcy jurisdiction has jurisdiction to decide matters 
concerning the removed case after state court action had been removed to bankruptcy 
court.) 12 
12. When a case is removed, it is the mandatory duty of the state court to 
proceed no further because subject matter jurisdiction has been stripped. If the state does so, 
16 
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In a case similar to the instant case, Allstate removed a case to the federal 
court under the diversity statute in re Preston v. Allstate Insurance , 627 So. 2d 1322 
(Fla. 3d DCA 1993). After removal of the case, the federal court dismissed the 
removed action without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction and did not remand the case back 
to the state court. 13 The Prestons returned to the state action and amended the original 
state complaint. The state court dismissed the amended complaint asserting lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction over the case based on the removal. The dismissal judgment 
was appealed to the state Supreme Court. The Florida Supreme Court held: 'The state 
court is allowed to resume jurisdiction of the removed case if, and only if, the federal court 
grants permission by entering an order of remand. The statute is explicit on this point. 
There was no order of remand in this case. Consequently the trial court could not resume 
jurisdiction of the removed action. Once the federal court dismissed the case without 
prejudice, the plaintiffs were free (among other things) to file another lawsuit in state or 
federal court. Absent an order of remand, however, plaintiffs could not return to state 
court to resume litigating the original (removed) case. See also 14A C. Wright, A Miller & 
E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure 551-53 (2d ed. 1985) (Unti! a remand order is 
certified and the certified remand order and File returned to the state court and docketed, 
the state court lacks jurisdiction over the removed matter.); It was necessary for 
plaintiffs to file a new lawsuit. Id. At 1324. The high court further held that it was error 
for the trial court to dismiss an action over which it had no jurisdiction. "Once a matter is 
removed to the federal court, a state trial court and its judge have no jurisdiction over the 
matter and cannot dismiss it." Weiser v. Bierbrouwerij, B. V, 430 So.2d at 987 (citations 
omitted). Accordingly, the Supreme Court struck the order granting the motion to 
dismiss and instead directed that the action was abated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
any resulting process is void. See National Steam-Ship Cp. Tugman, 106 US 118, 1 S Ct 
58, 27 LEd 87 (1882) (After removal, the duty of the state court was to proceed no further. Every 
order thereafter made by that court was coram non judice, void.) ; Johnson v. Estelle, 625 F.2d 
75, 77 (5th Cir. 1980); Same in Job v. Calder (In re Calder), 907 F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1990) 
(Removing a case to federal court causes the state court to lose jurisdiction; until a certified copy 
of a remand order is filed with the state court.). See 28 U.S.C. 1446(d); In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co , 
235 S.W.3d 619, 624 (Tex. 2007) (holding that orders issued by a trial court without remand 
jurisdiction are void.). 
13. The record shows that the federal court sitting in it's bankruptcy jurisdiction did 
the same thing in Hollis removed action against NAR. lt dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction 
and did not remand the action back to the state court. 
17 
Case 2:12-cv-00280-SWS Document 19 Filed 03/18/13 Page 18 of 77 
1446(d). 
In thls instant case, NAR obtained their attorneys fees judgment in the removed 
state action, more than a year after removal to the federal court. Six months after the 
void attorneys fees judgment was entered, the federal court entered a final judgment 
dismissing the case and did not remand the case back to the state court. The federal 
docket record shows that neither the federal court nor Holli were aware of the March 17, 
2004 attorneys fees judgment. (See federal docket as exhibit "12" attached hereto which 
does not mention this judgment). Therefore, the state court not only lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction at the time the attorneys fees judgment was entered ex parte against 
plaintiff because the state action had been removed, but the state court also lacked 
contempt jurisdiction to enter an attorneys fees judgment against Holli because these 
petitioned for this relief in the original (removed) state case. Accordingly, this court had 
a mandatory duty to vacate the March 17, 2004 attorneys fees judgment as statutorily 
abated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d). 
(2) NAR's Attorneys Fees Judgment Is Void For Failure 
To Acquire Personal Jurisdiction Over Respondent In 
The State Case Through Proper Service Of An OSC 
The power to sanction is limited by the due process clause of the United States 
Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. XlV (due course of law). Jurisdiction is the 
mandatory component needed to effect imposition of a sanction order. See Standard v. 
Olesen, 74 S. Ct.768 (1954) ("No sanction can be imposed under the Constitution absent 
proof of subject matter and personal jurisdiction".); Same In Marks v. Vehlow, 105 Idaho 
560, 567, 671 P.2d 473, 480 (1983). As decisioned by the US Supreme Court in 
Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767 (1980) (procedural due process 
mandates notice, service and opportunity to respond to an order to show cause before 
the imposition of a sanctions order.). 
In Gildea v. Guardian Title Company of Utah, 2001 UT 75 (UT 2001), the Utah 
Supreme Court reaffirmed the procedure to be employed when contempt proceedings are 
being considered against a party. "When the court considers sanctions on it's own 
initiative, due process requires the court to an order directing the party to 
18 
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show cause why that party has not violated (a and allow the party a reasonable 
time in which to file a response. Failure to give notice an order to show cause, results 
in a void judgment.). also Poljanec v. Freed Finance Company of Wyoming, 440 
P.2d 251 (Wyo. 1968) citing Spriggs v. Pioneer Carissa Gold Mines, Inc., Wyo., 378 P.2d 
238, 240, cert. den. 375 U.S. 855, 84 S.Ct. 117, 11 L.Ed.2d 82, reh. den. 375 U.S. 936, 84 
S.Ct 334, 11 L.Ed.2d 268, in order to punish for a constructive contempt, the offending 
party must have notice of the nature of the charge against him and be given an 
opportunity to answer and defend himself. That, we said is generally done by a rule to 
show cause or such other process as would meet the requirements of due process. 
Failure to give this notice results in a void judgment 
The record in this case shows that the NAR litigants purported to serve Holli 
with contempt process by mail instead of personally as required under URCP rule 4 14 , 
at a tatoo and massage parlor located in Orem, Utah, knowing full well that Holli did 
not reside at this address, and that Holli was in cache county jail as reflected on the 
federal docket - due to charges by the NAR litigants that Holli was practicing law without a 
license. (As aforesaid, these charges were dropped as frivolous.). 
Accordingly, the NAR attorneys fees judgment ls void for lack of personal 
jurisdiction over Holli. 
(3) NAR's Judgment Was Void Because Lundahl 
Was Not Provided An Impartial Tribunal 
It is well established that structural error occurs in a judicial proceeding 
14. Utah courts have acknowledged the importance of actual notice in contempt 
proceedings which requires personal service. Powers v. Taylor, 14 Utah 2d 118, 378 P.2d 519, 
520 (1963); see generally Von Hake v Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1171-72 (Utah 1988). Similarly 
other state courts also require personal service upon the contemnor to obtain personal jurisdiction 
to enter a contempt judgment. See Ex Parte Acevedo, Case No. 13-05-725- (Tex .App. 
11/9/2006). Here, Acevedo Court held that the contempt order entered against Acevedo was void 
because Acevedo was not personally served with the order to show cause citation and therefore 
not afforded adequate due process. The deputy in this case testified that the show cause notice 
was served on one of Acevedo's staff members and not personally served upon Acevedo. It is 
settled that constructive notice is inadequate when dealing with contempt matters. Notice the 
citation for contempt must be personally served on the alleged contemnor. Applied in Religious 
Technology Ctr v. Leibrech, case no OO-cv-503 (5th Cir. 2004) (we vacate the entire judgment of 
the district court including its sanction award --- for lack of jurisdiction over the alleged 
contemnor.). 
19 
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1 
where the parties are provided a biased tribunal. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 
(1927) (structural error to be subjected to a biased tribunal) cited by US v. Marcus, Case 
No. 08-1341 (Supreme Court . Ct. May 24,2010.), the high court affirmed that a 
constitutionally biased tribunal exists where the judge shows a personal bias against a 
party to the case.) In Offutt v. United States, 267 US 517, 539 (1925), the high Court set 
aside a contempt conviction imposed on a lawyer after a trial marked by personal 
recriminations and animosity between the trial judge and the lawyer. 
Furthermore, when a judge pre - determines a cause and denies a litigant of 
his right to present his case, the judge is said to be pervasively biased against that 
litigant. See Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs Of Mobile County, 517 F.2d 1044, 1045 
{5th Cir. 1975) ("Efforts to dispose of matters for reasons other than on the merits deserve 
to be characterized as "pervasive bias" or "prejudice" and meet the exception to the 
"extrajudicial source doctrine" sufficient to have the court disqualified and the judgment 
overturned.). See also United States v. Sciuto, 521 F2d 82, 85 (7th Cir. 1976) 
("Disqualification required when the record shows an effort to dispose of the case for 
reasons other than on the merits, or shows persistent due process violations committed 
by the court. Under these circumstances pervasive bias will be shown.). 
Here, the record shows that Judge Quinn never allowed Holli as the Defendant/ 
Respondent in the state case to present her case on the merits before he entered the 
February 13, 2003 judgment dismissing Holli's counterclaims with prejudice and unlawfully 
granted a coUection judgment against Holli which debt had been mooted by the 
negotiating of a check that paid in full the amount petitioned in the small claims pleading, 
(Refer back to exhibits "3" and "4" attached for collection compiaint and payment satifying 
this debt. Judge Quinn's actions evidenced dear pervasive bias against Holli and the 
inability to enter an impartial judgment thus showing that the judgment was also the 
product of fundamental error in failing to provide Holli with an impartial tribunal. 
II. The Utah Supreme Court Civil Contempt Judgment Entitled 
Holli Lundahl v. Judge Anthony Quinn Void Ab lnitio : 
(1) As In Violation Of The Automatic Stay Of The Bankruptcy 
Code Because Had Become Subject Of Holli's Bankruptcy 
; (2) For Lack Of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under The 
Bankruptcy (3) For Of Subject 
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Jurisdiction Because The Controversy Before The Court Had 
Been Mooted Several Months Before The Court Sat On The 
Controversy, (4) For Lack Of Notice And Of Any Opportunity 
To Be Heard On Any Contempt Matter, And (5) For Other Due 
Process Violations In Rendition Of The Judgment 
In Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp. 496 US 384 (1976), the High Court held that 
"Any order that exceeds the jurisdiction of the court is void, and can be attacked in ANY 
proceeding and in ANY court where the validity of the judgment come into issue:' See 
Rose v. Himely, (1808) 4 Cranch 241, 2 Led 608; Pennoyer v. Neff, (1877) 95 US 714, 24 
L Ed 565; Thompson v. Whitman (1873) 18 Wali 457, 21 I Ed 897; Windsor v. McVeigh, 
(1876) 93 US 274, 23 L Ed 914; McDonald v. Mabee, (1917) 243 US 90, 61 L Ed 608. 
"Courts are constituted by authority and they cannot go beyond that power delegated to 
them. If they act beyond that authority, and certainly in contravention of it, their 
judgments and orders are regarded as nullities and void. They are not voidable, but 
simply void, and this even prior to reversal." O!d Wayne Mut. I. Assoc. v. McDonough, 204 
U.S. 8, 27 S.Ct. 236 (1907); Wiliiamson v Berry, 8 How. 495, 540, 12 L.Ed. 1170, 1189 
(1850); Rose v Himely, 4 Cranch 241, 269, 2 L.Ed. 608, 617 (1808). Burns v. Baldwin, 
138 Idaho 480, 486, 65 P.3d 502, 508 (2003). 
Moreover, a Court has a duty to declare a judgment void for defects of personal 
jurisdiction or subject-matter jurisdiction, Catledge v. Transp. Tire Co., 107 Idaho 602, 
607, 691 P.2d 1217, 1222 (1984); or because the rendering court's action amounted to a 
plain usurpation of power constituting a violation of due process. Dept. of Health and 
Welfare v. Housel, 140 Idaho 96, 100, 90 P.3d 321, 325 (2004) (citation omitted). 
It is with these rules of law that Marti attacks the Utah Supreme Court civil 
contempt judgment entered against Holli on April 13, 2003 - as void ab initio and 
complete nullities. 
(1) The Utah Supreme Court Entered A Civil Contempt 
Judgment -Against Holli On A Case Which Had Been 
Removed To The Bankruptcy Court While A Rule 59 
Motion Attacking The February 13, 2003 Judgment 
Was Pending Before The State Trial Court 
The Utah courts have long held that a litigant 
21 
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final judgment if due process defects exist in that judgment in Pioneer, 100 F.2d 770 (10th 
Cir. 1938). Here, while the case was pending at the trial level in the Utah state court, 
Holli timely filed a Rule 59 motion attacking the February 13, 2003 judgment as wholly 
invested with due process violations. The record further shows that after Holli filed her 
rule 59 motion attacking the final judgment, Holli removed the state court action to the 
bankruptcy court. When removal is initiated at the trial level while that court has 
jurisdiction over the res, all ancillary proceedings including appellate proceedings are 
equally removed and enjoined. See Matter of Meyerland Co., 960 F.2d 512, 517 (5th Cir. 
1992) (The power of Congress to authorize removal of cases on appeal has been 
repeatedly affirmed in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 US (1 Wheat) 304, 349. 4 L Ed 97 
(1816)); Tennessee v. Davis, 100 US 257, 269 (1880); citing Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 
US (1 Wheat) 304, 349, 4 L. . 97 (1816) and Hadley 981 F. Supp. 690, 691(D.C.1997). 
Removal carries with it the whole res and matters related to that res. Martin v. Hunter's 
Lessee, 14 US (1 Wheat) 304, 349. 4 L Ed (1816) 
In addition, under the bankruptcy removal statute, either a plaintiff or defendant 
can remove an action which alleges matter "related to" a bankruptcy estate. There is no 
question in this case that NAR was seeking to enforce a fraudulently obtained judgment 
against the bankrupt Holli Lundahl's chapter 13 estate, and therefore "related to" 
jurisdiction existed to justify the removal. After removal, the federal court sitting in it's 
bankruptcy jurisdiction has exclusive jurisdiction over the removed claims. See Gen. lnv. 
Co. v. Lake Shore Ry., 260 US 261, 267 (1922); In re Birting Fisheries, Inc., 300 B.R. 489 
(9th Cir. B.A.P. 2003) (Bankruptcy court had exclusive jurisdiction to collaterally attack 
state court order and review for conflict with either confirmed chapter 11 plan or 
Bankruptcy Code.); In re General Carriers Corp., 258 B.R. 181 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2001) 
(Only federal court sitting in its bankruptcy jurisdiction has jurisdiction to decide matters 
concerning the removed case after state court action had been removed to bankruptcy 
court.) 13 See also 14A C. Wright, A Miller & E.. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure 
13. When a case is removed, it is the mandatory duty of the state court to 
proceed no further because subject matter jurisdiction has been stripped. If the state 
court does so, any resulting process is void. See National Steam~Ship Cp. Tugman, 
106 US 118, 1 S Ct 58, 27 87 (1882} (After removal, duty of the state court was 
to proceed no further. Every order thereafter made by that court was coram non judice, 
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551-53 (2d ed. 1985) (Until a remand order is certified and the certified remand order and 
file returned to the state court and docketed, the state court lacks jurisdiction over the 
removed matter.); Allman v. Hanley, 302 F2d 559, 562 (5th Cir. 1962) {state loses 
jurisdiction once removal is effected); Lowe v. Jacobs, 243 F.2d 432, 433 (5th Cir. 1957) . 
Here, all proceedings involving the NAR matter I res had been removed 
to the bankruptcy court and then subsequently withdrawn to the federal District Court of 
judge Dee Benson siting in his bankruptcy jurisdiction. The Bankruptcy docket shows that 
when Judge Dee Benson dismissed the NAR action for lack of jurisdiction and sent Holli 
out of the forum, Holli unsuccessfully appealed that decision before the 101h circuit court. 
Nevertheless no remand order was ever issued returning jurisdiction over the original 
cause to the state courts. 
Accordingly, all judgments entered concerning the NAR res after removal were 
prima facial!y void, including the Utah Supreme Court civil contempt judgment. 
(2) The Utah Supreme Court Civil Contempt Judgment Was 
Entered On Mooted Matter And Therefore Constituted An 
Advisory Opinion Prohibited Under Federal And State Law 
In Shipman v. Evans, 2004 UT 44 (Utah Supreme Ct 2004), the Utah 
Supreme Court re-affirmed that Utah Courts are not authorized to deliver advisory 
opinions or pronounce judgments on abstract questions; where the justiciable 
controversy has been decided before judgment is entered by the appellate court. The 
appellate court's oniy remedy is to dismiss the appeal as moot following US Supreme 
Court law under Steffell v. Thompson, 415 US 452, 459 n. 10 (1974) (Appellate courts are 
without power to decide questions once the controversy has been mooted. Only authority 
ls the dismiss the appeal.) Graham v. Peace Officer St. & Tr. Com'n, 737 P.2d 1060 
(Wyo. 1987) ( "We have often repeated the universal rule that a reviewing court will 
dismiss a case when, pending appeal, an event occurs which renders a cause moot and 
void.) ; Johnson v. Estelle, 625 F.2d 75, 77 (5th Cir. 1980); Same in Job v. Calder (In re 
Calder), 907 F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1990); Guilbot v. Vallejo, No. 14-07-00047-CV (Harris 
Co., TX, 2008) (Removing a case to federal court causes the state court to lose 
jurisdiction; until a certified copy of a remand order is filed with the state court.). See 28 
U.S.C. ' 1446(d); In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 235 S.W.3d 619, 624 (Tex. 2007)); Mapco, Inc. v. 
Forrest. 795 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex. 1990) (orig. proceeding) (holding that orders issued 
by a trial court without are 
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makes a determination of the issues unnecessary. Northern Utilities, Inc. v. Public 
Service Commission of Wyoming, Wyo., 620 P.2d 139, 140 (1980); State ex rel. 
Schwartz v. Jones, 61 Wyo. 350, 157 P.2d 993, 995 (1945)). 
In the NAR case, when the trial court entered a conclusive judgment on February 
14, 2003 which incorporated Holli as a party (refer back to exhibit "10" attached), the 
court admittedly reached Holli's notices to submit for decision re her intervention motion 
and thus mooted the grounds for Holli's writ petition to the Utah Supreme Court. 
Accordingly, when the Utah Supreme Court entered their "advisory opinion" on April 13, 
2003, almost two months after the issues underlying the writ petition had been mooted, 
the Utah Supreme Court entered an advisory ruling prohibited under both federal and 
state law. Under Steffel! v. Thompson, supra, the ruling was void ab initio for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction. 
(3) The Utah Su Court Civil Contempt Judgment 
Violated The Automatic Stay Of The Bankruptcy 
Code Because Holli Was The Respondent To The 
Purported Contempt Proceedings In the Utah 
Supreme Court 
The 10th Circuit had long held that where the debtor is the respondent in the 
proceeding before the court, the automatic stay bars any further prosecution of that 
proceeding. Consolidated Electric Corp., 894 F. 2d 371, 373 (101h Cir. 1990} (Stay 
applies in any official proceeding where the debtor is a ... respondent Any continuation 
of that proceeding is taken in violation of the automatic stay and consequently is void and 
without effect."). Same in Celotex Corporation v. Bennie Edwards, et al, Case No. 93-
1504 (U.S. Supreme Ct, 1995). 
The record herein shows that Holli was clearly the respondent in the Utah 
Supreme Court civil contempt proceeding as shown by the order directing the trial court to 
award attorneys fees and double costs against Holli for alleging bringing a frivolous writ 
petition. Accordingly, as a respondent in that proceeding, the automatic stay of the 
bankruptcy code applied since Holli was in a defensive position in that proceeding. 
Several Courts have thoroughly analyzed the competency of a civil contempt 
order entered against a respondent who is a debtor in bankruptcy. The 5th circuit has held 
"Where a violation constitutes a of civil contempt against a debtor and an 
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order is made during the pendency of a bankruptcy case, the contempt order is void as in 
violation of the automatic stay." Young v. Repine, No. 06-20807. July 22, 2008 (5th Cir. 
2008), "The stay applies to all attempts to obtain control over causes of action that are 
property of a bankruptcy estate." 3 Collier on Bankruptcy ~ 362.03[5}, at 362-20, 21 
(Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1997) . The legal conclusions applied were: "Civil 
contempt proceedings are conducted to exact usually a monetary penalty against the 
alleged contemnor. The monetary penalties reduce the value of estate assets in the 
bankruptcy estate and are construed as an attempt to obtain control over causes of action 
that are property of the bankruptcy's estate. As such, any non-bankruptcy court 
contempt proceeding which seeks to create a debt against the debtor or to 
diminish the vafue of estate assets, is strictly prohibited by the automatic stay of 
the bankruptcy code." In re Chaparro Martinez, 293 8.R. 387 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003); 
Foster v. Heitkemp, 670 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1982) (The automatic stay provision remains in 
effect as concerns a!I acts attempting to gain control over property of an Any 
action endeavoring to obtain control over property of an estate is void.); Thus, "[a]ny 
action in which the judgment may diminish" an asset of the bankruptcy estate "is 
unquestionably subject to a stay under this subsection." Concurring with decisions made 
in AH. Robins, 788 F.2d at 1001 (citing In re Johns Manville Corp., 33 8.R. 254, 261 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983)) ; In re Gruntz, 202 F.3d 1074, 1082 (9th Cir. 20.02) ; And In re 
Atkins, 176 BR 998, 1006 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1994). 14 
14. The propriety of entering a civil contempt judgment against a chapter 13 debtor was 
also thoroughly anlayzed in a Texas case In re Small, Civ. No. 14-08-01075-CV (Tex. App. -
Houston (14th Dist.) 2009) . Here, a Texas state court ordered the debtor to pay his wife's 
attorneys fees in a divorce proceeding while the debtor was in bankruptcy. The attorney took the 
attorneys fees judgment and applied it against the debtor's real property. The debtor was in jail 
but had filed a chapter 13 case before the judgment for attorneys fees was entered. The Texas 
appellate court held the civil contempt order entered by the state judge was void as in violation of 
the bankruptcy stay because it ordered the debtor, post petition, to pay a debt of attorneys fees 
and then sought to collect against the debtor's estate which was subject to the automatic stay. 
The automatic bankruptcy stay abates any judicial proceeding against the debtor, 
depriving state courts of jurisdiction over the debtor and his property until the stay is lifted 
or nullified by final administration of the bankruptcy case. Baytown St Bank v. Nimmons, 904 
S.W.2d 902, 905 (Tex. App.- Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied); An action taken in violation of 
the automatic bankruptcy stay is void, not merely voidable. Howell v. Thompson, 839 S W. 2d 92, 
92 (Tex. 1992) (order); Continental Casing Corp. v. Sameadan Oil Corp., 751 S.W. 2d 499, 501 
(Tex. 1988) (per curiam). The debtor here, Small, brought a contempt action against the attorney 
inside his bankruptcy case and was awarded upwards of $60,000 in punitive damages against the 
attorney for a deliberate violation of the automatic 
25 
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Holli's case bore a remarkable similarity to the Small case cited in footnote 14 
supra. The Utah Supreme Court, ex parte, imposed rule 38 sanctions against Holli and 
in favor of NAR during an appellate proceeding and then ordered the trial court to 
determine the amount of the monetary sanction for attorneys fees and double costs. 
NAR's attorney reportedly asked for these fees in violation of the automatic stay of the 
bankruptcy code as noted in the Utah Supreme court civil contempt order. The Utah 
Supreme Court civil contempt Order was void because it ordered the debtor Holli, post 
petition, to pay a debt of attorneys fees and then sought to collect that debt against Holli's 
estate assets which existed until January 4, 2006, when Hom's estate was fully 
administered and thereafter closed. See exhibit "13" attached. 
Morever, while Holli and Marti's Idaho property was still subject to the 
automatic stay of Hollis' bankruptcy estate, NAR liened that property as the attorney did 
in Small, supra. See exhibit "14" attached. The attorney was sanctioned $60,000 for 
obtaining a civil contempt order against a debtor who was in bankruptcy and thereafter 
seeking to collect on that judgment by liening the debtor's real property which was part of 
Small's chapter 13 estate. 
Based on the foregoing, the Utah Supreme Court civil contempt judgment 
which is tied to the NAR March 17, 2004 attorneys fees judgment, are void orders as in 
violation of the automatic stay of the bankruptcy code. 
(4) The Utah Supreme Court Civil Contempt Judgment Was 
Void Because No OSC Notice Was Either Identified In The 
Contempt Judgment Nor Served Upon Holli Notifying Holli 
Of The Pendency Of Any Contempt Proceeding 
The power to sanction is limited by the due process clause of the United 
States Constitution. See U.S. CONST Amend. XIV Jurisdiction is the mandatory 
component needed to effect imposition of a sanction order. See Standard v. Olesen, 
74 S. Ct 768 (1954) ("No sanction can be imposed under the Constitution absent proof of 
subject matter and personal jurisdiction." Sanction orders are in personam judgments.). 
Same In Marks v. Vehlow, 105 Idaho 560, 671 P.2d 473, 480 (1983). 
Based on the foregoing, the Utah Supreme Court lacked the power to sanction 
Holli not only because they lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the proceedings at 
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the time their civil contempt sanction was against Holli, but also because they 
failed to properly acquire personal jurisdiction over Holli's person by service of an OSC 
upon Holli. 
The face of the Utah civil contempt order does not reflect anywhere in this order 
that the Utah Supreme Court issued an OSC to Holli re cause to enter sanctions. As 
decisioned by the US Supreme Court in Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 
767 (1980) : procedural due process mandates notice, service and opportunity to 
respond to an order to show cause before the imposition of a sanctions order under 
Appellate rule 38. The Notes of Advisory Committee on Ru!es-1994 Amendment 
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 38 provide : The amendment requires that 
before a court of appeals may impose sanctions, the party to be sanctioned must have 
notice, service and an opportunity to respond. The failure to issue Holli an OSC sounds 
a death knell to the Utah Supreme Court civil contempt judgment See In Gildea v. 
Guardian Title Company of Utah, 2001 UT (UT 2001 ), reaffirming the procedure to 
be employed when contempt proceedings are being considered against a party. "When 
the court considers sanctions on it's own initiative, due process requires the court to 
issue an order directing the party to show cause why that party has not violated (a rule), 
and allow the party a reasonable time in which to file a response. Failure to give notice 
via an order to show cause, results in a void judgment. " Because there is a 
complete absence of any reference to an OSC in the Utah Supreme Court contempt 
order, and in line with this defect, the admitted failure to give Holli notice of the 
proceedings, the Utah Supreme Court civil contempt judgment is void ab initio. 
(5) Structural Error Bars Enforcement of the Utah Supreme 
Court Civil Contempt Judgment 
When rules provide the procedure upon which process is to be exercised, 
structural error occurs when that procedure is not followed at the level provided. In 
Cooter & Ge!! v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990), the high court concluded that 
Rule 11 does not authorize a district court to award an attorney's fee incurred in appellate 
proceedings. (a) language of Rule 11 limits sanctions to district court procedure only. 
Furthermore-- the Advisory Committee Note suggests that Rule 11 cannot be used for 
awarding sanctions for appellate proceedings. Rule 38 must employed by the 
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appellate courts to allow the award attorneys fees that are incurred in the appellate 
courts.). The record shows that Justice Christine Durham directed the trial court to 
determine the contempt "attorneys fees" incurred by NAR in the writ proceeding which 
NAR was not a party. The trial court had no authority to issue such sanctions under rule 
11 or rule 38. Such order by Justice Durham constituted structural error which rendered 
the civil contempt judgment void. 
Accordingly, because no notice, service, or opportunity to respond was 
given Holli, the Utah Supreme Court civil contempt judgment is void. Furthermore, 
structural error resulted in an invalid contempt judgment. 
Ill. Where Petitioner Has Established That A Judgment Is Void -
Court Mandated To Make Such A Decree and Order 
The Judgment Vacated 
"A judgment is void if the court that rendered it lacked jurisdiction of the subject 
matter, or of the parties, or if the rendering court acted in a manner inconsistent with due 
process of !aw.' " Williams v. New Orleans Public Serv., Inc., 728 F.2d 730, 735 (5th 
Cir.1984); Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 61 S.Ct. 339, 85 LEd. 20 278 (1940) (A void 
judgment also includes one procured by fraud.). 
Furthermore, a void judgment is one which has no legal force or effect whatever, 
it is an absolute nullity, its invalidity may be asserted by any person whose rights 
are affected thereby, at any time and at any place, and it need not be attacked 
directly but may be attacked collaterally whenever and wherever it is interposed, 
City of Lufkin v. McVicker, 510 S.W. 2d 141 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1973); 11 
CHARLES ALAN WRlGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER AND MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2862 (2d ed. 1995). "[T]here is no time limit for an 
attack on a judgment as void." Briley v. Hidalgo, 981 F.2d 246, 249 (5th Cir.1993) (quoting 
11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER AND MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 2862 (1973)). 
Utah has long held that where due process violations appear from the face of the 
record, the court has the duty to declare the judgment null and void and set the judgment 
aside. See Stockyards National Bank of So. Omaha v. Bragg, et at, 67 Utah 60, 246 P. 
966 (1925) [So too must a judgment or other order fall for errors of law on the 
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face of the mandatory record, such as showing the judgment obtained to be in variance 
with the practice of the court or contrary to well - recognized principles and fundamentals 
of the law. Where the face of the record shows that fundamental law was 
disregarded in the establishment of the judgment; the proceedings and the 
judgment will be rendered null and void for all purposes.as will all proceedings 
based upon and giving the void judgment enforcement effect. citing Ex Parte Fisk, 
113 us 713, 718 (1885)). 
CONCLUSION 
of the foregoing reasons, the NAR judgment dated March 17, 2004 and 
entered in Utah State Case no. 020201658 before the Third Judicial District Court and 
Utah Supreme Court Civil Contempt Judgment entered ex parte on April 3, 2003 as 
case no. 20030063 should hereby be declared void ab initio, vacated and set aside. 
Plaintiff Marti Lundahl further contends that it is irrelevant she is not named in 
the void Utah state court judgments. This Court and the Defense counsel are corruptly 
seeking to impose the civil contempt judgments against Plaintiff, thereby making plaintiff 
a person entitled to attack the validity of the void contempt judgments. 11 CHARLES 
ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER AND MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE§ 2862 (2d ed. 1995). 
Dated: March 10, 2013 
Certificate of Service 
The undersigned certifies that she will electronically served opposing counsel with 
the foregoing document and attached 14 exhibits on March 13, 2013 to the following 
email address: 
Richard Vasquez 
Law Offices of Snow, Christainsen and Martineau 
10 Exchange Place Eleventh Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
email address : 
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RONJ..l..D F. PRiCE - 5535 
Pill.li.S SCOFIELD PRICE 
A Professional Corporation 
340 Broadway Centre 
'l 11 East Bmadwzy 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411 i 
Te\aphone'. {801) 322-2002 
Facsimile: (801) 322-2003 
for 
i 
IN THE THIRD JUD!ClAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE STATE OF UTAH 
N.AR, 





MARKT. OLSON; OU;>ON ASSOC LA.TES, P. C.; 
ANTHONY C. T!DViEU, 0.0.S., OLYMPUS Vi2N 
DEt.JTALA!W NAR, 
Counte rcla irnJDefend ants. 
Plaintiff and countercl</1m defendants' 
Attome}~s' Fees And Double Costs Hofli 
ORDER AWARDING ATTORNEYS' FEES Aim 
DOUBLE COSTS AGAJNST HOW LUNDAHL, AND 
JUDGEMENT AGAINST How LUNDAHL FOR 
AITORNEYS' FEES AND DOUBLE COSTS 
FY THAT THE FOREGOlNG 
ANO-CORRECT COPY 
01 L FILED IN FIRST 
OURTS. 
Civit No. 020201658 
Anthony Quinn 
"Moving Parties") Motion For Award Of 
And For Otl;er Relief (ihe 
\LI !i 
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came before the Court for hearing at 8:30 am on Thursday, 19 February 2004. Ronald F. Price 
of the law firm PETERS SCOFIELD PrucE A Professi'tJnal Corporation appeared on behalf of t1e Moving 
Parties. Additionally, counterclaim defendant Marie T. Olson was present No otl)er persons er 
parties were present Thus, Holli Lundahl did not appear. Additiona!iy, defendants Kem Lundahl 
and John Behle did not appear and were not represented by counsel. 
The having t'le Motion, the supporting memorandum and the affidavit of 
Ronald F. Price in of tie Motion, having determined that Holll lundah! was properly 
served with the Motion, foe supporting memorandum and the Price having determined 
that Hom Lundah! was properly served wit"i notice of the hearing on the Motion, being duly advised 
in the premises and upon good cause showing, hereby enters the following order and judgment 
with respect to the Motion: 
1. Pursuant to the ruling of.the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Lundahl v. Quinn, 
67 P .3d i 000 (Utah 2003) that the Moving Parties are entitled to recover from Holli Lundahl the 
amount of attorneys' fees and double costs incurred by the Moving Parties in connection .wlth 
responding to, and as a result of, the Petition for Extra Ordinary Writ Directed to Judge Anthony 
Quinn of the Third Judicial District Court Pursuant to Rule 658 (the "Petition"} filed by Hom 
Lundahl in connection with this matter, and pursuant to the Utah Supreme Court's instructions in 
the Lundahl opinion that this Court determine the amount of those attorneys' fees and double 
. . 
costs to ml'lard and to enter such an award against Holli Lundahl and in fa.v.or of the Moving 
Parties, the Court hereby ORDERS that Hom Lundahl shall pay to the Moving Parties the sum 
of $4 707.50 for attorneys' fees which the Moving Parties incurred in connection with responding 
2 
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to the Petition, and the additional wm of $598.70 for double costs which the Moving Parties 
incurred in connection wllil resr~ding to the Pefilion. This order shan constitute a judgment 
against Hom Lundahl. 
DONE this .11 
BYlHECOURT 
3 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 23ro day of February 2004, and on lhis ? day of March. 
2004, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER AWARDING ATTORNEYS' FEES AND OOUE:!.E 
COSTS AG>JNST HoLIJ LUNDAHL, AND JUDGEMENT AG>JNST How LUHDA.HL f'OR A ITORNEYS' FEES 
AND DOUBLE Cosrs was serv~ in the manner indicated to the foliowing: 
Gregory M. Constantino 
Constantino Law Office, P.C. 
68 South Main Street, Suite #BOO 
Salt Lake Cfty, Utah 84101 
No. (801) 530-i 333 
Hom Ltmda:h! 
200 East Center Street 
Oram, Utah 84057 
4 
_:::£... U.S. Mail 
__ Federal Express 
__ Hand Del!verf 
U.S. 
__ Federal Express 
__ Hand De!rve.ry· 
Case 2:12-cv-00280-SWS Document 19 Filed 03/18/13 Page 35 of 77 
I 
2 
Case 2:12-cv-00280-SWS Document 19 Filed 03/18/13 Page 36 of 77 
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67 P.3d l 000, 470 Utah Adv. Rep. 28, 2003 OT I l 
(Cite lls: 67 P .3d 1000) 
Supreme Cou.-t of Utah. 
Holli LUNDAHL, Petitioner, 
v. 
The Honornh1e Anthony QUINN, Respondent. 
N.A.R. INC., Mark T. Olson, Olson & Associates, 
P.C., Anthony Tidwell, D.D.S., and OlyropllS View 
Dental Center, Respondents and Real Parties in In-
terest 
No. 20030062. 
sought to interve,.~ in u.micr'lv11w 
The District Court, Salt 
£?,!!~~-""'~:.!!!£™' J., re!'hsed to address 
n~••fiA>N>n for ex.l:rlJQf-
Supreme that: \ l) when an 
indlvi<Jlual avails herself of the judicial machinery as a 
matter of routine, special leniency on the basis of pro 
>e status is manifestly inappropriate; {2) litigant would 
no longer be affon!ed reasonable indulgence; (3) liti-
gilllt's petition was frivolou.~ on its face; and (4) real 
parties in interest were entitled 10 s!:cmey foes and 
double costs for defending action. 
So ordered. 
West Head.notes 
45 Attorney &lld Client 
:'!ID Retainer and Authority 
45k62 k. Rights ofl.itigants to Act in Person or 
by Attorney, M.Q!t Cited Cases 
Supreme Court is generally lenient with pro se 
litigant~. 
ill Attorney tmd Client 45 ~62 
45 Attorney and Client 
;t5lJ Rewiner !JJld Aud10rity 
Pagel 
45k62 k. Rights ofl.itigauts to Act in Person or 
by Attorney. Most Cited C~ 
Wnen an individual avails herself of !he judicial 
machinery as a matter of routine, special leniency on 
th:: basis of pro se status is mll!lifest! y inappropriate, 
pill"icul.arly when the filings in qulll!tion rue routinely 
frivolous and have been brought wilh the apparent 
purpose, or al lellllt effect, of harassment, not only of 
opposing parties, but of !.he judicial machinery itself. 
ill Attorney and C.llent 45 €;::::>62 
45 Attorney and C1ient 
~Retainer Md Authority 
:I~ L to Act in Person or 
by Attorney. ~"OE.'-""'-'"-~'~""'"' 
Prose litigan: wbo bad numerous 
prose acti.:m:s would no longer 
indulgence, and lhus, litigant would be cl:wged with 
fall lw:lowletlge and undenrumding Qf all relevant 
Statutes, rules, and c= law, where fo.igaru hlld chosen 
to make legal self-representation a full-time hobby, if 
oot a career. 
Ml Attorney and Client 45 £;:::;;>62 
45 Attorney and Client 
~ Re!!liner and Authority 
4 5k62 k. Rights of Urlgant.~ to Act in Person or 
by Attorney. M2>'1.t Cited <;ases 
Supreme C.iurt deemed any argument by pro se 
litigant thal a:tempted to distort legal authority fur 
purpose of evading or circumventing pros.crlptioo 
against unlicensed pmctice of law a.:i oot brought in 
good faith, for purpo!!CS of litigant's petition seeldng 
_extraordinary writ allowing her to intervene in un-
derlying eo!lec!ions action, where litigant had been 
e;:press!y informed in the past that she could not rep-
resent the legal ~nteresis of other persons and litigant 
cited statute prohibiting practicing law without a li-
cense in petition. U.C.A 1953. 78-9- !O! (3}. 
VGE'RTIFY THAT THE FOR~GOING 
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{Cite as: 67 .P.3d 1000) 
102 Costs 
28, 2003 UT 1 ' 
!021 Natur<:, Grounds, and Extent of Right m 
General 
102.k t Nat>Jre and Grounds of Right 
k. ln General.~~~~~~ 
Pro sc litigant's petition for extraordinary writ, 
requesting an order directing trial court to allow her to 
intervene as a matter of right in underlying collections 
action, failed to comply with requisite standard for 
asserting such a petition, and thus, petition was friv-
olous on i!s face; rn!e governing substitution of paries 
provided proper mechanism, if any, for litigant to 
obmin relief she and 
she even pu.rport to argu.e 
extension or modificntion. 
1fil P:irties 187 
287. Parties 
287IV New Parties and Change of Parties 
287k5.1 Substitution 
2B7k5S k. b GeneraL "'~"'·"'~""""-"'"""'""' 
Courts cannot be compel.led to recog::llze a sub-
slitution of parties at tile whim of tl:e movnnt Rules 
Civ.Proc., Rule 2.li:;l. 
Appeal and Error 30 €:=:>428(2) 
JQ Appeal a::id Error 
30V'l] T ransfor of Cause 
J9V1IrDi Writ of Error, Citation, or Notice 
Filing Notice and Proof of Service 
~Qf.:'!£?.GJ k Time for fi!i.ng. 
Cited Cases 
\\!here a timely motion for attorney fees is inter-
posed, tJi.e time for filing a notice of appeal does not 
begin to run until a final order fixing the innount of 
those foes is entered. 
2~7 .Parties 




Provision in rnle governing substitution of parties 
that the action be continued by or against the 
original party," urJess the court grants a motion for 
substitution, preserves tbc court's inherent power to 
manage the case without undue disruption, confusion, 




Persons \Vho May or Must Sue 
Pretrial Prncedure 307 A 
397;1. Pretrial Proceu'uro 
307 Ai:II Dismissal 
in l.nterest 
1Q] Affl(!i) 1nvvlu.-itar/ Dismissal 
}_07 AJilll2}£ Gro1mds in General 
~,_,_,,~.:;.Par-Jes, Defects as to 
k In General. ~_lpst 
Rule requinng actiom to be brought hi the nam.e 
of a real party in imerest and prohibiting dismissal of 
action or. ground that it was not prosecuted in name of 
real party in interest until court hnd appropriately 
examined :he issue was inapplicable to prose litigant's 
request to intervene in underlying col:ections action as 
a matter of right for purposes of pursuir.g counter-
claim, where there was no question that counterclaims 
were initially brought in name of a real party in in-
terest and basis for dismissal of lawsuit had nothing to 
do with litigant's belated assertion that she should be 
allowed to i:itervene. Ruics Civ.Proc., Rule 171.e}. 
102 Costs 
l 02! Nature, Grounds, and Extent of Right ir: 
General 
lncre::;sd Costs, and Double or Treble 
Costs 
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Costs 102 ~194.44 
102 Costs 
l02Vlil Attorney Fees 
102kl94.44 k. Bad Faith or Meritless Litiga-
tion. Most Cited Cases 
Pro se litigant's frwolous petition for extraordi-
nary relief, requesting a.'l order directing trial court to 
allow her 10 inter1ene as a maner of right i.n underly-
ing collections action, entitled real parties in interest to 
attorney fees and double costs for defending such 
petition. Rules Apo.Pree,, Rule 3J(c)(l1; Rules 
Civ.Proc. Rule 65B(a1. 
llll Costs 102 
lQl. Costs 
rn;;;.:v1 Costs; in Forma 
IO~AJ 27 Actiou or Defense in Fom1a Pauperts 
l.Q]Jc 12a k Nam.re and Grour:d.~ of Right 
Ordinarily, wi:J.ere litigants cannot afford to pay a 
filing fee, that fee is waived so that poverty will not 
create a de facto barrier to access to the courts. 
*1001 Holli Lund.ahl, petitioner prose. 
~~<;t~~±-!.!~' Salt Lake City, for N.A.R., Mark 
Olson, Olson & i\.:ssociates, Anthony Tidwell. 
Olympus View Denial Center. 
PER CURIA-\1: 
"J l This matter comes before the court on petition 
for extraordinary writ The petitioner, Hom Lundahl, 
asserts she bas filw a motion to intervene and an 
amended counterclaim comolaint on which the district 
court refused :&.rule bccaus; it deemed her a nonpa.rty 
lo the action. fodge AntJiony Quinn filed a response, 
as did N.AR. be., Mark T. O!son. Olson & Associ-
ates, P .C, Anthony Tidwell, D.D.S., and Olympus 
View Dentai Center as real parties in interest. We 
deny the petition and further hold that it is frivolous. 
?age J 
'I! 2 1\s background to this court's order on lhis 
petition, a brief recitation of the history of petitioner's 
many appcara."lces before this court is appropriate. 
Since 1999, Holli Lundahl Elli has submitted no fewer 
than twenty-seven filings, consisting of ninetee::i ap-
peals, four petitions for extraordinary writ (includi11g. 
the instant petition), two petitions for writ ofcert[orari, 
a.71.d two petitions for interlocutory appeal. Of these, 
five appeals are presently p~d~ before e_il?er Lli.is 
court or Liie court of appeals, """' two decisions on 
appeal were summarily affirmed, one dedsiotl on 
appeal has been affirmed per curiam, four appeals 
w;re dismissed for lack of jurisdiction (including 
Huili's uttempt to appeal a criminal case where the 
lower court had dismissed the cha.'"geS against her), 
two were dismissed as premature, one appe~ 
was dismissed for ~n improper rule 54(b) certificatio::, 
a:1d one was voluntari;y dismis.sed. Three pe-
ti[ion.s for 
have been denied. 
fN l. Because this roaHtr was originally 
brought as a counterclaim by Hoili Lund.i.hl's 
sister, Kelli Lundahl, v .. e generally will refer 
to them by their first names to avoid confu-
sion.. 
FN2. Four of Llie nineteen appeals noted 
above were consolidated into a single action, 
leaving sixteen separate appeals for disposi-
tion. 
'1) 3 1n fief.son v. }acohsen, 669 ~.2d 1207, i 2 i3 
i]Jtah 1983'), Hus court held that "as a genera! role, a 
party who represents himself will be held to the same 
standard of knowledge :md practice as any qualified 
member of lbe bar." Nevenheless, Nelson also noted 
that " 'because of his lack of technical knowledge of 
law and procedure (a layman ac.ting as his own attor-
ney) should be accorded every*ltl!J2 consideration 
that may reasonably be indulged.' " id. (bracketed 
ianguagc in original) (quoting Heathman v. Hutch l 3 
Uta)) 2d 2.2.§., 268,, 372 P 2d 990, 99 l r l962)) 
Lllf_:n ~ 4 :\ccordingly, fois court generally is le· 
nicnt with prose litigant.,. !r.dividuaJs have a right to 
represent themselves wit..'1out being compel1ed to seek 
professional ass.ista:ice. \Vbere they are largely 
strangers to the legal system, courts arc understanda-
bly loath to sanction t.'tem for a procedurat misstep 
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here or thcreH Holli1 however 1 is a str:n1ger to 
the legal system. Wbcre most ordin:i.ry wtlividuals 
find :hemse!ves in court on only a handfol of occa-
sions in their iives, Holli has managed to embroil 
herself in more litigation iJi just a few sh0r1 years than 
one would thIDk humanly possible. Wben an indi-
vidual avails herself of the judicial machinery as a 
matter of routine, special leniency on the basis of pro 
se status is manifestly inappropriate. 
ill, 5 This is particularly true where the filings in 
question are routinely frivolous and have been brought 
with the apparent purpose, or at least effect, of har-
assment, not only of opposing par'Jes, but of the judi-
cial machinery itself. \Vb.en Holli is Wl.Successful in 
the relief she seeks 1 she h;1S no~ 
resorted to collateral attack on the 
from district cour: denials of petitions for extnlord;,. 
nary relief narnicg as defend::mts. Tnerefcre1 
t.,e dicru.m in l'iel.son cautioniug 
courts to be len.iem with pro se 
clear that the re=nable 
we now r!1ake 
ilia! has been 
afforded to Holli in :..':e past is al an end. Wbere Holli 
has chosen to make iegal self-representation a 
foll-time hobby, if not a care.er, it is not too much to 
expect her to strictly abide by the ruies the 
appearances of before th.is court. Tnerefore, 
she sball be charged with foll knowledge and under-
standing of all relevant statc!es, rules, and case law. 
",) 6 We also note Holli has occasionaUy employed 
the right to se!f-repn::senLl!tiou in a questionable 
manner. In this petition, as well as in at least three 
other recent appellate filings, Holli has purportedly 
acquired another person's cause of action by assign· 
ment and tlien has professed to represent thar cause of 
action in her own rigbt.rn;i The Utah State Bar Rules of 
lntegrn!ioc and Management do not "prohibit a person 
who is unlicensed as an iltlorney at law ... from per-
sonaliy representmg that person's ov.11 interests in a 
cause to which tbe person is a party." J,}llih S tatc \l_ill 
R. integ;a1ion and Manageme!l!J3_ IlI!T}. However, 
this exception to the prohibition on the unauthorized 
practice of Jaw is limited to actions where "the person 
is a party in his or her own right and not as p.n as-
signee" E'.:f~ ld. (emphasis added). In this petition; 
Holli concedes the cause of action belonged 
solely lo Kelli Lundahl. On pages five and six of her 
petiuon, Holli asserts Kelli's counsel abandoned her 
P:Ige 4 
on the momii>g of a heJring :o determine a mouon for 
summ:i.ry judgment. Holli then states tMt "Kelli was 
unable to obtain other coue..sel willing lo sue ru1 at-
torney. Accordingly, Kelli assigned her property 
damage claims lo Holli Lundahl." (Em;;hasis added.) 
ln other words, the expressed purpose of the assign-
ment was to allow Holli 10 prosecute the action be-
cailse Kelli could not obtain a licensed attorney. 
FN3. Lundahl v. Alta View Hospital. .No. 
20020749; Lundahl v. Qwest CommunU:a-
tions, No. 20020748; Lundahl v. llJC, No. 
200 i 0336. Tne response to the instant peti-
tion aiso contains some very troubling alle· 
gations tba t Holli has appea.-ed at hearings 
and Le::ielf as Kelii 
Resp(Jnd'CTJ\S have attached an aifi-
as }(eJlL We note thJt t::tis af:id:rvit does 
Holh Lundabl as the per-
son aopcarine: we aJsc note some of u1e al-
" arc ...,not by affidavit a.11d 
are heJ.rsay. We therefore make clear tho! 
they do nOt affect our decision today. 
Subsection 78-9-101(3) of the Utah 
Code contaln.s substnntia!ly the same provi-
sion. lnitially s.cheduled to be repealed on 
May l, 2003, :he repeal date has been ex-
tended to May 3, 2004. See H.B. 349 Sl, 
2003 Gen. Sess. (Utd1) (enac:ed). 
~i 7 We offer no ruling at this time regarding 
whether Holli has violated the proscription* IIJ03 on 
the unauthorized practice of law Nonetheless, it re-
mains pertinent to our purposes here that she actually 
cited section 78-9-101 of the Utah Code in her petition 
and that she has been expressly informed iri the pa.st 
that she cnnnot represent the legal mterests of other 
persons.fl!j Conset:juently, we deem any argumen! t.luit 
mt.:mpts to distort legal authority for the purpose of 
evading or circwnvenling Liie proscription against 
unlicensed practice as not brought in good faith 
Ef:J~ E.g.. Lundahl Alra View 1Iosp11al, 
No. 20020749 (letter from court dated Oc-
tober 23. 2002) 
'""'"'-'""'-'-"'.1 .. 0!.'-"".,.· "'-~;;,.e...\!.l.~~""'''~ .E roce-
fri volous appeal, motion, bnef. or 
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other paper i$ one that is not grounded in fact, not 
warranted by existing iaw, or not based on a good faith 
argument to extend, modify, or reverse e:dsfrng law." 
With this standard in mmd, we turn to L'":e present 
petition. T'.1e underl;~ng collections action was com· 
rnenced against Kelli as a defendant. 111e plaintiffs 
eventually agreed to dismiss the action w1th prejudice, 
apparently due to settlement of the claim. However, 
the case continued forward because Kelli elected to 
pursue a counterclafrn against the plaintiff and otl:er 
parties. On November 25, 2002, the district court 
granted the counterclaim defendants' motion for 
summa.~f judgment and directed counsel to prepare 
the order. According to Holli's petition, Kelli assigned 
ber claims on December 4, 2002. Holli asser'.s she then 
move.cl to intervene fl:!.~ on December 6, followed by 
n.umerous mot.ions and The counterclaim 
defendants moved for attorney fees, and the district 
court scheduled a on th;;t mJtter. 
a.11 order to the November 25 
on Deceinber 27 ~ and tbe 
conducted on January J 6, 2003. The 
Ja.nuary 16~ 2003) hearing before the di.strict court 
indicates Kelli appeared and was by li-
censed legal counsel. It is not clear whet.her Ho!J.i was 
present at Llie The district court indicated it 
would av.'<l!'d a fi .. '1:.ed amount of attorney fees and 
directed the counterclaim defend.ants' counsel to pre-
pare an order. The district 'Court stated it would not 
address Holli's pleadings because she was not a party 
to the case. It also specifically state.cl it wouid not 
aUow HoUi to appear as a party unless she filed a 
motion for substitution to rule 25(c) of ths; 
Yl:iill.~1.iJ~.s .. Jl1J&llim~~r~. Holli then brought the 
instant petition, requesting an order directi..rig the dis-
trict court to al low her lo intervene as a matter of right. 
FN6. The respondents to the petition dispute 
whether this motion was actuJJUy filed. They 
assert Holli obtained a date-stamped copy 
without lea"0JJg a copy for the district court 
While these allegations are also troubling, 
resolution of the conflicting allegations is not 
materiai to our decision here. For the limited 
purvose of reviewing this petition, we \vill 





on the documentation provided by 
it is not warracted by existing law. A 
writ may be brought oPJy 
5 
where "no other piain, speedy and adequate is 
available." Utah R. Civ. P 65filfil. Wbile Holli 
acknowledges this standard, her petition manifostly 
fails to comply wiLh. it 
FN7. The bulk of the allegations of fact in 
Holli's petmon are argumentative, 
conclusory, or irreleva.'11- Because !.his couri 
doe:; not have access to the record, it must 
necessarily rely on those and docu-
ments properly derived from that record and· 
submitted as part of !he petition to guide its 
deterrnl:nation of frivolousness. 
the court upon r.11oti(1r,. di:ects the person to whom the 
int.ere.st is t::ra.uSferred to be S"'-.Ibstiruted in the act.ion,'' 
Wnile nr1e 25(£} m 
pcnnissive rather than ma.rn:latory terms, it is clear 
courts cannot be compelled to recog:ni:ze a substitution 
of parties at the w!-illn of the mov;int. See, e.g .• b:~qjder 
l 2£D. (upholding denial of motion for substitution of 
real party in interest, where u:olion was filed subse-
cp . .:ent to default judgment). * 1004 The provision L'i:it 
tb.e action "may be continued by or against fr1e ongina! 
party," unless Llic: court grants a motion for sub:>titu-
tio11. Dreserves the cou..111s inherent power to manage 
the ·c~se without undue dis01ption, confusion, or in-
l<;rference.£1:!! See Briggs v. He.fs. ) 22 Utah .559, 56.L, 
252 P.2d_53S, 539 (19531. 
FN8. One of Holli's asserted justifications for 
;eking an extraordinary writ is her claim 
that the time for filing a notice of appeai 
began to :-un on December 27, 2002. The real 
panies in intcres!, on the other hand, assert 
that order was not a final judgment Regard-
'., less, where a timely mouon for allomey fees 
is interposed, the time for filing a notice of 
appeal does not \Jegin to run until a final or· 
der fixing the amount of those fees is entered 
See ~QQQ_i.[L:t 
("[Al irlal court must 
determine the am:mnt of attorney fees 
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awarclahie to a party before the judgment 
becomes final for purposes of appeal."); see 
also Sinner v. Schriever. 2000 trr 45. f 19, 2 
P.3d 442. In this case, the final order on the 
motion for attorney fees had not been filed at 
the time Holli submitted this petition, and, in 
any event, Holli's own failure to timely move 
for substitution does. not create au emergency 
necessitating this court's intervention. 
ill '!I l ! Holli instead improperly moved to in-
tervene as a matter of right under rule 24(a).mi Rule 
24(a) grants a right to intervene, upon "ri.m.ely appli-
cation," where the applicant "cl.aims an interest relat-
ing to the property or transaction which is the subject 
of the action.'' however, cannot claim an inde-
pendent interest relating to either property or a trm:is-
action because the "tra:nsaclimi" at issue is the alleged 
conveyance of ihc chose in action il~eli. Jf couns were 
lO countenance such subterfuges, it would confer an 
um:onditional to intervene on the entire universe 
of individuals or entities capable of 
the assignment of a C<Juse of action. 
FN9. Holli additionally relies on@~ l 7(a} oJ 
the Rules of Civil Procedure. Rnk 17(a) re-
quires actions to be brought in the name of a 
real party in interest. It also prohibits dis-
missal of the action "on the ground that it is 
not prosecuted in the name of the real party in 
interest," until the court has appropriately 
examined the issue. This rule plainly is in-
apposite. There is oo question the counter· 
o!a[ms initially were brought in the name of a 
real party in interest. Aiso, the bas:s for dis-
missal of the lawsuit had nothing to do with 
Holli's belated assertion that she shonld be 
allowed to intervene; indeed, the district 
cou.rt granted SUO"..rnary judgment before 
Holli received her purponed assigru:nent. 
fl 12 Conse.quentl.y, the district court's justifiable 
refusal to address a multitude of last-ditch, disruptive 
legal filings was well within its diuretion nnd ~vp­
ported by Holli's failure to avail herself of the proce-
dural rule designed te afford her !l1e relief she claimed. 
Holli has documented no basis i.u law for bringing a 
petition for extraordinary writ. Nor does she even 
purport to argue in favor of a good fuith extension or 
modification. bstead, the legal she presents 
in support of her petition is confined 10 a conclusory 
assertion that she has a stat..ilo.ry right to i.nter1ene, 
accompanied by several manifestly inapposite cita· 
tions Vt'here nile 25fc) provided the proper mecl:rn-
n.ism, if any, for HolJi to obtain the ~lief she .requests, 
F!'lo her petition for extraordinary relief is frivolous on 
its face. 
fN 10, Si,.,ce rule 38 of the Utah Rules Qf 
Appeila1e Procedure allows the appellate 
eoun to independently determine prop!!r 
substitution of parties, Holli would not have 
been deprived of her right 10 seek substituc 
tfon even if she had brought a proper motion 
for substitution and the district coun had 
failed to rule on it prior to entry of final 
Jut!gnaerit. Assuming, without deciding, !bat 
a motion for substitution prior to 
entry of final judgment would not loll ilic 
time for a notice of appeal, the to 
appeel wouid remain vested in Kelli, and 
Holli could to pursue ber 
chii.rn of before L~e appellate 
court 
UQJ ii I J We therefore turu to the appropriate 
consequence for filing a frivolous pleading. Rule 33(a) 
oft.he Utah Rules of A..miellate Procedure provides that 
"if the court determines that a motion made or appeal 
taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, 
i! sh.all award just damages!' llill Pursuant to this 
provision, the real·piuty-i.o-intcrest respondents bave 
requested costs a.ad attorney fees. See~""'-'-"'-'-"'~'-' 
33(c)(l}. We hoid N.A.R. Inc., Mark Oisoa, Olson & 
Associates, P.C., Anthony Tidwell, D.D.S., and 
Olympus View Dental Center are entitled to attorney 
fees and double e-0sts for the time and resources ex-
pended in ~ 1005 defending against this frivolous 
. petition_ We direct the district court to determine the 
! 
am.cunt of those sanctions and to take whatever other 
actions it deems appropriate within its jurisdictional 
Luthority. 
fNl L Fer purposes of tr.is n:ile, "a motion 
made or appeal takenM necessarily i~ludes 
all filings thnt are submitted to this court. 
Otberwi.<;e, parties would be excused from 
the consequences of filing a frivolous peti-
tion for discrctionnrj review. 
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l4, 2002 
KELLI LUNDAHL 
2748 N 930 EAST 
PROVO, UT 84604 
Reference Number: 68515-60676 
Original Creditor: Olympus View Dental-Anthony Tidwell DDS 









Estimated Service Fees: 




AS OF 02/14/2002: 
the 
tin~ Summons '1nd 
whatever means 
runourH due. As of 
$'i0'7J1 
.....,/ '·~ 
THE BALANCE DUE Wll,L CHANGE DAILY AS Il\1TEREST, COURT COSTS AND 
A1TORNEY FEES {IF APPUCABLE TO YOUR ACCOUNTJ ARE INCURRED. 
lF YOU PAY PRIOR TO OUR F1L!NG THE COMPLAL'-11, YOU MAY BE ABLE TO AVOID 
PA YING IBE FJLL"iG FEE. PLEASE CALL FOR THE CORRECT BALANCE BEFORE 
SENDING PA YMEN1. 
OLSON ASSOCIATES. P.C. 
Attorneys for N.A.R,, foe. 
THIS IS A COi\1Mll1'<1CATION FROllrf A DEBT COLLECTOR. 
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Mark T. Olson (5529) 
OLSON ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
10 West Broadway, Suite 750 
S€llt Lake City, U1' 94101 
Telephone: (801)363-.9966 
Reference No. 69515-60676 
IN THE T'rl:RD DISTRICT COURT, i>'l'GR.J:l.AY DBPli.RTMENT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STAT.E OF trI'AR 
N .A. R., INC. 
C 0 M P L A I N T 
Plaintiff) 
CaSf>! No. 
Jefendants. j J1TDGE 
I 
y., _______ , __ , l ______ -------
Plaintiff. N.A.R., INC., of Defendants and 
as follows~ 
. That Plaintiff is a Utah Co:rporatiort, with ita princi.pa1 
place of business in Salt .Lake County, Utah. 
2. Th.at Defendants are residents of, or the subject agreement 
was executed in, SALT ;:...l\KE COQNIY. 
3. That the amount in cont:roversy 1 excluaive cf costs 1 does 
not exceed $2000.00. 
<l. That under the terms of a 0 signed credit agreemen<: dated 
11/27/2000, (See copy of agxeemeut attached hereto) the 
Defendants are indebted to: Q1yrnpus View Dental-JL-ithony Tidwell DDS 
in the amount of $382.59 fer dental ser<ices together with 
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interest thereon in the anmunt of $15. 62 at: the current rate of 
21.00~ since 12/05/2001, the appro::d.mate date of the default. 
S. That the agreement provides for a reasoni!ble attorney's 
fee. 
f. That prier to this action the above account was assigned 
to Plaintiff herein, who is now entitled to bring sui':: thereon, 
7. That the subject obligation is a family expense, Defen-
dar.ts were acting as a !arniJy unit at the t:.rne the obligation •,;as 
incurred, and Defenda:nt:E are jointly and severally liable upon 
this debt pursuant to Ut~~ Code ~,.nn. Sect.l.on 30-2-9, 
B~ If authorized by contract, the balance may 
include a collection agency fee. 
ff 
re sed, or failed, to pay. 
against Defendants 
in the S\.l.Jrt of $382.59, together with court costs, and int.crest 
thereon, •at 21~00~ from 12/os/2001, post: judgrnent interest at 
21.00% frcrr, the date of judgment, and a reasonable attorney's 
fee Pu.!:Suant to Rule 4-505.01 in the a..~ount of $150.00, or as 
esta..'?lished by affidavit purguant to Rule 4-SCS, Utah Code of 
J"udicial Administration. 
DATE'JJ this 14 day of FEBRUARY, 2002. 
Plai~tiff's Address: 
10 Weat Broadway, Sulte 610 
Salt ~ake City, Utah 84101 
OLSON ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Plaintiff 
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M.D. D!CT, LLC. 
535 E. .;sons. SV!TE iHW 
SALT L"$£ CITY, UTAH z.!!07 
(50;) 293<3 H}C 
OL£n &. Ass. (}J:lthoncy Tidweij) 
HJ Wd ·Sm:a.dMy~750 
S:ili L<k!: Ci1y, lJtllh 84 ID l 
F1B5T SECUPJfY , 
fUt.,""7 fJNiON OFr:i;..,, 
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P--CL/ .l'D:co/3 /19 ·-AAR-02D!i3 CL:';! /:£24 Uib£B/597. 21/USD/'176313 
/ l/OOODOOQ021~Q008,1 5'6 /SV • ,102122GEGH350/ 
·-. , ----~ 
iClosed i.s the photocopied ,i..teru ycu J;eCjlle.St..ed~ ' }'O!" furt.her E!;SSi&tance 7 
.e·ase call ::.-.a00·-85 9-·3557. \: ·-800-'J.'O·- WELLS ! Y-'.JtJ have no: J:>een charged 1! 
~e fc:r thi.s ~e.rv .ice_ 
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I:l\J TF.E YBIR.D DIS'I'RICT CDDRT, MIJRRAY DEPP~RTI~fil!J'"f 
SJ~LT L~._f\:E COL1:::T-£, STATE ('F CTl~S 
JS .A.R., lNC 
et 21-. 
De.fenda12L ( s) . 
Il\: TEIS )\CTIOJ\T 1 t.he DefenCant {s) : 
MAR 2 7 2DO? 
fai.led Le 
appear CL"ld ansh,.er Plainti:::-f ts on file t.e:rein 1 and the 
, the defal~l t cf 
sai.d IJef enCant { s) in c:he 
to law, 
~~ttest ;nv ha:nd.1 and the seal of said Court: this 
of 2002. 
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Mark T Olson (5529} 
OLSON llBSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorneys for PlaL~tiff 
10 Vlest 1 Suite 750 
Salt Lake OT 84101 
Reference l'lo, 
IJefendar~t ( s) ~ 
T11e Pla.ir.ti£ filed it.s :::c.use of actionr tb.e Clerk 
er1tered tb.e defc~ul t 
reason of breach of contract, it is hereby.: 
entered in fa-;,roi- cf. Plaintiff 
PR::C!.'\FCIPAL 3AL.l1-1<1C2: :-
PE.EJITD0YIE1\T :::S.JTE:f-:ESJ." FEOJ,·1 12/0S/2GC~~: 
CCl1?h~TI1T F'Il:I?>JG :FEB~ 
PROCESS SER\lTCE l~EE: 
o~rHER CODT:1:' C().STS : 
I~TTQR!:Jif~ FEES : 
RETORH C?..EC!\: FEE: 
$ 3 2'' 
'"' 
:::: 
$ J ,, 1 a 
5 } 
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2 Interest as to Defen6a.nt, KELLI LillT.:JP1i11 on total 
3. 
is 21.00% per ar;num fro~ the date of 
is enter.e-ii .in fa\.ror of Plaintiff and 
PRI.NCIPP.21 BJl.LFECE: 
PREJODGMEfv'T IN'I'E'""ri.EST FROM 12 / 0 5 / 2 0 0 l: 
COI".!PlJ',I.l'n' FILING F.EE: 
PROC'ESS SERVICE FEE: 
O~~ CODR'T COSTf3: 
? .. TI'CRNEY FE:ES f 
RETDFJ} CIIBCK FEB~ 























Defend<3..r1t f K£LLI e:xpeilded in collecting s2.id JUagrnent: 
by exect1tio:c.t or 
2002. 
DEFEl(D . .?iN"'}'· I s Il\-P'OR11?~"2ION': 
KEL.l)I 'f.,ffiffiAfIL 
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-lr'lit>r1i:1r:.t!on 
be::fcre and atter th0. n~wnber1 fctJ~~_,,.,:anpJe ~~l ~ .. 1 
tnrve t>. r1eg~ltive 11-ffec:-r yo1.;r h.:tun!! c r!:df~ extension .t-i.n<.J c.re.,>t 
\\'~ted en 1ho· 1 !!.q .. )c;rt. 
carefd\y r t:v[e\v the ·n-ern1~ listed bekrw \"-1he.n tht~y chvck 
PV!!r.\~e nl'.:)tt! that the. ~(COL;qt !f'lforrr:..1n~·.w, cunr.+.~c~t:Kl v,.-1e1 
nxorde<, <«>ch ,,. b~:1kn1ptc::r, ul·;o rnily ;,ppear wl:r1 your cred:t 
ht~d lati::ar' ln thi:i n:!pt:.1rt 
:;rm Cl!'<. CT MU1U<AY CIY 
5'\6 \ s ;;r.r..,-rE ST //' STATE 
MU!'>,Rf\Y UT G•\ l (J/ 
I 6St) 
AMEX 
P BCJ>-:, 78'7 ! 
FORT LAUDEFDPL:: H .. 
T)-155016302652 
BA[)KONU: 
P\) EOX 90 ! 008 
VvOP:r'H TX, 76 IQ i 












()·./It Cl~1trt1 Jildgn 'IC ;"H, f'la~1itlif 
!N<:. Th~ itcrn ;s sd·,i;,d1..1i~;;;-.~ ~:o 
on r·ccord Lni;ii 3~2009. 
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DISTR.ICT COURT MURRAY COURT 




Defendant{s) ~ LUl\'D?~!'.iL 
MINUTES 
MOTION TO SET fl.BIDE J1JDGY&\<"T 
Case No: 020201658 DC 
Da~e: 
C~ FR?;.TTO 
May 29, 2002 
Plaintiff's· Atrl~orney(s}: !"lA.'RlC T OLSON 
Audio · 
Tape Number: 02-265 Tape ColL"'lt: 3530-5.920 . 
JIB.AIU NG 
TAPE: 02-265 .cou:NT; 3530-
0n record 
This matt€r before the court on the defendant's motion to set 
aside the default judgment. 
The default juµgment is set aside. 
To be set for ~rial'.. 
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Mark T. Olson (5529) 
OLSON ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Plaintiff 





IN TI·D~ THIRD DISTRICT COURT, MV'i~.Rl-'.Y DEPAR'.I1>';El>JT 
SAL'I IJL'ili COUN'.I'Y I STATE OP D'l'l\11 
J:LA. MCY:rION TO DISMISS 
P PEJDlJ I CE 
Case No 020201658 
t.~ .p: 
witC p:.rrsuan.t to Rule 41 f tJ'tah Rc.les of Ci \ril 
l=)rccedure 
This motion is based C>Il tb.e fact that the cause 
of act.icr1 'Upon wh.icb th:is action was based h.as been set:.t.1 ed to 
the satisfaction o:f Plaintiff and L";efendai.;_t (s) ~ 
D~ ... TED this 13 <lc.J." of Ju..ne, £002. 
A;:tor:neys fo:c Plaint.iff 
This is a cc;rrrnunicatioD from a de~ct colle:ctor. !rhis is c:r1 
to collect a debt. ~"A.ny infO?Fi2tio:r;_ obtained v,rill be used 
purpose. 
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Ha:rk T. Olson (5529) 
OLSON ASSOCIATES, P.C 






L"'J Z...:r:E ?tlIRD DISTRICT COGT / M"DR.PJ:..Y DEPP.:RTr'iED,,tT 
is dis:m.issed ~~>Ii tb 
DJ!.TED thJs 
SALT LAKE comu~y J STATE GF L....rr?B 
KELLI I.JJND.AJ-IT.i 
JO:tf!i B.EhwE 
BY TiB COLTR:I 
~his is t.~_ COfft:'T;u::;icat ion froru 
to collect a detn:. :P.22.'{ 
r:r:..:rpc::;{:. 
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THIF..D DISTRICT COURT MURRAY COURT 
SA.LT LA.1<E COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NAR, MHTDTES 
Plaintiff, OBJ TO DISMISSP.L H:Ell.RJNG 






Defendant{s): KELLI LDNTIAHL 
Plaintiff• s Attornev (s) : JIK.ARK T OLSON 
Audio -
Tape Number: 02-345 Tape Count: 545 
REARING 
TAPE: 02-345 COUNT: 545 
BRUCE LUBECK 
Ji.lly s, 2002 
Mark Olsen appearing for NAR. Deft Kelli Lundahl appearing. 
COUNT: 598 
Kelli Lundall addresses the court regarding her opposition to the 
Judge signing the dismissal. Case was not set on the calendar 
because of the dismissal filed. Deft requestino the Dismissal 
Order to be set aside as she has filed a -counte~ claim. 
COUNT: 1053 
Mark Olsen presents his agrument. 
COl~'T: 12213 
Court after hearing the arguments and concerned about.missing 
documents in the file ordereu that the Dismissal Order to be set 
aside. Court to prepare a complete file with all documents intact 
and set the case for another Pre-trial. 
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Case No: 020201558 
Date: ·Jul 08, 2002 
Dated this .f(__ day of 
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RONALD F. PRlCE • 5535 
PARSONS, DAVlES, KINGHORN & PETERS 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-4300 
Facsimile: (801) 363-4378 
IN THE THIRD JUDIC1Al DISTRICT COURT, 
STATE Of UT AH, COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 





MARKT. OLSON; OLSON AsSOCIATes, 
P.C.; ANTHONY C. TIDWELL, D.D.S. 1 
OLYMPUS VlEW DENTAL AND N.A.R., 
CounterclaimJDefendants. 
Civil No. 020201658 
Judge Anthony Quinn . 
Counterclaim defendants' application for award of attomeys's fees came before 
the Court for hearing on 16 January 2003, at 9:00 a.m. Counterclaim defendants Mark 
Olson and Olson Associates, L.C. were present, and plaintiff and counterclaim 
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Davies, Kinghorn & Peters. Defendant and counterclaim plaintiff Kem Lundahl was 
A.rm.§ 76-10-1601 st seq .. 
Court at the he!c! Oil 16 awards and counterclaim 
defendants attorneys' fees in the amount of $4,517 .22. 
Additionally, and for the reasons stated at the 16 Januacy 2003 hearing, the Court, 
on its own motion, hereby strikes any and all papers filed in this matter by Holli Lundahl. 
Now, therefore, being fUiiy advlsed in the premises, and having previously entered 
its order re: counterclaim defendants' motion for summary jt:dgment and related motions. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That plaintiff's complaint. and all claims asserted therein, be, and the same 
hereby are, dismissed with prejudice. 
2. That·younterclatm..Sefo~am Hom Lundah!'s counterclaim, and all claims 
asserted therein, be, and the same hereby are, dismissed with prejudice. 




11 1 3. Judgment is entered In favor of plaintiff and counterclaim defendants and 
ll againstemh1111luim defendant Kem Lundahlln the amount of $4,517.22, with such sum 1 
l 
It is further ordered that this judgment against Kelli Lundahl shall be I. 
I 




I augmented in the amount of reasona~e costs and attorneys' fees against ccunterclalm 
J i plainmf Kelii Lundahl expended in collecting said judgment by execution or otherwise .as 








t l Approved as to Form: 
of 
CONSTANTINO LAW OFFICE, P.C. 
Greg Constantino 
2003 .. 
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· HoJliLundahl 
200 E. Center Street 
Or.e~ Utah 84-05 7 
.. FILED 
V1AH S!JPAEME C01Jfi7 
"1r..? .2 B 2003 
PAT.aAArttoJ.OMEW 
. CLERK OF mt: ccivm 




: MOTION FOR.SUMl\iiARY 
DIS).-iISSAL OF PETITION 
FOR EXTRAORDINARY Vv'RIT 
. . 
AS MOOT 





HOLLI LUN"DAHL as . 
. ·Defendant assignee. to coottaet 
Ciaims·of K.~ Lundahl 
HOLLI. LUJ:IDAHL as assignee 
To coµntercl.a~s [Set off claims} 
Of Kelli Lun&h1 
Countero1aim Plaintiff, 
v 
NAR, lNC., MARK OLSON, 
Third Judicial District Court case 
no. -02020 Hi58 
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OLSON & ASSO,...."t~ .. SS P.C.~ 
OL Y}JPUS VIEW DIDffAL, 
ANTIIOf-.i-ry TIDWELL DDS Al\i"D 
DOES COUNTERCLAIM 
DEFE1'i1JAi-rrs 
Petitioner Holli Lundahl hereby moves this court for summruy 
dismissaJ ()f the Petition for Ex:t.ra-Ordinary relief filed wit.h this court by 
toentera 
filed by Holli Lundahl in December 2002 and January 2003 • 
This dismissal is required because said petition ~ been rendered 
moot by order entered by Jµdge Quinn on February 13, 2003 in re Third 
Judicial District Court case no. 020201tf8 md attached he.."eto as exrubit 
"'A". The judgment adds Hom Lundahl as a party to i.heaction by a 
rilling 011 the merits of Holli Lundahls cotmterclaims S'llhject: matter of her 211 d 
First Amended Counterclaim filed wlli the trial court on December 6, 2002; 
therefor:e implying that thecourt granted Holli Lundahl's motion to 
intervene and mooting petitioners request herein.to direcUudge QuIDn to 
enter a ruling on LUNDAHL's Notices to Submit for decision LlNDAHL's 
motion' to intervene. 
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In addition to the foregoing, on January 31, 200~ Holli Umdahl 
filed chapter 13 bankrutpcy. As the defendant assignee to the OLYMPUS 
VIEW dental contract and the underlying case here~ this court is 
permanently enjoined by the automatic stay ofthebankmptcycode from 
court 
no impact upon enforcement of the ru..1:om.atic stay. 
Dated: March 28, 2003 
Certificate of Service 
The undersigned certifies mat she served this motion for SUllllil&Y 
dismissal upon the following parties: 
Brent JQ!:m.son 
Atty Judge Quinn 
450 S. State Street 
SLC, Utah 84111 




FOR CASE #: 2:03-cv-01083-DB 
Lundahl v. NAR, et al 
Assigned to: Judge Dee Benson 
Demand: $0 
Case in other court: 04-04224 
US Bkrcy Dist UT, 03-02317 
USBkrcy Dist Uf, 03-21660 
USCA 10th Circuit, 04-04224 
Date Filed: 12/H/2003 
Date Terminated: 09/0112004 
Jury Demand: Defendant 
Nature of Suit: 423 Bankruptcy Withdraw! 
Jurisdiction: Federal Question 






Olson & Associates 
represented Hom Lundahl 
139868 
CACHE COlJNTY JAIL 
E-3 
1225 W VALLEY VIEW STE l 00 
1 
PROSE 
represented by Ronald F. Price 
5742 W HAROLD GATIY DR 
SALT LAKE CHY, lJf 84116 
(801)530-2964 
Fax: (801) 322-2003 
Email: ronprice@ppktrial.com 
LEAD AITORNEY 
AITORNEY TO BE iVOTJCED 
represented by Ronald F. Price 
(See above for address) 
LEAD ATFORlvEY 
AITORl'vEY TO BE NOTICED 
represented by Ronald F. Price 
\I . II l:J... 
(See above for address) 
LEAD A HORNEY 
A1TORNEY TO BE N011CED 








SECOND Motion Holli Lundahl to amend counterclaim to add additional parties and 
claims for wi!lfu 1 violation of the automatic stay and removal statutes (kvs) (Entered: 
07 /26/2004) 
29 Memorandum by Holli Lundahl in to [18-1] motion to enjoin Holli Lundahl 
from commencing any litigation against NAR, Mark T. Olson, Olsen Associates, 
without first obtaining leave from this court 
Holli Lundahl on 
-,,n,hr-~•,. of service [29-i] opposition memorandum, [29-2] motion to file a second 
amended coi.mterc!aim in accordance with the present status of the case, [29-l) motion 
and -1/J/03 
!] 
of the summonses 
change of address (kvs) (Entered: 08/02/2004) 
Order mooting [18-1) motion to enjoin Holli Lundahl from commencing any litigation 
against NA.Tl, Mark T. Olson, Olsen Associates, Anthony Tidwell and Olympus View 
Dental without first obtaining leave from this court (See order for details)signed by 
Chief Judge Dee Benson , 8/24/04 cc:atty (kvs) (Entered: 08126/2004) 
36 Order granting [10-JJ ex parte motion for leave to file overlength memo sig,11ed by 
cc;atty (kvs) (Entered: 08/26/2004) 
to extend time until 115103 for p!a to resp to Safety lnv's 
mot'remand action to state court signed by Chief Judge Dee Benson , 8/24/04 cc:atty 
{kvs) (Entered: 08/26/2004) · 
38 Order granting [2-1 J motion to withdraw the reference, granting [3-2] motion to dismiss, 
mooting (3-l J motion to remand, denying r7- l l cross motion for sanctions of default 
judgment and recommendation of disciplinary action against the license of Ronald 
Price, denying [7-1] cross motion for Declaratory Judgment, denying [28-J] motion to 
amend counterclaim to add additional parties and claims for willful violation of the 
automatic stay and removal statutes signed by Chief Judge Dee Benson. 813 J/04 cc:att\ 
(kvs) (Entered: 09/0 !/2004} . • 
per docket no. 38 (kvs) (Entered: 09/01/2004) 
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District of Utah· Live Database 03-2J66t, 
PROSE, DISMISSED, CLOSED 
U.S. Bankruptcy Court 
District of Utah (Salt Lake.City) 
Bankruptcy Petition #: 03-21660 
Date filed: 01131/2003 






200 East Center Street 
Orem., UT 84057 
UTAH-Ur 
80 l-368-5 707 
SSN I ITIN
Trustee 
An1:!xes' Diaz tr 
9 Place 
Suite 313 
Salt Lake City, lJT 84111 
(801) 537-1910 
U.S. Trilslee 
Unih::d States Trustee 
#9 Exchange Place 
Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 8411i-2147 
# 
represented by Holli Lundahl 
PROSE 
Docket Text 
The Trustee has filed a Final Account ofTnistee and has 
certified that the estate has been fully administered, and oo 
timely objection has been filed. Accordingly, it is ORDERED 
that the trustee is discharged and TIIB CASE IS HEREBY 
CLOSED. Judge William T. Thurman (kmc,) {EOD: 
01/04/2006) 
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GAANTOR; SECURITY NATIONAL MORTGAGE COMPANY 






10!!21 S. OLD HWY 191 
MAlAD IO 83252 
NORTHERN TITLE COMPANY 
MALAD 10 83252 
·················•••£ND or .REPOR .. ,,,.".., •• , ••• .., ........ . 
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Marti Lundahl 
PO Box 2814 
Evanston, WY 82931 
307-352-9577 
Fax# 307-212-6888 
._,,. ._ 6{(lG1 i.JA. C 
U.S. [Ji~j:"''; 
Dl~)· !'"'TD'= 
' ,, < i'.ING 
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STEPHAN ; s, CLERi\ 
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COMPANY OF FLORIDA 
Case No. 2012· CV - 280-S 
VERIFIED 
Plaintiffs Motion For A Declaratory 
Judgment To Decree The May 24, 
Contempt Judgment Entered 
Court Case No. 
I 
To Be Considered After Considering : 
Plaintiffs Motion For A Declaratory 
Decree Finding The March 17, 2004 
Utah District Court NAR Attorneys 
Fees Judgment And The April 3, 
2003 Utah Supreme Court Civil 
Contempt And Attorneys Fees 
Judgment, Both Entered Against 
Holli Lundahl VOID As A Matter 
Of Law And To Vacate Same 
Comes Now Marti Lundahl and files this Motion for a declaratory judgment 
decreeing the May 24, 2006 contempt judgment entered in Idaho federal court case 
number 4:05-CV- 127, Holli Lundahl v. NAR, Inc., void ab initio as applied to Marti 
Lundahl, a non party to that action. Furthermore, this federal judgment is also void on 
it's face as to any person - based on standing defects in the complaining contempt 
1 
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witnesses who obtained the May 24, 2006 federal contempt order. 
To establish the constitutional defects in the May 2006 Idaho federal 
contempt order entered in USDC-ldaho case no. 4:05-CV-127, Plaintiff adopts in full 
and incorporates herein, her motion for a Declaratory decree finding the March 17, 2004 
Utah District Court NAR Attorney Fees Judgment and the April 3, 2003 Utah Supreme 
Court Civil Contempt and Attorneys fees judgment entered against Holli Lundahl VOID as 
a matter of law, as predecessor argument to this motion for declaratory decree ruling 
the Idaho May 24, 2006 federal Judgment void ab initio. 
Plaintiff has standing to seek this declaratory decree because all of 
the aforesaid contempt judgments are being unlawfully applied against plaintiff - to 
avoid enforcement of a final Utah money judgment entered in Plaintiff's favor against the 
American lnsurance of Florida. 
Furthermore, Plaintiff was first apprised by an OSC order entered by this District 
27, as 
a 1n above contempt by footnote 2 
of that judgment which asserts that plaintiff herein Marti Lundahl is also Hom Lucinda, 
the latter a party to that Idaho federal litigation. Marti Lundahl will file concurrently 
herewith, a response and supporting affidavit to this Court's February 27, 2013 OSC 
which will attest under penalty of perjury that Hom and Marti are not the same persons, 
and, that Marti and Holli have been the victims of a criminal scheme to bar their fair 
access to the courts through the corrupt use of various "partial" court offices as criminal 
enterprises to achieve the illegal objectives of extortion under color of law and criminal 
obstruction of justice by the tort defendants constitutionally liable to Marti and Holli. 
Nevertheless before reaching the contempt issues raised in this litigation, it is 
necessary for Marti to attack the validity of the two contempt orders upon which this court 
predicates Marti's alleged rule 11 violations. This motion addresses the invalidity of the 
Idaho federal contempt judgment entered May 24, 2006 and facially directed against Marti 
Lundahl aka Marti Telford. 
This Court Has Sua Sponte And Inherent Jurisdiction 
To Vacate VOID Judgments That Encumber A Record 
The Wyoming Supreme Court held in re Emery v. Emery, 404 745 ryvyo. 
2 
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08/09/1965) : "The provisions of WY Stat. § 1-325, are irrelevant when the Plaintiff 
seeks to vacate a judgment wholly void for lack of jurisdiction, 30A Am.Jur., § 693, p 
659. The power of a court to vacate a void judgment is regarded as inherent and 
independent of any statutory authority. A Court will not permit a void judgment 
to encumber a record and will vacate the ineffectual entry thereof on application at 
any time. 49 C.J.S. Judgments§ 267, pp. 480-481. A void judgment is not binding. 
It confers no rights and equitable relief is mandated to prevent harm 
resulting from the fact that the judgment appears or purports to be valid. 
A.LI. Restatement, Judgments,§ 117, p. 565 (1942). 
Attached hereto as exhibit "1" is the void March 17, 2004 NAR attorneys fees 
judgment which served as the basis of filing the Idaho federal court case, Holli Lundahl 
al v. NAR, Inc, et case no. 4:05 - CV - 127. This judgment is established as void 
pursuant to the showing made in Plaintiff's motion for declaratory judgments decreeing 
17, the 
Court Contempt Judgment, ab initio. That Motion should be 
considered first by this court before considering this motion. 
Attached hereto as exhibit "2" is the lien against Plaintiff's and Holli Lundahl's 
Idaho residence by NAR, Inc. and which unequivocally placed jurisdiction in the state of 
Idaho to attack this lien /collection process. (Moreover Holli Lundahl could obtain general 
personal jurisdiction over the NAR litigants because NAR Inc. does business in the state 
of Idaho as a national debt collector.). See exhibit "3" attached hereto for certificate of 
authority for NAR Inc. dated May of 2003. 
it is the foregoing VOID process that plaintiff sought to collateraly attack in the 
state of Idaho. 
INTRODUCTION 
Void Judgments Are Subject To Collateral Attack Under 
The Declaratory Judgment Act If They Are Prima Facially 
Void And They Are Presented For The Purpose Of Inflicting 
Harm Against A Party To The Case 
The State of Texas recently decided a case where the Plaintiff in the action 
collaterally attacked a void judgment in an offensive maneuver in a court of registration in 
3 
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re Wagner v. D'lorm, 315 S.W.3d 188 (Tex.App. Dist.3 2010). The Defendant moved 
to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiff offensively 
collaterally attacked the void judgment in a different court under the Declaratory 
Judgment Act The Texas Appellate court concurred with the Plaintiff holding that since 
the judgment was void as shown by the face of the record, the judgment could be 
collaterally attacked in any forum where collection on the judgment could be made. A part 
of the analysis in that case went as follows: 
Appellant Ronald R Wagner sued appellees Roberto D'Lorm and Edward P. 
Dancause in Travis County district court seeking a declaration that a default 
judgment previously obtained by D'Lorm and his attorney, Dancause, against 
Wagner in a Zapata County district court was void. D'Lorm med a plea to the 
jurisdiction asserting that the trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to 
declare void the judgment of another district court. 
Analysis: 
The Travis County District Court's Subject-Matter Jurisdiction 
in this from the of D'Lorm's to the jurisdiction on the 
has sufficient facts to 
jurisdiction, a liberal construction of his 
pleadings. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226. In his petition, Wagner aBeged that the 
Zapata County default judgment is void because he was not named as a party to the 
prior lawsuit resulting in a judgment against Wagner. 
A judgment is void, and thus may be collaterally attacked, if the rendering 
court had "no jurisdiction over a party or his property, no jurisdiction of the subject 
matter, no jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment, or no capacity to act as a 
court." Austin lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Sierra Club, 495 S.W.2d 878, 881 (Tex. 1973); see 
also Browning v. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d 336, 346 {Tex. 2005) (same); Mapco, inc. v. 
Forrest, 795 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex. 1990) (orig. proceeding) (same). Ely v. United 
States Coal & Coke Co., 243 Ky. 725, 49 S.W.2d 1021; McDonald v. Mabee, 243 
U.S. 90, 37 S.Ct 343, 61 L.Ed. 608 {1917). LR.A. 1917F, 458; Restatement of the 
Law of Judgments, §§ 6, 8, and 117;1 Freeman on Judgments, §§ 226, 228, and 
339. This Court has also held that a judgment may be collaterally attacked because 
of "fundamental error." Texas Dep't of Transp. v. T. Brown Constructors, lnc., 947 
S.W.2d 655, 659 (Tex. App.--Austin 1997, pet. Denied). A court's rendition of 
judgment against a party not named in the suit is fundamental error. Mapco, Inc. v. 
Carter, 817 S.W.2d 686, 687 (Tex. 1991). 
Here, Wagner pleaded that he was neither named as a party nor served with 
process. If true, that would mean that the Zapata County district court committed 
fundamental error by rendering judgment against Wagner because he was not a 
party, see id. 1 The default judgment rendered against him would be void and 
subject to collateral attack. See Austin lndep. Sch. Dist., 495 S. W.2d at 881. 
1. Likewise here. Marti complains that she was not named a party to the Idaho 
federal litigation in re Holli Lundahl v. NAR, !nc.4:05-CV-127 and therefore it was 
fundamental error for the trial court to have entered a judgment against Marti. 
Furthermore, Marti contends that the court no contempt jurisdiction over Marti 
because no OSC was issued nor served upon Marti in order to invoke the court's in 
personam contempt jurisdiction over Marti. 
4 
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D'Lorm asserts that, because the Zapata County court had subject-matter 
jurisdiction in that case and the time for filing an appeal from that judgment has 
expired, Wagner's only remedy "to attack" the judgment was a proceeding in the 
nature of a bill of review.a direct attack. We disagree. Wagner brought his attack 
in a different court from the one that rendered the judgment under attack. 
Wagner's attack here is properly classified as collateral, not direct This Court 
has held that, in a collateral attack, the challenger must show in the record that the 
judgment was obtained without jurisdiction. Narvaez v. Maldonado, 127 S.W.3d 313, 
317-18 (Tex. App.--Austin 2004, no pet.). Alfonso v. Skadden, 251 S.W.3d 52, 55 
(Tex. 2008) ("'In order for a collateral attack to be successful the record must 
affirmatively reveal the jurisdictional defect."' (quoting White v. White, 179 S.W.2d 
503, 506 (Tex. 1944))). See also Browning, 698 S.W.2d at 363 (appeal from 
declaration rendered by one court declaring judgment of another court void is 
collateral attack); Empire Gas & Fuel Co. v. Albright, 87 S.W.2d 1092, 1096 (Tex. 
1935) (attack on judgment of one court in another court is collateral attack); 
ln light of the foregoing, we hold that Wagner's pleadings were sufficient to 
give the trial court subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate his claims for 
declaratory relief. The court therefore erred when it granted D'lorm's plea to 
We reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings. 
same 
injunction, as in the case with respect to May ldaho judgment 
re USDC-ldaho case no.4:05-CV-127. Likewise, with to contempt/injunction 
orders unconstitutionally obtained. The Supreme Court held in Baker v. Gen Motors 
Corp, 522 U.S. 222, 234-36, n 9; 118 S Ct 657; 139 l.Ed.2d 580 (1998) ("if the sister 
state injunction order was not constitutionally obtained, full faith and credit cannot 
be accorded that judgment in the forum where that judgment comes at issue. 
Accord in Chapman v. Krutonog, No. 8214451 (Cal.App. Dist. 2010); Advanced Bionics 
Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal 4th 697, 708 . Void judgments are never given 
credit. Prather v. Loyd, 86 Idaho 45, 50, 382 P.2d 910, 915 (1963) ("[a] void judgment is 
a nullity, and no rights can be based thereon; it can be set aside on motion or can 
be collaterally attacked at any time."). Other courts have also held that full faith and 
credit applies equally to equity decrees as it does money judgments. McElroy v. 
McElroy, 256 A.2d 763 (Del.Ch.1969); Higginbotham v. Higginbotham, 92 N.J. Super. 18, 
222 A.2d 120 (App.Div.1966); Miller v. Miller, Supra; Restatement (Second) of Conflict of 
laws§ 102 (1971); 50 C.J.S. Judgments§ 889 h. (1947). "Full faith and credit extends 
to foreign equity decrees or money judgments which order an in personam payment of 
money or a duty in equity. Varone v. Varone, 359 F.2d 769 (7th Cir.1966); Rozan v. 
Rozan, 49 Cal.2d 322, 317 P.2d 11 (1957); Ivey v. Ivey, 183 Conn. 490, 439 A.2d 425 
(1981); Weesner, 168 Neb. 346, 95 N.W.2d 682 (1959); Higginbotham v. Higginbotham, 
5 
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supra; Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws § 102 comment d (1971) 
The Judgment issue here was the product of a case in which Marti Lundahl 
was not named as a party nor was Marti served notice regarding any contempt matter 
directed at her in the Idaho federal case. This Court and the Defendant are seeking to 
enforce the Idaho federal judgment against Marti because the Idaho federal judge sua 
sponte named Marti as subjected to the May 24, 2006 judgment in footnote 2. 
Marti has concurrently filed under separate cover an affidavit which attests and 
establishes as a matter of fact and law that Holli and Marti are different persons, it is 
Plaintiffs position that the Idaho federal judgment should be declared void and set aside 
so as not to impact plaintiff any further in this or any other proceeding in which plaintiff 
may become a party. Furthermore, the age of the judgment being attacked bears no 
consequence. See United v. One Toshiba Color 213 1 157 (1 Ot11 Cir. 
if a is can transmute a 
now proceeds lay out a Statement of Facts relevant to the Idaho federal 
judgment 
Uncontroverted Facts 
1. Marti adopts the factual history set forth on pages 5-16 of her Motion for 
Declaratory Judgment to decree the March 17, 2004 Utah District Court NAR Attorney 
Fees Judgment and the April 3, 2003 Utah Supreme Court Civil Contempt and Attorneys 
fees judgment entered against Holli Lundahl VOID as a matter of law, . . as if fully set 
forth herein and further states: 
2. In the latter part of 2005, the NAR litigants recorded the void March 17, 
2004 attorneys fees judgment against Holli Lundahl in the state of Idaho for enforcement 
purposes (in spite of knowing that the judgment was a nullity. The March 17, 2004 
attorneys fees judgment on it's face pointed to the void Utah Supreme Court civil 
contempt judgment See exhibits "1 "and "2" attached for this judgment and recordation.) 
3. The state of Idaho had both general personal jurisdiction over NAR Inc. 
(see exhibit "3" attached) and in rem jurisdiction over Holli and Marti's Idaho properties 
(refer back to exhibit "2" attached which reflects a special warranty- reconveyance deed 
conveying Idaho residential property to Holli Lundahl), to the void filing under 
6 
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the Idaho wrongful lien act. 
4. As shown in Marti's motion for Declaratory Judgment to decree the March 
17, 2044 NAR Attorneys Fees judgment and the April 3, 2003 Utah Supreme Court civil 
contempt judgment VOID ab initio, these judgments were void primarily because of 
federal injunctions under the Bankruptcy code which stripped the state courts of all 
subject matter jurisdiction to issue any process against Holli, a chapter 13 debtor. 
5. It is undisputed that Holli Lundahl filed chapter 13 bankruptcy on January 
31, 2003 in the state of Utah as Bankruptcy case no. 03-21660. On June 10 and 11, 
2003, the Bankruptcy Judge Judith Boulden conducted a confirmation hearing in 
Lundahl's chapter 13 case and confirmed a modified chapter 13 p!an after disallowing 
debts claimed by Eli Lilly, LAHA, the IRS and CNA, which determined were al! VOID. 
Bankruptcy Judge Holli to file an amended plan her 
19, chapter 13 
creditors See exhibit "4" No creditor or in interest 
confirmation order. 
6. Three months after Holli's Amended Chapter 13 plan had been confirmed, 
another bankruptcy judge invoked jurisdiction over Holli's chapter 13 case and sought to 
conduct another confirmation hearing. Hom filed a Mandamus Petition against 
Bankruptcy Judge Thurman barring him from acting unconstitutionally with respect to 
Holli's chapter 13 bankruptcy case. In retaliation to Holli's mandamus petition, 
Bankruptcy Judge Thurman dismissed Holli's chapter 13 bankruptcy case asserting that 
Holli no longer qualified as a chapter 13 debtor given all of the debts to Eli Lilly, LAHA, 
CNA and the IRS were disallowed as VOID. See 11 USC§ 109(e) of the Code requires the 
chapter 13 bankruptcy debtor to owe a bonified debt to obtain standing as a debtor under the 
Code.) Bankruptcy Judge Thurman then dismissed without prejudice several of Holli's 
"removed cases from other jurisdictions", for lack of residual subject matter jurisdiction -
given his dismissal order of the main bankruptcy case. These dismissal orders occurred 
while Holli's motions to withdraw the reference of her removed cases, were pending. 
7. When Holli's motions to withdraw the reference of her removed cases 
citing personal injury and RICO claims to the Bankruptcy Court reached the single District 
Court assigned to all of Holli's cases, i.e Judge Paul Cassel for disposition, Judge 
Cassell converted al! of Holli's motions into appeals given Holli's bankruptcy case had 
7 
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been dismissed. Judge Cassell then entered same perfunctory affirmance order in 
every case dismissed by the Bankruptcy Judge Thurman; thereby also dismissing Holli's 
removed cases for lack of residual subject matter jurisdiction, & WITHOUT PREJUDICE.1 
Holli appealed every dismissal because they involved removed cases wherein extensive 
litigation had occurred for 9 years or less. In late October and November of 2005, the 
1 otn circuit would essentially affirm each dismissal judgment entered by Judge Paul 
Cassell. Under the Utah Savings statute, Holli then had one year to re-bring ail of her 
dismissed claims in another forum from the date the appellate mandates were returned to 
the District court in late November and December of 2005. 
Plaintiff now lists the relevant cases dismissed without prejudice in the Utah 
and 101h circuit courts sitting in Bankruptcy, as these non-prejudicial dismissal 
dispositions are relevant to the lies and fraud upon the court perpetrated in the Idaho 
case of 
case no. 4:05-CV-127. 
Bankruptcy Removal Proceedings As To Eli Lilly et, al, 
(1} On September 15, 2003, Holli removed 6 related and pending 
state and federal cases involving Eli Lilly and Company, 
ACS, GE, Pacific Mutual Insurance Company (PIMCO), Doug 
Murdock and others, AND dating back as early as 1992, to the 
Utah Bankruptcy Court as Adversary proceeding# 03-P-02402. 
Attached hereto as exhibit "5" is that removal petition filed in 
USDC-Utah case no. 2:04-CV-88, Judge Paul Cassell presiding. 
Attached hereto as exhibit "5" is the removal petition filed in the 
Utah federal court. 
1. Judge Cassell made subsequently mooted inaccurate assertions in his perfunctory 
dismissal orders, to wit: that Holli failed to properly serve summonses on the defendants in her 
adversary proceedings and that Holli failed to prosecute her appeals. First and Foremost, the 
summonses had been properly served on the defendants when the process had been initiated in 
other jurisdictions before removal to the district court. After removal, a plaintiff is not required to 
serve the defendant with a new summons. Finally, with respect to prosecuting her matters as 
appeals, in the first paragraph of every order, Judge Cassell admitted that he had converted 
Holli's motions to withdraw the references into appeals at the time he issued his dismissal orders. 
Hence Holli was given no notice that Judge Cassell would proceed on the matter as an appeal. 
Nevertheless, the final rulings dismissing the cases without prejudice mooted all interlocutory and 
ancillary rulings. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env., 523 U.S. 83, 100 n.3 (1998) (a 
determination that the district court lacked jurisdiction over a claim moots any other 
challenge to the claim. Indeed, we have no power to decide any ancillary issue if we lack 
jurisdiction. See id. At 93-102.) Accord in Beierle v. Colorado Department of Corrections, No. 
03-117 4 (10th Cir. 10122/2003) 
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(2) The returns of summonses in the removed proceedings were 
filed in the original actions. See exhibit "6" attached for just 
one docket record showing returns of summonses in a 
removed federal case against Eli Lilly. Also attached to 
exhibit "5" is a certificate of service showing service of the 
removal petition on the name parties. 
(3) Attached hereto as exhibit "7" is the dismissal order entered 
by Judge Paul Cassell and affirmed on appeal by the 1 Olh 
Circuit in November of 2005. As can be seen by this order, 
the dismissal was without prejudice. 
(4) EU LILLY would falsely advocate in the Idaho federal action 
that HOLLI was declared a vexatious litigant in the California 
Courts. Attached hereto as exhibit "8" the California Federal 
Docket showing at PACER Doc. 147, the California Federal 
Judge LILL Y's request to declare Holli In 
fact no trial court declared Hom vexatious. 
(1) Holli removed her litigation pending against CNA Financial 
Corporation and the Comptons to the Utah Bankruptcy Court 
As Adversary Proceeding # 03-P-2336. This case was moved 
to District Judge Paul Cassell's court and assigned case no. 
2:04-CV-88 PGC. On September 1, 2004, Judge Paul Cassell 
dismissed Holli's removed cases against CNA and the 
Comptons without prejudice. Attached hereto as exhibit 
"9" is this dismissal order. The dismissal was affirmed on 
Appeal by the 1 ou1 Circuit and the appellate mandate returned 
to the District Court in November of 2005. 
Idaho Proceedings Re LAHA 
(1) In 2005, Los Angeles Home-Owners Aid filed a federal case 
against Hom in the Idaho federal court as 4:05-cv-00126-BLW. 
This case was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
because an involuntary bankruptcy petition was filed against 
HOLLI in California in February of 2005. 
When the Idaho federal judge allowed intermeddling by the foregoing non-parties 
into the Idaho federal litigation against NAR, Inc., the foregoing intermedd!ers would file 
false petitions to the Idaho judge claiming that HOLU had tried her claims against these 
9 
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persons and had lost on the merits, and that HOLLI had been validly declared vexatious 
in California trial courts, the Utah Supreme Court and the Idaho federal court. (Noting 
that before one can be declared vexatious, the Court must have jurisdiction over the 
subject matter. Catholic Conference, 487 U.S. At 74-5.). The record shows that no 
vexatious litigant order was issued by the California trial court (refer back to exhibit "8" 
attached) or by the Idaho federal court. Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court and the 
Idaho federal court lacked jurisdiction to enter any contempt orders against Holli. 
8. After NAR obtained their illegal and void attorneys fees judgments against 
Holli, NAR- a national collection agency, published these void judgments all over the 
internet in continuing publications - thereby causing significant damages to Hom and 
other partner's commercial interests. NAR also recorded these void judgments against 
Holli's credit report. 
9. Holli 2 brought in 
federal court in Idaho. The Idaho federal action case no. 4:05-CV-i 27 was to : 
(1) void and vacate : (a) the NAR lien, (b) the March 17, 2004 Utah District Court 
NAR Attorneys Fees Judgment, and (c) the April 3, 2003 Utah Supreme Court Civil 
Contempt Judgment; all under the Declaratory Judgment Act; (2) seek remedy under 
the Unlawful Debt Collection Practices Act against NAR, Inc and her co- conspirators, 
and (3) seek treble damages against NAR Inc. under the RICO statute for substantial 
injury to plaintiffs economic business interests as a result of NAR's fraudulent conduct. 
See Deck v. Engineered Laminates et. al, 349 F.3d 1253 (1 oth Cir. 2003) (authorizing 
RICO actions for fraud related conduct that effects economic interests when mails or 
wires are used.}. Plaintiffs S. Walker and Mari Galhardo were business partners with 
Plaintiff Holli Lundahl and were therefore also injured. 
10. The Idaho federal action also sought prospective declaratory and 
injunctive relief against the Utah Supreme Court justices entering the civil contempt 
judgment against Holli - under Section 1983. No where in the complaint did Holli seek 
money damages against these judicial officials as she knew such action would be barred 
by judicial immunities. When Holli learned of a gth circuit ruling in re Wolfe v. 
Strankman, No. 02-15720 (91n Cir. 2004) which instructed that a litigant suing under a 
vexatious litigant statute must sue only the chair of the judicial council in his administrative 
capacity as the enforcer of the statute or rule, Holli filed an amended complaint on April 
10 
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7, 2006, naming only Utah justice Christine Durham in her administrative capacity. Hom 
tendered the amended complaint to the federal clerk who refused to file the First 
Amended Complaint pursuant to instructions of the sitting federal judge Richard Tallman. 
(See supporting affidavit of Holli Lundahl.) In July of 2006, the federal clerk sent Holli a 
letter indicating that they were returning Holli's First Amended Complaint because Judge 
Tallman instructed the clerks not to file this document; in express violation of FRCP Rule 
15(a). Attached hereto as exhibit "10" is the federal clerk's letter. 
11. Immediately after Holli and other plaintiffs submitted their First Amended 
Complaint for filing on April 7, 2006, the federal judge sitting on the Idaho litigation as 
PACER Doc. no. 19, issued an OSC directed at Hom Lundahl only to show cause why 
the federal court should not declare Holli a vexatious litigant pursuant to the void Utah 
Court March 1 
as 
Doc. no. order after that he failed to an 
adequate procedure The OSC was amended to provide for certified mail 
return receipt requested delivery of the OSC upon Holli at Holli's claimed Malad, Idaho 
address. See Court docket reflecting these OSC notices as exhibit "11" attached hereto. 
12. Holli received the OSC at her home in Malad Idaho. After the OSC 
issued, various non-parties invited themselves into Holli's Idaho federal litigation as 
tortious intermeddlers and sought to advance a broad contempt judgment/injunction 
against Holli which would bar Holli's prospective litigation against these tortfeasors - given 
the prior dismissals without prejudice rulings entered in Hollis prior cases against these 
persons in the Utah Bankruptcy Courts. 2 
2. The docket record in the Idaho federal litigation shows the following 
appearances by tortious intermeddlers into Hollis Idaho federal litigation: 
(a) As PACER Doc. no. 26: lntermeddlers Eli Lilly, Advanced 
Cardiovascular Systems, Pacific Life Insurance Company (PIMCO), GE, Prudential and 
Citigroup, collectively filed a petition asserting abusive and criminal litigation practices by 
Hom dating back to 1992 when Holli commenced litigation against Eli Lilly, et al. LILLY 
falsely claimed that all of Hollis claims against LILLY had been determined on their merits 
against Holli. that Holli had been declared a vexatious litigant by the California trial court, 
and that ULLY had spent over $1,000,000 in attorneys fees fighting Holli's allegedly 
frivolous claims. (One would ask why it would cost $1 million to defeat frivolous petitions 
unless in fact the petitions were not frivolous.). Refer back to exhibit for dismissal 
order of claims against LILLY et al, without prejudice. 
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13. Hom appeared at the hearing and argued the following grounds for 
removing Judge Taliman from the cause: 
(1) mandatory disqualification because Judge Taliman owned upwards 
of $250,000 stock interests in PIMCO aka Pacific Life Insurance Company, a 
complaining intermeddler and joint tortfeasor in Holli's lawsuit against Eli Lilly and 
Company. (Refer back to exhibit "5" attached for joint tortfeasors.). Because of this stock 
interest, Judge Tallman was barred from sitting on Holli's contempt proceeding as a 
matter of law under the Judicial Disqualification statute. See exhibit "12" attached for 
Judge Tallman's financial report for 2006. See exhibit "13" attached for information on 
PIMCO. Judge Tallman refused to recuse himself. 
(2) HOLLI next argued that not one party to the case had filed a 
petition for contempt between the dates of the issuance of the OSC on April 7, 2006 and 
the hearing date on May 15, 2006 and therefore the judge lacked jurisdiction under rule 
11 to enter any contempt order against Holli. In response Judge Tallman indicated 
jurisdiction over inherent 
n~ ~ fue 
the court had no jurisdiction over the petitions submitted by 
Holli complained the intermeddlers lacked standing to interfere with her litgation 
against the NAR defendants. Judge Tallman did not respond to this contention during the 
hearing. 
(4) In closing, Holli pointed out to the court that the volunteer inter--
meddlers had filed petitions containing blatantly false information and that the motive 
for doing so was because the intermeddlers knew Hom was going to reopen every one of 
her lawsuits dismissed without prejudice during her bankruptcy case and that she had 
until November of 2006 to do so. It is clear by Judge TaHman's later produced order, that 
this judge had every intention of blocking Holli from ever re-filing any of her suits against 
the intermeddlers .. 
(b) As Pacer Doc no. 23, lntermeddler LAHA claimed that Holli 
engaged in abusive litigation by invoking the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court to 
summarily litigate all of her claims in one forum convenient to Holli, the debtor. 
{c) As Pacer Doc. Nos. 27, 28 and 29, the CNA and Compton 
Defendants filed numerous corrected petitions asserting that Holli lost her claims against 
them on its merits, that these persons feared Holli would pursue litigation against them 
again, and that Holli allegedly engaged in service fraud by repeatedly filing numerous 
false certificates of services asserting that represented counsel was served with 
respective motions. (Refer back to exhibit "9" attached for dismissal order as to CNA, et 
al.). Furthermore, Holli maintains a third party fax account and also emails process to 
maintain a verifiable record of service. In addition, Holli is well known for videotaping 
personal service of process. In fact as Pacer Doc. no. 55 in re USDC-!daho case no. 
4:05-CV-460, Holli provided videotapes of all of her services on the defendants. See 
exhibit "14' attached. 
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Almost two weeks later on May 24,2013, Judge Tallman entered a scathing 
and corrupt Memorandum Decision against Holli which tantamounted to a criminal 
indictment. 
Judge Tallman prefaced his decision by first manipulating the facts and 
jurisdictional bases' for Plaintiff's claims against the NAR defendants and the Utah 
Supreme Court justices. Judge Tallman made the following findings 
Re The Utah Supreme Court Contempt Judgment 
(1) Lundahl v. NAR, Inc., 434 F.Supp.2d@ 856-857 (ID, 2006): 
The Court finds that the present case, Lundahl v. NAR, Inc., 4:05-cv-
00127-RCT, a blatant attempt to 
were as 
Lundahl v. Quinn, 67 P.3d 1000, 1001 
further that it is frivolous."). 
Lundah!'s to collateral 
below that operandi is to re!itigate in a new 
jurisdiction once they have been dismissed as frivolous. 
Judge Tallman was referring to the Utah Supreme Court civil contempt 
judgment. As shown in Plaintiff's Motion to attack this judgment, this Writ 
action was filed to compel Judge Quinn to address Holli's Notices to submit 
for decision. Judge Quinn did address Hollis notice to submit two months 
before the Writ Petition was decided, thereby mooting the Writ petition. 
Nevertheless, the Writ Petition did not address the merits of the underlying 
action and this fact was evident from reading the contempt judgment itself. 
Irrespective, the Utah Supreme Court civil contempt judgment suffered 
from other fatal jurisdictional defects aside from the fact it had been mooted 
two months before the Utah Supreme Court sat on the matter. As argued in 
Plaintiffs motion to attack this judgment, it violated the automatic stay and 
removal statutes of the bankruptcy code and the contempt judgment was 
entered ex parte and without notice to Holli. There was also structural error 
in the Judgment because it directed the trial court to enter an attorneys fees 
judgment for litigation activities which admittedly occurred at the appellate 
level in violation of URCP rule 11 and URAP rule 38. 
Re Holli's Idaho Residence Address 
(2) Lundahl v. NAR, Inc., 434 F.Supp.2d@ 857 (ID, 2006): 
This Court also has reason to believe that Plaintiff is not a resident of 
Idaho, given the numerous addresses she has used in this Court and the 
fact that Court mail to various plaintiffs in her actions is returned as 
undeliverable. See exhibit "17" attached for Oneida County Tax record 
13 
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showing ownership by Holli of the Malad Property. 
Judge Tallman's finding with this respect to Hollis Idaho residency was 
remarkable in light of the fact that Judge Tallman caused Hom to be served 
with the OSC at her Malad, Idaho residence and NAR attached this 
residence to pay off it's void March 17, 2004 Attorneys fees judgment. 
Re the 1997 Ninth Circuit Vexatious litigant Order 
(3) Lundahl v. NAR, Inc., 434 F.Supp.2d @ 858 (ID, 2006): 
In re Holli Lundahl, No. 97-80258, Order (9th Cir. July 17, 1997), the gm 
circuit issued an Order to Show Cause, listing nineteen (19) cases which 
had been initiated by Lundahl in that court. Of those, seventeen (17) had 
been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit concluded that 
"Respondent's practice of burdening this court with meritless litigation 
justifies careful oversight of respondent's future litigation in this court." Id 
Judge failed to acknowledge 
the pre-filing injunction. 
(1) 
uu-.."c' as it in 1998 
Lundahl in Utah. One, an arm 
Eli Lilly's corporate malfeasance introduced exhibit "1 into 
foreclosure litigation against Holli. The 9th circuit docket as it then existed 
bore a non-existent P.O.Box address for Holli which the gm circuit then 
claimed to have served notice of the OSC upon Holli. During the Utah 
litigation seeking to foreclose on Holli's property, property records were 
produced which showed that Holli resided at and owned 27 48 N. 930 E. 
Provo, UT. See the records extracted from this state litigation as exhibit 
"16" attached hereto. Since the gm circuit did not serve Holli with the OSC at 
Holli's correct residence address, no notice was given to Holli of the 9th 
circuit pre-filing order, thus rendering it VOID. Also, because Holli proced-
urally defaulted the contempt action buttresses the contention of no notice. 
3. The 9111 Circuit Contempt/ Injunction Order was Void Because No 
Notice Was Served Upon Holli To Give Hom 
See WILSON v. NORTH CAROLINA, 169 U.S. 586 (1898) (When the contemnor 
denies service of the rule to show cause, the writ must be dismissed for want of 
jurisdiction and the rule to show cause, discharged.). See also Peay v. Bell South Med. 
Assistance Plan, 205 F.3d 1206, 1209-10 (10th Cir. 2000) (stating a court may exercise personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant only if the procedural requirements for service of process are 
satisfied and the exercise of jurisdiction satisfies due process). Also see Ministry of Defense v. 
Cubic Defense, 385 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 2004) (Citing In re Center Wholesale, Inc., 759 F.2d 1440, 
1448 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding judgment void because aggrieved party had not received 
adequate notice of the proceedings .) Same in Printed Media SeTVS., Inc. v. Solna Web, Inc., 
11 F.3d 838, 84243 (8th Cir. 1993); SIMON v. SOUTHERN RAILWAY, 236 U.S. 115 (1915) 
(United States courts by virtue of their general equity powers have jurisdiction to enjoin the 
enforcement of a judgment obtained by fraud or without service. Furthermore, a judgment 
against a person on whom no process has been served is not erroneous and voidable, but. 
upon principles of natural justice, and also under the due process clause of the Fourteenth and 
Fifth Amendments, is absolutely 
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(2) In addition, the face of exhibit "15" attached shows that the gin 
circuit opened an independent action against Holli without any juridical 
pleading before the gth circuit court giving that court subject matter 
jurisdiction to enter any contempt rule against Holli. This also invalidated 
the entire appeal case no. 97-80258 which was in fact unilaterally opened by 
the 91h Circuit law clerk Susan Gelmus. 4 
4. The 9th Circuit Did Not Have A Juridicial Petition Before Their 
Bar When The Motions Attorney Invalidly Issued A Contempt 
Judgment Against Respondent Holli Lundahl; Hence There 
Was No Subject Matter Jurisdiction To Enter A Contempt 
Order Against Holli 
In order for an appellate court to acquire article m powers, a final judgment raised 
by a timely notice of appeal, or a timely injunction appeal must be filed with the appellate 
court. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood. 441 U.S. 91, 99, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 1608, 60 
66 (1979). of 118 921, 139 LEd.2d 
392. 107 S.Ct. 318 
246 P. 
it, and a 
is or not must fall. So too must a or sequestrating order 
fa!! for other errors of law apparent on the face of the mandatory record, such as showing the 
judgment obtained to be at variance with the practice of the court or contrary to well-recognized 
principles and fundamentals of the law. Where the face of the record shows that fundamental law 
was disregarded in the establishment of the judgment; the proceedings and the judgment will be 
rendered null and void for all purposes. ). 
Furthermore, in Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 123 S.Ct. 
366, 369-70 (2002) the High Court held that "[t]he AU Writs Act does not confer subject matter 
jurisdiction on federal courts; there must be an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction in 
order to issue a Writ or injunction under the All Writs Act Same in Morris v. T E Marine Corp, 344 
F.3d 439 (5th Cir. 2003); Hornung v. City of Oakland No. C-05-4825 EMC, (Docket No. 20) 
(N.D.CaL 2006) (The All Writs Act by itself does not provide a basis for federal question 
jurisdiction.); Retirement Systems v. J.P. Morgan Chase, 386 F.3d 419 (2nd Cir. 2004); Kiay v. 
United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092 (11th Cir. 2004); In Re Tennant, 359 F'3d 523 (D.C. Cir. 
2004) (All Writs Act confers authority to issue writs of mandamus "in aid of the court's prospective 
jurisdiction". Hence subject matter jurisdiction must be independently provided by another federal 
statute.); U.S. v. Raheman, 355 F.3d 40 (1st Cir. 2004) (no subject matter jurisdiction in federal 
court unless plaintiff's complaint states another federal daim outside of the All Writs Act.) 
If subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, the jurisdiction to render an order of contempt is 
also lacking. See also United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 295 (1947) (If 
no jurisdiction existed, "then the proceedings were void and the civil contempt citation must be 
reversed "in its entirety."}; Magness v. Russian Federation, 247 F.3d 609,619 n. 19 (5th Cir.), csrt. 
denied, 122 S.Ct 209 (2001); Followed in Rieser at 1224 (Where a court lacks jurisdiction in a 
case, any judgment regarding the case is void. The effect of a void judgment is that it must be 
treated as having never existed. A void judgment cannot be recognized by anyone, but must be 
entirely disregarded or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to 
the void judgment It has no legal or binding force or efficacy for any purpose or at any place .... All 
proceedings founded on the void juclgment are themselves regarded as invalid and ineffective for 
any purpose.). See also Meadows v. Dominican Republic, 817 F.2d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1987)(void 
judgments can be attacked at any time and in any proceeding where credit is sought to be given 
to the void judgment) . 
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(3) Also, it is well established that LILLY had orchestrated 
Holli's brutal assaults in 1995 by IRS officers and HCA hospital staff, and 
that together these assaults put Holli Lundahl into a coma. It is also well 
established that these IRS officers subsequently charged Holli with federal 
assault crimes to explain the seriousness of Holli's personal inJunes. 
Subject to these fabricated charges, Holli was placed in the MDC in Los 
Angeles in a comatose and paralyzed condition until she could be tried on 
the charges. Holli's intake medical record at the MDC showed that Holli 
was paralyzed and in a coma when she was registered into the medical unit 
at the MDC. See exhibit "18" attached. (Holli later brought suit on the 
foregoing assault claims. The action was removed to the bankruptcy court 
and dismissed without prejudice by Judge Paul Cassell in 2004. See exhibit 
"23" attached for the docket record and dismissal without prejudice order.) 
Nevertheless, Twenty-one (21) out of the Twenty-two (22) notices 
of appeals referenced in the gtn circuits unserved OSC, were filed while 
Holli was in a coma in the MDC and awaiting the ability to tried for the 
Hom was jails 
did not 
to the gth circuit court 
from filing or 
records, of dismissed 
Holli's notices of appeals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because they 
were not based on a final judgment and because no other notarized IFP 
papers were submitted by Holli to obtain waiver of filing fees. (This should 
have been the first clue that Holli did not execute the Notices of appeals.). 
Holli has always maintained that Eli lilly forged Holli's name to the multiple 
notices of appeals in order to extract an ex parte and unnoticed pre-filing 
order against Holli - having been unsuccessful at doing so at the trial level. 
(Refer back to exhibit "8"attached PACER Doc. no. 147 showing this failed 
attempt.). It is well established that forged process voids proceedings based 
thereon. 5 
5. The Notices of Appeals Supporting The 9th Circuit Contempt I 
Injunction Order Were Forged In Respondent's Name Thereby 
Rendering Them Void Ab lnitio and Invalidating The Resulting 
Contempt/ Injunction Order By The gtn Circuit Court 
It is well settled that a document which has been forged is void ab initio. See In re 
Orosco, No. 87-1933 (9th Cir. 1988) (forged document is void ab inito). In addition, any document 
based on a forged document is likewise void. See In Re Abboud, BAP No. 99-033 (10th Cir. 1999) 
citing to Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 US 726 (1946) (judgment is procured by fraud is void ab initio.). 
See also Weber Meadow-View Corp. v. Wilde, 575 P.2d 1053, 1054 (Utah 1978) (where the 
record showed subterfuge, devious means, or collusion which prevented a party from fairly 
appearing before the court, any resulting judgment is void and must be vacated.); ln re 
KOUGASIAN v. TMSL, INC., 359 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2004) (Full Faith and Credit Clause does not 
give credit to a judgment obtained by way of extrinsic fraud and fraud upon the court. Citing 
Barrow v. Hunton, 99 U.S. (9 Otto) 80 (1878)). "If the court "finds that fraud played a part in 
obtaining a judgment, it will deprive the judgment of any enforcement effect. " McDaniel v. Traylor, 
196 us 416, 423. 
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(4) Finally, the gin circuit vexatious litigant order could no longer be 
enforced under California law because vexatious litigant orders are time 
limited to 7 years and at the time Judge Tallman purported to enforce this 
void order, it was 9 years old. 6 Accordingly, Judge Tallman could not 
use this order as a basis to execute another vexatious litigant order in the 
Idaho federal litigation. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the gt11 circuit pre-filing order was void ab initio 
and could not support Judge Tallman's May 24, 2006 contempt injunction against Holli. 
Re The Criminal Fraud Charges Advanced Against Holli 
(4) Lundahl v. NAR, Inc., 434 F.Supp.2d @ 858 (ID, 2006): 
1 (1 
217 (1 
Brown, No. Order {D. Idaho April 7, 2006); 
Home-Owners Aid, Inc. v. Lundahl, No. WL 1140649 (D. 
May 13, 2005); Lundahl v. CNA Ins., No. 20010845-CA, 2003 WL 22145999 
(Utah App.2003) . 
Affidavit of J. Kevin West, No. 4:05-cv-00127-RCT at 2-3 (Docket No. 30) 
{noting that Plaintiff signed numerous certificates indicating that service of 
process had been made when West did not actually receive the documents 
and pleadings); Affidavit of Kent A. Higgins, No. 4:05-cv-00127-RCT at 2 
(Docket No. 31) (claiming that a document with a forged signature was filed 
in a District of Idaho case). 
Footnote 2 : Plaintiff has employed numerous aliases in her past litigation 
including, but not limited to, M. H. Telford, Marti Telford, Holli Lundahl, H. 
Lundahl, and Marti Lundahl, and Holly Mattie Telford. 7 See, e.g., Telford v. 
Brown, No. 4:05-cv-00460-RCT, Order (D. Idaho April 7, 2006). This Order 
shall apply to Plaintiff even if she improperly proceeds under one of her 
current or future aliases. It will also bind all persons acting in concert 
with her. 
From 2006 through 2009, Holli would be prosecuted criminally for the foregoing 
6. In Wolfe v. Strankman, No. 02-15720 Cir. 2004), the ninth circuit 
opined that Wolfe remained on the vexatious litigant list for seven years and on April 19, 
1999, Wolfe's name was removed from the list, and the prefiling order against him was 
rescinded based on the limitations period set out under the California vexatious litigant 
statute. 
7. In the Idaho litigation, Judge Tallman found without any evidentiary support 
that Holli Lundahl aka Holli Telford was also Marti Lundahl aka Marti Telford. 
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fraud and forgery allegations cited in federal judge Taliman's May 24, 2006 contempt 
injunction - under the federal perjury statute. 
FBI report admitting to this perjury prosecution. 
exhibit "19" attached hereto for 302 
Wyoming chief federal judge William Downes presided overc allc of Holli's 
criminal prosecutions. Judge Downes refused to allow Holli to represent herself and 
ordered representation by the public defender's office. Judge Downes also kept Holli in 
the federal prison system as a pre-trial detainee for a period of 3 years while the multiple 
criminal cases were pending, in part to: (1) ferret out Holli's alleged prosecutions under 
multiple alias names constituting interstate identify fraud, (2) to force Holli to undergo 
numerous medical examinations which confirmed or invalidated the injuries Holli claimed 
to have sustained at the HCA in of 1 at of IRS 
in 
as asserted in 
"1 
From 2006 to 2007, federal public defender Robert Steele communicated with 
Plaintiff Marti Lundahl via telephone and in writing to obtain defense evidence rebutting 
the charged crimes against Holli. See exhibit "1" attached to Marti Lundahl's affidavit for 
written communication from FPO Steele. As shown in FPO Steele's written 
communication, Steele admitted that one of the primary purposes of the criminal 
prosecution was to verify Holli's injuries sustained from the 1995 assaults while in custody 
of the HCA hospital in orange county, California. (See attached hereto as exhibit "20", 
the PACER docket no. 238 in re USA v. Holli Lundahl, case no. USDC-Utah 2:06-CR-
693 showing that the FDP's office subpoenaed these records on Holli.). 
Marti responded to FPO Steele by providing the requested records, list of 
witnesses, a letter from her private doctor, and a demand that Marti be permitted to testify 
on Holli's behalf concerning Holli's 1995 witness tampering claims against Eli Lilly, et al.. 
In her demand letter, Marti also contended that LILLY and other tortfeasors in Holli's 
RICO cases had attempted to witness tamper with Marti in April of 2006, given to very 
suspicious circumstances surrounding Marti's near fatal 2006 auto accident by a hit and 
run driver operating a 5 ton Hummer without license plates and that ran over the top of 
Marti's hyundai crushing Marti's body inside her small car. the whole of Marti's 
concurrently submitted affidavit in to this court's 3 OSC 
18 
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Marti was never given the opportunity to testify because Holli's criminal cases 
were dismissed effectively with prejudice upon findings that no probable cause existed 
that Holli committed any the charged and supplemented crimes. See exhibit "21" 
attached for docket record showing the dismissal order, requiring return of all of Holli's 
seized properties and directing that the USA pay for Holli's commercial flight back from 
the Federal Medical Center at Carswell Texas to Utah. Holli was finally released from the 
FMC in April of 2009. Attached hereto as exhibit "22" is the final dismissal order entered 
in all of the federal criminal cases. 
Re Conclusion That Holli's Litigations Activities Are Abusive 
v. 
names 
purports to invoke. 
number and content of the filings indicate the harassing and frivolous 
nature of Lundahl's claims. See De Long, 912 F.2d at 1148. 
Marti asserts that the favorable prosecution of the federal criminal proceedings 
in Utah from 2006 through 2009, established as a matter of fact and law that Hom did not 
engage in any of the crimes or abusive litigation tactics for which she was charged by 
Judge Tallman in his May 24, 2006 Injunction order. (See FPO letter to Marti in April of 
2009 [ex. "1" attached to Marti's affidavit], and admitting that the government was 
prosecuting Holli for the crimes alleged in Ta!lman's May 24, 2006 Memorandum 
Decision.). Therefore, not only did TALLMAN lack subject matter jurisdiction over the 
contempt proceedings at hand, his entire order was a RICO instrument based on 
complicit fraud of the volunteer intermeddlers. Furthermore, the docket record shows at 
exhibit "1" attached, PACER doc. no. 20, that the OSC was issued directly to Holli, not 
Marti, and therefore Marti Should not be bound by the void Idaho injunction order 
because she had no opportunity to contest the order at the time it was entered. (See 
doctors letter attached as exhibit to Marti's affidavit establishing that Marti was in a 
coma in Utah Valley hospital at the time the OSC was issued and the hearing on the 
proceedings were allegedly conducted.). "A nonparty will not be bound by the injunction, 
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and, if she has had no opportunity to contest its validity." See Alemite, 42 F.2d at 832 
(declaring that a decree which purports to enjoin non- parties "is pro tanto brutum fu!men," 
and must be ignored). 
ARGUMENT 
The Idaho Federal Contempt /Injunction Judgment is void ab lnitio as to both 
Plaintiff Marti Lundahl and contemnor Holli Lundahl on the following legal grounds: 
(1) 
In v. , 11 ldaho 572, 83 P. 956 (1905) : 
held that a stranger to the proceeding can not obtain a contempt order) followed in State 
v. Bettweiser, Docket No. 32083 (Idaho. App. 2006). In Pennoyer, 95 U.S. 714 [24 LEd. 
565] (1878), the High Court held : "an OSC must be based on the acts or omissions 
of the party named in the complaint and as related to the merits of the action." 
"Sanctions must be based on the acts or omissions of the represented party or counsel as 
well as the legal merits of the pleading at bar." Zarsky v. Zurick Mgmt, 829 S.W.2d 398, 
400 (Tex. App. Houston [141h Dist.] 1992, no writ) TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN.§ 
10.005 (Vernon 2002). 
In the Idaho federal contempt proceedings, not one party filed a petition to 
contempt Holli in relation to the subject matter or merits of the complaint before the court. 
A review of the docket record after the April 7, 2006 OSC issued, reveals no contempt 
petition was filed by a party to the case. Therefore, the OSC was based upon volunteer 
intemmeddlers contempt petitions ; all whom had a substantial motive to commit fraud 
in their petitions because Hom had the statutory right to reopen her lawsuits against all of 
the volunteer intemmeddlers. 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are procedural in nature and do not 
provide substantive rights. See Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 ("The Supreme 
Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules 
20 
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of evidence" but "[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right."). 
The goal of Rule 11 to deter baseless filings must be effectuated within the limits of the 
Rules Enabling Act's grant of authority. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S 
384, 393, 110 S.Ct 2427, 2454, 11 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990). The language used in the 
Advisory Committee Notes indicates that it is the parties who are entitled to 
sanctions, not non-parties. 
Several federal courts have considered the question of non-parties seeking 
sanctions in a case in which they were not a named party. In Vesco v. Snedecker, No. 
02-2181 (10th Cir., 2003}, the 10th circuit offered the following analysis: 
Attorney Livingston filed a motion under Rule 11 of the Federal " Rules of Civil 
Procedure requesting an "award of sanctions" caused [the State] Defendants' 
abusive filings. We hold that Attorney Livingston lacks to file a 
the order denying entered in his clients case, 
was not a to his client's action. to N. Y 
972 F.2d 486 Cir. 1992) 
to ,..,..,.,\'.,.,~\' 
Int'!, 290 F.3d 
may not bring Rule 11 motion for Westlake 
Prop. Owners Ass'n v. City of Thousand Oaks, 915 F2d 1301, 1307 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(holding attorney for party cannot bring Rule 11 motion for sanctions as he is 
not a party to the action.); accord in Port Drum Co. v. Umphrey, 852 F.2d 148 
(5th Cir.1988 ) . Donaldson, 400 U.S. at 531, 91 S. Ct. At 542 -43. State of 
Montana v. U.S. E.PA, 137 F.3d 1135, 1141 (91n Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 
921 (1998); Venegas v. Skaggs, 867 F.2d 527, 529 (9th Cir. 1989), aff'd, 495 U.S. 
82, 110 S. Ct. 1679, 109 l.Ed.2d 74 (1990). 
The 10th circuit further opined that in N.Y. News, Inc. v. Kheel, 972 F.2d 482, 
486 (2nd Cir. 1992), the 2nd Circuit came to a !ike conclusion as Livingston supra. 
Quoting: 
" Kheel is an attorney who filed an independent action in federal " court 
under Rule 11 to attack RICO charges in a complaint alleging his 
involvement with a conspiracy scheme. Kheel however was not a named 
party in the RICO complaint. The Kheei court held that Kheel had no right 
to move for sanctions under Rule 11 . Kheel's remote interest in a 
streamlined, abuse-free judicial system was not a "significantly 
protectable interest" that gave Kheel standing to inject himself into 
litigation making collateral allegations against Kheel. Even if the non-
party asserts the judgment has an adverse effect, the non-party may not 
interject himself into litigation that does not plead that person as a party. 
Citing Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 304 (1988) (Even if a nonparty asserts 
that the judgment, or some action taken by the court in reaching the 
judgment, has an adverse effect on him, the nonparty is not allowed to 
appeal the judgment as the operative pleading does not set forth facts 
alleging the non-party's injury sufficient to grant him standing ) 
Furthermore, the All Writs Act does not provide authority to enter a contempt 
judgment in a case where standing or jurisdiction is lacking See Syngenta Crop 
21 
Case 2:12-cv-00280-SWS Document 20 Filed 03/18/13 Page 22 of 118 
Protection Inc. v. Henson, 537 US 28 (2002) (Citing Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction 
v. United States Marshals Service, 474 US 34, 41 (1985) (All Writs Act "does not authorize 
[federal courts] to issue ad hoc writs when jurisdiction is otherwise lacking.)); Gullickson 
v. Southwest Airlines Pilots' Ass'n, 87 F.3d 1176, 1186 (10th Cir.1996) (rejecting all 
Writs Act as independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction to enter contempt orders.); 
Renteria- Gonzales v. l.N.S., 322 F.3d 804, 811 (5th Cir. 2002) ("The All Writs Act does not 
confer an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction and thus does not grant the 
power to enter contempt orders.) 
Based on the foregoing, Judge Taliman's contempt order entered into the docket 




is a of subject matter 
matter jurisdiction to May 
Hom or Marti. Standard v. , 74 Ct.768 (1 
sanction can be imposed absent of jurisdiction".) 
(2) The Idaho Federal Court Civil Contempt Judgment Is Void 
Because It Exceeded The Limited And Defined Article Ill 
Authority Granted By The Juridicial Pleading At Hand 
It is well established that the complaint before the court is the juridicial means 
by which the court exercises his article Ill powers. See Stockyards National Bank of So. 
Omaha v. Bragg, et al., 67 Utah 60, 246 P. 966 (1925) (It is fundamental law that the 
petition filed by plaiintiff is the juridical means of investing a court with jurisdiction 
of the subject-matter, and that a judgment which is beyond or not supported by the 
pleading must fall.). Also see Gladstone Realtors v. Villiage of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 
99; 99 S Ct. 1601, 1608; 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979) (For a federal court to acquire subject 
matter jurisdiction, the complaint must set forth the defendant's illegal conduct, must 
show a palpable injury suffered by plaintiff which is traceable to the defendant and the 
challenged conduct alleged in the complaint ; and must set forth competent legal 
redress, or the judgment and the proceedings thereon are void.). Followed In Mid-Mile 
Holding Trust v. Pro lndiviso, Inc., 131 Idaho, 741, 746, 963 P.2d 1178, 1183 (1998). 
In the NAR complant, Holli set forth the illegal conduct of the defendant parties 
named in that complaint. Holli also alleged the palpable injury she and other plaintiffs 
22 
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suffered fand traced that palpable injury back to the challenged conduct of the named 
defendant parties. See Morris v. TE. Marine Corp., 344 F.3d 439 (5th cir. 2003) (A 
denial of due process occurs when the court issues a prejudicial rule outside the 
four corners of a complaint to the substantial injury of a party.). See also Manway 
Construction Co. Inc v. Housing Authority of the City of Hartford, 711 F.2d 501 (2nd Cir. 
1983) (Held: The claims against the Bank in the contempt proceeding raised new and 
unrelated issues not pleaded in the breach of contract complaint between Manway and 
the Authority. Accordingly, the district court was without subject matter jurisdiction to 
consider the contempt petition presented by the Authority. Ancillary jurisdiction over the 
Bank does not hold because there must have been - a transactional relationship -
is 
1 F.2d 100 
Cir. 1943) ("A by a court lacks jurisdiction over 
parties or of the subject matter, or that lacks the inherent power to make or enter the 
particular order involved, is void."). See also RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS (SECOND) 
§1 (1983). 
Here, the claims advanced by the volunteer intermeddlers were not 
transactually related in any manner to the allegations of the NAR complaint . Judge 
Tallman lacked authority to expand the allegations of Holli Lundahl's complaint beyond 
it's four corners. Because Judge Tallman did so, the entire NAR prosecution was tainted 
by Judge Tallman's unlawful usurpation of federal power and the entire action is bull and 
void and should be declared as such. 
(3) Judge Richard Tallman Was Actually Biased And Therefore 
Committed Structural Error When He Sat On Holli's Idaho 
Litigations 
A Number of federal courts have held that owning stock interests in the company 
who petitions for relief, mandates immediate disqualification. 6 
6. See Chase Manhattan Bank v. Affiliated Fm Ins. Co., 343 E3d 120, 123 (2"° Cir. 
2003)(Chemica! Bank, merged with The Chase Manhattan Bank under merged entity "Chase". 
23 
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Here, Judge Taliman had a vested interest of $250,000 stock interests in 
PIMCO who stood to benefit from Judge Tallman's broad injunction barring Holli from 
suing the petitioning parties. Judge Tallman was therefore actually biased against Hollis 
interests and therefore barred from sitting on the contempt proceeding. 
In addition, Judge Tallman purported to act as an investigating arm for the 
complaining witnesses accusing Holli of multiple crimes. When Holli complained of 
Judge Tallman's actions, Judge Tallman deferred the matter to the FBI as shown in 
exhibit "19 attached hereto and effectively acted as a complaining witness for the future 
2006 through 2009 criminal prosecutions brought against Holli. When Judge Tallman 
acted as an investigator instead of an impartial tribunal, he committed structural error 
1 
It is is 
disqualified for appearance of bias." ln re Murchison , 
942 (1955). Here, due process requires nullification of 





After the merger, the judge, his wife, and a family trust purchased between $300,000of stock in 
the merged entity. At a bench trial, the judge rendered a judgment of $92 million for the Chase in 
violation of § 455(b)(4). The case was appealed and subsequently remanded for further 
proceedings. See 196 F.3d at 377. The judge immediately divested himself of the Chase stock 
and, acting under 28 U.S.C.§ 455{f), thereafter conducted the requisite proceedings on remand. 
We hold that the divestiture after remand could not cure the past appearance of a disqualifying 
financial interest at the time of trial, and therefore reverse and remand to a different judge.). See 
also Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc., et.al. v. Ntsebeza, et al., No. 07- 919, Supreme Court of United 
States. (May 12, 2008) (Because the Court lacks a quorum, 28 U.S.C. §1, since a majority of 
the qualified Justices are own upwards of $15,000 stock interests in the corporate 
defendants named in the lawsuit, the judgment of the 2nd Circuit is automatically affirmed 
under 28 U.S.C. §2109. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2nd Cir., 2007). 
7. See In re U.S., 441 F.3d 44 (1st Cir., 2006) (See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 
75 S.Ct. 623, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955). Just as there is a prohibition against a judge "adjudicating a 
case where he appears to act as an investigator for the government," Johnson v. Carroll, 369 F.3d 
253, 260 (3rd Cir. 2004), there is a prohibition against a judge adjudicating a case where he has 
become an investigator against the government. We order recusal of the present district judge 
and direct that the case be assigned on remand to a different judge.). See also Yengo, Matter of, 
371 A.2d 41, 72 N.J. 425 (N.J.1977) (Respondent considered himself part of the prosecution 
structure rather than an impartial judge in re State of New Jersey v. Whitehead. The respondent's 
disrespect for law extended to the Constitution and cases decided under it the United States 
Supreme, all of which prohibited the wearing of two hats while sitting as an impartial arbiter over 
matters before his court. Removal of Judge Yengo is forthwith ordered.). 
24 
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(4) Marti Was Given No Notice of The Pending Contempt 
Proceedings, Are Void As Applied to Marti 
The record before this court establishes that Marti was in a coma in Utah Valley 
Medical Center's critical care unit when the OSC in the Idaho federal action was issued 
and heard. There is no evidence that Judge Tallman served Marti notice of the OSC 
proceedings he conducted on May 15, 2006 at the hospital or at any other loci for Marti. 
The power to sanction is limited by the due process clause of the United 
States Constitution. See U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV. Jurisdiction is the mandatory 
component needed to effect imposition of an in personam sanction order. See 
v. Olesen, 74 Ct (1954) ("No sanction can the 
of personal are 
1 
proof an 
order as to Marti is 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the reasons, Plaintiff Marti Lundahl Idaho 
Federal contempt proceedings, and in fact the entire case, was rendered null and void 
by Judge Tal!man's illegal actions taken wholly without Subject matter jurisdiction, 
without personal jurisdiction, and without any modicum of Due Process. This Court 
therefore has a duty to decree void and vacate the Idaho federal injunction, all orders 
entered in that case, and to publish its equity decree far and wi 
Dated: March 10, 2013 ~
Marti Lun 
Certificate of Service 
The undersigned certifies that she will electronically served opposing counsel with 
the foregoing document and attached 23 exhibits on March 14, 2013 to the following 
email address: 
Richard Vasquez 
Law Offices of Snow, Christainsen and Martineau 
10 Exchange Eleventh Fioor 
City, Utah 84111 
address: 
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RONALD F. PRiGE- 5535 
PmRs Scorn:LD PRICE 
A Professional Corporation 
340 Broadway Centre 
111 East Broadwzy 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841i1 
Te!ephone: (801) 32.2-2002 
322-2003 
for Piaintiff!Counterc!sim Defendants 
MAR f 7 20C~ 
!N THE JUD!CU\L COURT 
SALT LAKE 
HOLL' U.iNDAnL, 
Courri:erda im!P lab tiff, 
MARKT. Oi . .SDN; OLSCNt\SSOClt,TES, P.C.; 
h.rrHoNYC. Tmwru, D.D.s., OLYMPusV18!-.r 
DENTAL.AND NAR, 
Gounterclalm!Defer.dants. 
Plalntlff and count2rc!2im defendants' 
ST.A.TE OF UTAH 
ORDER ].1;wAADl1~G ATTORNEYS' FEES AND 
DOUBLE COSTS AGAJNST HOLLI AND 
JUDGEM!:NT AGAJNST HOLLI LUNDAHL FOR 
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND DOUBLE COSTS 
Civil No. 020201658 
Judg~ Anthony Quinn 
Fees And Double Costs Against f-1o!Ji Lundahl, And For Other Relief (the 
\t I Ii 
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car;ie before fiie Court for hearing at 8:3C am or: 'Thursday, 1flFebrna;y2004. R.on.s!d F. Price 
of the law firm PETERS SCOFlELD PRJCEA Professional Corporation appeared on behalf cf the Moving 
Parties. Additionally, counterclaim defendant Mark T. Olson was present. No other persons or 
parties were present Thus, Hom Lundahl did not appear. Additionally, defendants Kem Lundahl 
and John Behle did not appear and were not represented by counsel. 
The the memorandum and the affidavit of 
in support of the that Hoili was 
served with determined 
advised 
cause 
1. Pursuant to the ruling of. the Utah Court in the case of Lundahl v. Quinn, 
67 P .3d 1000 (Utah that entitled to recover from Holli Lundahl the 
Parties in connection w!th 
responding to, and as a result of, the Petition for &fro Ordinar1 Writ Directed to Judge Anthony 
Quinn of the Third Judicial District Court Pursuant to Rule 65B (the "Petition") filed by Hom 
Lundahl in connection with this matter, and pursuant to the Utah Supreme Court's inst'Uctions in 
the Lundahl opinion that this Court determine the amount of those attorneys' fees and double 
costs to award and to enter such an award against Hom Lundahl and in !av.or of the Moving 
" 
Parties, the Court hereby ORDERS that Hom Lundahl shall pay to the Moving Parties the sum 
of $4 707 .50 for attorneys' fees which the Moving Parties incurred in cormecilon with responding 
2 
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against Helli Lundahl. 
EYIBE 
3 
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CERTiflCATE OF SERVJCE 
I hereby certify thal on ttie 23l'!I day of Febmary 2004, and on this ?· day of March,. 
2004, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER AWAAO!WG ATTORNEYS' FE.Es AND OOl.!BLE 
Cosrs AGAINST HoLl.l L!JNDAHL, AlllD JUDGEYENT AGA:NST How LUNDAHL foRATIORNEYS' fas 
A~n DOUBLE Com was serv~ in the manner indicated to the following: 
Gregory M. Constantino 
Constantino 
68 South Main Street, Suire #800 
Sa!H..ake Utah 84101 
200 East Center 
U!Bl'J 84057 
530-1333 
_:::£... U.S. Mail 
__ Hand Delivery 
U.S. Mail 
4 
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0510.112006 !0:49:00 RC006 CLERKS OfflCE ONElDA COUNTY 
138395 
138962 
l11stn11ne11t Count: 2 
1211512005 04:201) 
0412712006 03:20p 
Hl5 • LIEN 
14 ms 36E 1~3;.-,9 
14 16S 35E T-3779 
NAR, INC. (UENOR) 
ENTS 
056 ·DEED. WAR!~N1Y, SPECIAL 
14 H!S 36E T-3179 
14 ms 36E T-377!l 
5 
GRANTOR: SECURITY NATIONAL MORTGAGE COMPANY 
GRANTEE:.: KEDDINGTON. JAMES 
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CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORITY 
OF 
N.A.R., INC. 
File Number C 149341 
I, BEN YSURSA, Secretary of State of the State of Idaho. hereby certify that an 
App!ic21tion for Certificate of Authority, duly executed pursuant 10 the provisions of the 
Idaho Business Corporation has been received In this office and is found to 
conform to law. 
ACCOROlNGL Y and by virtue of the authority vested in me by law. I issue this 
Certificate of Authority to transact business in this State and attach hereto a dupilcate of 
the app!ication for such certificate. 
Dated: 23 May 2003 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
,, .. , I 
By - 4~~~~~i~~ ..... ·-------- - · 
-==~.::::::_ ........... -----·---·-········· ···~--~-----······:'········- . .......... .... ....................... -.. ---................. ...... ... . ............... ...  
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2C2 ~, ~==-=~A~P=P=L~l=CA=T=l=O=N~F=O=R=C=E~R=T=IF=IC=A=T~t..·---~-··~-· ·~-~-=-===·_.~%i:=_ ... ~11 
· ! OF AUTHORlTY (For Profit) ,;,· ·~~ If 
r (!nstructions Qn Bacx of Application) . 1 , ._,.,.. 
!
'.:I ~ . . "' ""deraigned Coomration appli8' fo. a Ce<tificate of Authmity and "''"a; fellow" ' ; · ;J ':( :;~.·~.· ;_;,~"?. · 
The name of the corporation is U:~; 
I N·A·E;tNc. ... 
2. The name which it shall use in Idaho is: N ·A · ]?.~ INC. _ __ p C · ~: 
3. It is incorporated under the laws of: -~tA~J-'-"a~h.L_ __________ c,_~.L..~ ·:.....· ~ · ) 
--~~"----L--=--.:.1--"0 / 1y /1qq S r.:; 4. its date of incorporation is: 
5. The address of its principal office is: 
..c.. /o w. ir~!Jadu'tl1-/ c;;fr. &lo 
6. The address lo which correspondErnce should be addressed. if different from item o. is: 
~--/.\ ~ ' ' --r - _l,4. . . - ., ( (._ 
- - -----·--Jl'... ~I · t-t.'- ~ ,µ "· · C.1. C ,ti' kt;:~,,:; 
7. The street address of its regislered office in Idaho is:. 5'i:i ;J 7_ /:£M~ £ ')/ O()fi1,. /!} '?370& 
I 
and its registered agent in Idaho at that address is: ~.W\e..p , \ UC ·f';~- f Pr 1 '.\ ±r .ai 
I 8. 
! 
The names and respective business addresses of its directors and officers <ve: 
Name Office Address ! 
-pavi d ~ax.-kn 
~ ol 5tJ.Xftv> 
Jlil-ttY ,..J Mod 
tr&?/duJ- :no ~e~ Ctr. j.J.s4'+Lah vi . ~ 
Iii u. Pru:1 /o&:vd =?...10 B69"J &. t.J.Sz/.J.:'4k.t ul wo5L/ 
sewe,wy 
TypedName: 1JA>Jt.f2 _)# ~ 
Capacity: ~I~ 
- ---- -··· ---·· ---
13':1q(, 5 · 1PO E. ~ t,d- fr'f~~ 
:no ic~y {',v. µ. s,.Jtl...ft u.J. ~ 06 
Customer Acct # . 
Secretary of Stat;;-.;-;e only--
IDllHO SECRETARY OF STATE 
05/23/2003 05:00 
CK: 57946 CT: 178C75 BH: 64248S 
1 @ 1118.89 = 188.88 AUTH PRO i 2 
1 @ 28.88 = 28.88 CORP SUR W J 
G lY0 3Y I 
-··· - ·--·--.- .... :--.. - - - -. ---···--·-·--
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~ ._, 
Utah Departm~nt nf Cnmrnen:::e 
DJvision of Corporations & Ccmmercial C0c,; 
J.Sll East JOO Suuth, 2nd Flou;-. S .. \1. Bo:t l4ti'.'0:i 
3d;~ Lake Cit}", t:T 3..S: i .i ... 67D!: 
S,cnici C en tu: {3G l) 530-4341) 
Ai~ 8; 22 Toll Fm:: (3"77) S'2 6-J9~4 Cuh R~sid::w 
h1: {801) 530-{j4J8 
",..Very Si!e: h!!F ://W)V~'. CO'!"Jm4!rt~.u~;ih.gO'tJ 
CERTIFICATE OF EXISrfENCE 
Registration Number: 
Business Name: 





OCTOBER 14, 1995 
DOMESTIC COLLECTTON AGENCY 
ACT1VE 
The Division of Corporations and Commercial Code of the State of Utah, custodian of the records of 
business registrations, certifies that the business entity on this certificate is authorized to transact business and 
was duly registered under the laws of the Sta!e oflJtah. 
Dept. of Professional Liceming 
(801) 530-6628 
f:\hom~"..i:C'lrp'.cam1non\ternplatc\co _ n1..:m . wpd 
Kathy Berg 
Director 





Securities Consumer Protection 
(801) 530-6600 (801 ) 530-6601 
:-rvised. 03~ i 1}-0 I mm 
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: BANKRlJPTlY ~ti. 'df:.n6di.1-
TRUSTEE ANDRE DlAZ 
Tli.E DEBTOR PROPOSF.S TIIE FOLLOWL'liG A..'1El"i"DED CHAPTER l3 Pl,A.,~: 
1. Pursuant to court order dated Junt 11, the Debtor sh&!l imhmit to th£ 
in the amount ofS50 pe• nwnth for t!u: of no less th::w 60 
d1alms lire paid as for in the Phn.1. 
mi.•·m.::nt$ made to the Tru!i?ee to eonfirmntion slu1!l he co11trib1.1t'l:'d as<\ 
cm:itrilmtitm. '.flrn Trustee is 1:fr1h:red to hold the dditi:ir's 
further prder of the court, 
2. From the .!IO the Trustee sfo<l! make to crediton 
11.lhH'l'cd claims in the following order 11nd on 11 pro nit.a h8sis for each claim witl.tin 
the druis: 
A. CLASS A. payments orifar<od the Court as 11et forth in 
B. admini!!tr~iive claims under H USC section 567{2) 
, i.!u.:hi.ding fees and cost.,. 
C, CLASS C. _Allowed secured claim!! of the creditors with 
Interest u indicated below: 
NONE 
Pur.;ua:it to 11 USC section 506(b} and l32.5{a)(5), the interest netes~acy to 
provide these crediion their allowed claims shall be paid from the petition date for 
each creditor whose eol!ateraJ value exceeds the claim amoHt; otbenvise, interest 
shall be paid from. the date the i:onf!rmatfon order is entered by tbe Clerk. 
. 
D. CLASS D. Allowed priority unsecured claims under section 11 USC section 
507(a)(2)-(8) shall bi! paid JOO% with iw inforcst. 
.E. CLASS E. Allowed mmpriority unsecured claims, which shall fodude t:lze 
n!lowed claims of al! crcditon not otherwise classified in this Plan, shall be 
pald Ill! allowed unsecured cli1ims at the rate of 6% per annum from ti1e date 
the confirmation order ill entered.· 
}'. Additional provisions Jrnmu.1n! tu 1.1 USC m:tlon 1322(1>): NONE 
3. The trustee is entitled lu ~ fee under section 586( e). 
4. Unless otherwise ordered by the Co.Uri~ all property of the t.'!!tatc shall vc.st in 
in the debtor upon Confir:m.Ation. 
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5. Ia 111::.:ordam:e wffh 11 USC ~ectiun 1328(a), upori eompletfoa of the Plan, 
Desc Main 
The Debtor shall he dlseh.arged of all debts provided for by the Plan or dis11l1-0wed_nnder 
scctill.n 11 USC section SIJZ: - . - . 
6. This .Plu1 provide,~ that creditor.\ will receive 100% ofal1owed or adjudicated 
Cbtims, thus providing creditors wid1 a great.er return under tbfs plitn then the creditors 
Would receive if the esfatc of the Debtor Wtt) liquidated itnder Chapter 7. 
7. During the coarse of these bankruptcy procedfo'gs, the Debtor will he 
prosecuting .nu:merow adversary proceedings on disputed claims. Further the Debtor will 
be pro,1l'cuting an pending lawsuits listed as assets to debtors estate in these bankruptcy 
proceeding11 and NW further object to the lift of any stay order involving a forfeiture of 
funds belonging w the dcbfor or otherwise induded 113 gnrnnds 1.11Hfor the ~tay provision of 
the bankruptcy cod~ 
VERiHCATION 
Tbe 1.foes tfalt ta the best of her 
'4rm:mnt8 nncl vahies set forth above are true m:id upon 
the comi clo so. 
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EOLLI LUNDAHL 
1?0 BOX 970632 
OREM., UTAH 84097-0632 
ATTORNEY PRO SE 
E-MAIL HOLLILUNDAHL.l@JUNO.COM 
r1·· ~ 
' LEO Iii fHE 
UNITED SHTES 
8ANKRUPTCY co:_ 
2003 SEP I 5 p 3: 11 
\~':LLli\11 C. STILLGEBAUE'R 
CLEKX Of COURT 
BY-;:;~~.--::-:-.::-:,-,-­
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DEPUTY CLERK 






DOUG MURDOCK, ELI LILLY AND 
COMPANY, INC. , ADVANCED 
CARDIOVASCULAR SYSTEMS,INC. 
MERRELIN BLAND, JOYCE JOHNSON 
PATRICIA WAYMAN, BEVERLY 
GILSDORF, CONNIE HARRISON, 
EVE CHAPLIN, GTE CORPORATION 
NOW VERIZON CO:MMONICATIONS, 
PACIFIC MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. , 
KAREN KADYK AND COUNTY OF 
RIVERSIDE, DIRECTOR OF THE 
STATE BOARD OF CHIROPRACTIC 
EXAMINERS VIVIAN DAVIS IN 
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AND DOES 
OFFICERS IN THEIR OFFICIAL 
CAPACITIES AND SAN 
DIEGO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
JUDGE JAMES AHLER 
Defendants 
BANKRUPTCY CASE NO. 03-21660 
13) 
ADVERSARY PROCEEDING NO. 
03 p -
AMENDED 
NOTICE OF :REMOVAL OF THE 
FOLLOWING CASES: 
UTAH STATE CASE NO. 010902105 
AS TO DOUG MURDOCK ONLY; 
CALIFORNIA STATE CASE NO. 219124 
FORMERLY CASE NO. 214606; 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFOR..~IA 
CASE NO. CV94-021 RJT FORMElU.Y 
CASE NO. CV94-045GLT; CALIFORNIA 
STATE CASE NO. SC03S8381, AND; 
SAN DIEGO ADMINISTRATIVE CASE 
NO. L-9505197. 
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Plaintiff Holli Lundahl hereby files this amended :notice of 
removal and rem.aves the following state and federal cases having 
common claims or representation: (1) Utah state case no. 010902105 as 
to defendant Doug Murdock only, {2) California state case no. 219l24 
formerly state case no. 214606; (3) United States District Court 
Central District of California case no 94-021 RJT formerly case no. CV 
94-045GLT, (4) California State case no. SC0398381, and; (5) San 
Diego Administrative case no. L-9505197 to the United States 
Court for the Central District of Utah to 28 USC 
section 1452 and :rule 9027. All cases above stated were 
to The removed claims 
are non-core, and :non-final 
federal civil and RICO claims , 
and al.l of the bear a demand. 
Plaintiff Holli Lundahl DOES NOT CONSENT to the 
on the 
final orders or 
:removed claims . 
Furthermore because of the nature of claims, all of these 
must be transferred to the United States District Court for 
further disposition pursuant to 28 USC sections 157{b) (5), (d) & (e). 
Due to the volume of the papers in the cases, plaintiff 
attaches hereto the :relevant interlocutory :rulings and other court 
process conclusive of the court entering a final competent order in 
the removed cases. The relevant process is attached in chronological 
order: 
CALIFORNIA STATE CASE NO. 219124 FORMERLY CASE NO. 214606 
1. Exhibit "l" : Caption page in California state case no. 
219124 formerly 214606 showing the state causes of action sued upon to 
include: Defamation, Intentional Interference with Contract, 
Intentional interference with Prospective Economic Advantage, Breach 
z. ' 
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of Contract, Common Counts, [Insurance Bad Faith], Fiduciary Fraud. 
Following is the defamatory communications published and authored by 
by Eli Lilly; 
2. Exhibit "2" : Decembe.r 9, 1992 Stipulation and Order 
signed by the state judge staying the civil action against Eli Lilly 
until further notice based upon the pendency of the criminal action. 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF 
CALIFORNIA CASE NO. CV94-021R.JT FOR..~Y CASE NO. CV94-045GLT 
3. Exhibit "3": The cri.m.inal act.ion .in favor of Lundahl on 
23, 1993. On 13, 1994 LmIDAHL filed a action 
Eli for civil , federal RICO and anti trust 
vio1ations in addition to the state l.aw c1aims set :forth in exhibit 
law claims under s~ction 1367 s federal case was 
the honorab1e Gary L. On March 1, 1994, LILLY a motion 
to d:ism..iss claiming that plaintiff's state law claims were ti.me 
ba.:.ered. On April. 25, · 1994 , Judge Gary Taylor granted in part and 
denied in part LILLY' s motion to dismiss. The federal court found 
that none of plaintiff's claims were time barred and therefore denied 
the motion to diSll!.iss on this ground. The federal. court granted 
Li11y' s motion to dismiss with leave to a.mend ordering LUNDAHL to 
plead her fiduciary fraud claim with more particularity. Exhibit "3" 
attached is a true and correct copy of the court's written order 
issued on April 25, 1994. 
4. Exhi.bi t "4" : The May 19 / 1994 default entered against 
defendant Eve Chaplin and supporting documentation. 
5. Exhibit "5": Gary Taylor's ruling dismissing the 
corporate entities without prejudice for lack of standing as not in 
existence at the times alleged in the complaint. 
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6. Exhibit "6": On August 22, 1994 plaintiffs submitted and 
filed a status report in support of a status conference. Attached 
thereto was all of the registered state court criminal process 
supporting the federal complaint. Exhibit "6" attached hereto is a 
true and correct certified copy of the top page to the status report 
and supporting certified state court documents. 
7. Exhibit "7": On November 3, 1994, the state court in 
case no. 219124 entered a permanent stay order on the state case until 
resolution of federal case number 94-045GLT. Ex:hibi t "7" is a 
certified copy of the order. 
On October 17, 1994 the federal 
~n tered an order that LUNDAHL was the to all 
hea1 t:h ca.re cl.aims bi:U.ed to El.:i that 
LILLY would not be any matters which were or could 
have been 
LUNDAHL' s contract, bad faith, 
imprisorunent and malicious prosecution and de£a.mation claims in 
LU1""DAHL' s favor. The court left Lundahl' s intentional interference 
with prospective economic advantage and anti trust claims for later 
disposition. See a true and correct certified copy of this order is 
attached hereto as exhibit "8". 
9. Exhibit "9 11 : The action was subsequently transferred to 
the federal judge Robert Timlin just appointed to the bench. Robert 
Timlin was a state appellate justice sitting on Lundahl' s under1ying 
state criminal. action when Lundahl filed a writ o~ habeus corpus on 
the grounds of Brady violations. Judge Robert Timl.in also owned 
upwards of $240, 000 in stock interests in the defendants companies 
appearing before his court. Seven (7) months after the case was 
transferred to the new and conflicted federal court, LILLY/ACS filed 
a counterclaim seeking to :retry the criminal case in. the civil forum 
in violation of Judge Gary Taylor's October 17, 1994 order. Attached 
hereto as exhibit "9" is and true and correct copy of the face page of 
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the Counterclaim filed into the court :record en April 23, 1995. NO 
SUMMONS was ever issued on the counterclaim. which was in fact a cross 
complaint filed in violation of Gary Taylor's order and FRCP rule 13. 
10. Exhibit "10": During discovery issued on May 12, 1995, 
the County o:f Riverside and Kadyk attested under oath that the 
criminal case was dismissed because LILLY' s witnesses lacked 
creditability and the county felt it would not prevail on the criminal 
charges before a jury. Exhibit "10" attached is a true and correct 
copy of this response. 
11. Exhibit "ll": documents were obtained from the 
OOL LUNDAHL' s criminal. trial and to vested interests 
and insurers of Eli LILLY to include GTE, Life A:t;surance 
of America, and of the United St.at.as, 
CNA. Attached hereto are true and correct o:f these 
responses in the federal action. Later 
revealed that the 
interests in GTE. 
Robert J. Timlin had vested stock 
affiliates and CNA. 
12. Exhibit "12": On September 4, 1996 in violation of the 
law of the case doctrine, L:ILLY filed another motion to dismiss or 
in the alternative a summa.:r:y judgment motion re-arguing matters 
previousl.y determined by the Honorable Ga.ry t.aylor on April 25, 1994 
and October 17, 1994 in Lundahl' s favor and overruled these orders. 
TIMLIN found that LUDNAHL was not an assignee of the ACS Health plan, 
that LUNDAHL' s claims were time barred and that the only claim that 
survived summary judgment was LUNDAHL malicious prosecution claim. 
See exhibit "12" attached for a true and correct copy of this order. 
13. Exhibit "13": On June 30, 1997 because the County of 
Riverside and KADYK testified through deposition testimony that the 
state criminal case was dismissed because LILLY' s employee's 
statements to Riverside County and Kadyk lacked credibility [which"was 
the same· as saying the statements and reports were false] and 
therefore the county detenuined that they would. not prevail on a 
5. 
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criminal trial, Judge Robert did not reach the probable cause issue on 
the malicious prosecution charge and instead found that the criminal 
action was not favorably te:z.::m.inated to LUDNAHL because it was 
dismissed by the people before it was tendered to a jury fo:r a jury 
verdict. See Robert Timlin' s ruling entered on June 30, 1997 as 
exhibit "13" attached hereto. 
14. Exhibit "14": On May 8, 1998, Judge Tim1in dismissed 
LILLY' s first amended counterclaim against Holli Lundahl with 
See certified copy of this 
"14" attached hereto. 
Exhibit "15": On October 6, 
order as exhibit 
Timlin entered 15. 
a default Belli Lundahl on the firat amended 
Holli Lundahl with 
1998 and 
served process and not to the action, 
on s, 
not 
and o:f alter ego 1 s t.o Holli Lundahl . 
"15" attached for default judgment. 
16. Exhibit "16": LUNDAHL appealed these judgments 
believing them to be final. On August 26, 2002 during the pend.ency of 
a 2002 bankruptcy case filed by Holli Lundahl the 9th circuit entered 
an order finding that no final judgment had been entered because Judge 
Timlin had not ruled that the underlying action was finally disposed 
as to all parties and claims, had not te:rm..inated the litigation with 
prejudice and had not determined who won the action. The 9th circuit 
dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
See exhibit ''16" attached for 9th circuit order. LUNDAHL prepared a 
proposed finci.1 order on October 21, 2002 for purposes of appeal. and 
pursuant to the appellate mandate. Judge Tim1in :rejected LUNDAHL' s 
:final order and forwarded the order hack to LUNDAHL on Ocother 24, 
2002 due to his actual bias conflicts with the case. On January- 31, 
2003, LUNDAHL :filed this bankruptcy case which stayed the California 
federal. proceedings in light of the counterclaims being pursued 
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against LUNDAHL. The federal and state cases were removed to the 
bankruptcy court based upon an extension granted by Bankruptcy Judge 
Judi th Boulden after an erroneous dismissal of Lundahl' s bankruptcy 
case in June of 2003. 
SAN DIEGO OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS CASE NO. L-9505197 
17. Exhibit "18": To obstruct the California federal action, 
LILLY contacted LUNDAHL's licensing Board in March of 1995 to confirm 
action taken Ltih"!.lAHL. On March 11, 1995, 
the board indicated that LUNDAHL had had current and clear license 
since it's issuance. Sae exhibit "18" attached for letter. 
On , 1995 the San Office of Administrative 
to LILLY's a time barred, 
and admi:nis t.ra ti ve action with the same 
criminal :from December 1990 June of 1991 
as San Diego Office of Administrative hearings case no. L-9505197. 
At the outset, the action was commenced out of the subject matter 
jurisdiction of this adm.i.nistrative office pursuant to the Government 
Code section 11508 (a) as LUNDAHL only had a co-owned interstate 
office located in Los Angeles California and was a .residence of the 
state of Utah, County of Utah. Lundahl timely filed 
a notice of defense which included claims that the San Deigo 
Administrative Offices lacked subject matter and personal jurisdiction 
over LUNDAHL and the action was further barred by affirmative defenses 
of res judicata 1 collateral estoppal, judiciai estoppal, accord, 
satisfaction, release, waiver, unclean hands and equitable estoppel. 
19. Exhibit "19": On September 4, 1995, after the San 
Diego Office of Administrative Hearing sent Lundahl a subpoena to 
appear in San Diego County for the Administrative Hearing by 
criminally using the contempt. powers of the state through the issuance 
of a subpeona ordering LUND"AHL's appearance out of jurisdiction, 
LUNDAHL filed a statutory pre-emption against. the San Diego Law judge 
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assigned to hear the case re-iterating the office' s lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction. See exhibit "19" attached for pre-emptory 
challenqe. 
20. Exhibit "2011 : On September 8, 1995 LUNDAHL supplemented 
the pre-em.ptoxy challenge in exhibit ''19'' supra when she learned that 
AHLER was formerly of counsel to LILLY's attorney's law offices 
representing LILLY in the above stated federal action and that AHLER 
owned of $210,000 in stock interests in LILLY, LILLY 
affiliates and LILLY' s insurer also liable for any LUNDAHL 
obtained LILLY in the above stated California fecieral 
21. Exhibit "21": 
office and took LUNDABL to the out 
of 
and other affirmative 
defenses which AHLER set of£ until it was time for LUNDAHL to 
her case in chief. LUDNABL continued to be forcefully detained for 
appearance day to day until September 27, 1995 when AHLER conspired 
with LILLY, OTA, GTE and PACIFIC LJ:F.E 1 the latter three LILLY 1 s 
insurers, to expire LUNDAHL as a party opponent and steal LUNDAHL' s 
evidence, and when that failed, to fal.sely charge LUNDAHL with 
felony assaul.t so that LUNDAHL' s defense would be defaulted to the 
state. These persons procured LUNDAHL's false .imprisonment in federal 
jail for the most part of S months while AHLER continued to prosecute 
the administrative action without LUNDAHL' s presence and 
representation, defaulted LUNDAHL on proceedings that were totally 
l.acking in jurisdiction and barred by numermous affirmative defenses 
and entered a decision on October 6, 1995 revoking LUNDAHL' s license 
and finding LUNDAHL guilty of the sa.me fraud crimes adjudicated in 
Lundabl's favor in the state criminal forum on July 23, 1993. 
Moreover, LUNDAHL was never served notice of the decision nor was-she 
aware that the proceedings were continuing without her representation 
while she continued to be detained in federal jail. On January 1 7 , 
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1996 LUNDAHL was :released from jail. On January 31, 1996 LtJNDAHL 
learned of the administrative decision when LILLY filed the decision 
in the above stated federal action in support of a motion to dismiss 
under the doctrine of collateral estoppal. On February S, 1996 
LUNDAHL filed an administrative appeal by way of a verified ex parte 
application for a de facto writ of mandamus [California requires that 
the mandamus petition be filed within 30 days of the entry of the 
decision] to 
L'ONDABLS' verified 
the void decision. See exhibit "21" for 
forth the defenses. 
22. Ex.hi.bit "22 11 : 
Court in its denied the de facto 
fox writ of mandamus filed. 
was vo:id as a matter of law. The 
was also void as a :matter of law as credit to a void 
administrative 
UTAH STATE CASE NO. 010902105 
23. Exhibit "23": In Nove1'1l.ber of 1999, Plaintiff and he:r 
sister were involved in a car accident. Murdock fraudulently claimed 
to have treated pl.aintiff' s sister when no such treatment was 
rendered. Plaintiff's sister assigned the false debt to plaintiff who 
then brouqht an action against Murdock for RICE/RICO and unlawful debt 
collection practices. Murdock did not appear and was defaulted. The 
Law offices of Snel.l. q.nd Wilner we:re then retained by Murdock and 
filed an unserved motion to vacate the default and to dismiss the 
action fraudulentl.y arguing that plaintiff sued this doctor under the 
Utah Malpractice act when no such cause of action was stated. The 
trial court dismissed the action based upon the .fraud committed by 
this law office. See exhibit "23" attached for copy of the void 
' -
dismissal order. '.I'his same law office is now representing LILLY in 
the big case above stated and has committed similar void acts. 
q, 
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REMOVED CONTEMPT CASE INITATED BY LILLY AND GTE 
24. Exhibit ''24": During the prosecution of California 
federal case no. CV94-045 changed to case no. 94-021, L!LLY's counsel 
fabricated a false subpoena and thereafter charged LUNDAHL with having 
fabricated the false subpoena and committing forgery. In March of 
1995, TIMLIN certified a criminal contempt order against LUNDAHL based 
upon unsupported facts as LILLY's Lundahl 
demanded a trial under 18 USC section 402 and under BRADY 
that the GTE was 
of the false 
with a certified letter to carry 
GTE's 
3, 1995 and sent to G'l'E's 
by certified mail bearing certified receipt no. Z 174 324 396. See 
exhibit "24" attached. 
25. Exhibit "25": The Subpeona sent to GTE by LUNDAHL via the 
certified mailing clai.med by GTE was a st.ate subpoena and furthermore 
the document was not received by GTE until February 6, 1995, three 
days after G'.rE processed the fal.se federal subpeona. See exhibit "25" 
attached hereto for state process served on GTE. 
26. Exhibit "2611 : This is the false federal subpoena hearing 
GTE's legal dept's stamp date of February 3, l995 on it's face. 
27. Exhibit "27": GTE claimed that the records were sent to 
the court under seal in violation of BRADY because of the privacy act. 
2B. Exhibit "28": The process was returned to GTE and never 
claimed by plaintiff because the process t issued by plaintiff. 
See exhibit "28" for returned process. 
Dated: September 9, 2003 
Attorney Pro Se 
/D. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that she gave notice of this removal 
to the following attorneys represented in the following pleadings: 
The Law offices of 
Morris, Polich and Purdy 
1055 W. Seventh Street, 24th Floor 
Los Angeles, California 90017 
& 
3410 E. Fourteenth St. 
Riverside, CA 92502 
General for the ~tate 
Of California and Utah 
1350 Front St. 
Utah General's Of£ice 
South 
s:r..c, Utah 04114 
I!, 
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Exhibits/ 
tta hm t 
to thi 
h v n t 
s ann d. 
Please see the 
case file. 
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Cvf/ECF - California Central District 
.,REFER 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT for the CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
(Eastern Division - Riverside) 
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE#: 5:94-cv-00021-RT 
Demand: $0 
Case in other court: Santa 8:94-cv-00045 








Date Tenninatcd: l 
Demand: Both 






Francis C PizzuHi 
Francis C Pizzulli Law Offices 
718 Wilshire Blvd 




ATTORNEY TO BE N011CED 
Jerry L Steering 
Jerry L Steering Law Offices 
4063 Birch Street, Suite JOO 





ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED 
represented by Donald R Johnson 
If\ PRO PER 
27365 Jefferson Ave 
Other 
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CV!!ECF • Caiiforni:! Central District 
Advanced Cardiovascular ,v.,u,,.,,., Inc 
A 
Defendant 






ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED 
Donald L Ridge 
Morris Polich and Purdy LLP 
1055 West 7th Street Suite 2400 





ATIORl\fEY TO BE NOTICE.D 
Laine T 
Peterson & Ross 
333 South Grttnd Ave 
Suite !600 







A ITORNEY TO BE NOTICED 
Carol Ann Humiston 
(See above for address) 
TERMINATED: 0113011996 
LEAD ATTORNEY 
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED 
Donald L Ridge 
(See above for address) 
TERMINATED: 0113011996 
LEAD ATTORNEY 
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED 
Laine T Wagenseller 
(See above for address) 
TERMINATED: 0113011996 
LEAD ATTORNEY 
ATIORNEY TO BE NOTJCED 
file://IC:tusers/E!ham/Desktop/L"SDC-94%20CV%2002!'%20Dockethtm[lil3i20 !3 ! l :33:3 i PY!} 
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Anthony G Brazil 
above for 
LEAD ATTORNEY 
ATTORXEY TO BE NOTICED 
Carol Ann Humiston 
(See above for address) 
LEAD ATIORNEY 
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED 
Donald L Ridge 
(See above for address) 
LEAD ATIORNEY 




ATTORivEY TO BE 





A 1TORlvEY TO BE N011CED 
represented by Anthony G Brazil 
(See above for address) 
LEAD AITORNEY 
AITORNEY TO BE NOTICED 
Carol Ann Humiston 
(See above for address) 
Ll:.,"'AD AITORNEY 
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED 
Donald L Ridge 
(See above for address) 
LEAD AITORNEY 
ATFORNEY TO BE NOTICED 
Laine T WagenseHer 
(See above for address) 
LEADAITORNEY 
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AITORNEY TO BE NOTICED 
represented G Brazil 
(See above for address) 
LEAD ATTORNEY 
ATTORNEY TO BE 1VOTJCED 
Carol Ann Humiston 
(See above for address) 
LEAD AITORNEY 
AITORNEY TO BE NOTICED 
Donald L Ridge 
(See above for address) 
LEAD ATTORNEY 
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED 
LEAD ATTORiVEY 
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED 
G Brazil 
LEAD ATTORNEY 
ATTORNEY TO BE 
Carol Ann Humiston 
above for 
LEAD ATTORNEY 
ATIORNEY TO BE NOTICED 
Donald L Ridge 
(See above for address) 
LEAD ATTORNEY 
A1TORNEY TO BE NOTICED 
Laine T Wagenseller 
(See above for address) 
LEAD ATTORNEY 
AITORIVEY TO.BE N01ICED 
represented by Anthony G Brazil 
(See above for address) 
LEAD A11'0RNEY 
ATTORNEY TO BE N011CED 
Carol Ann Humiston 
(See above for address) 
LEAD ATTORNEY 
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ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED 
Laine T Wagenselier 
(See above for address) 
LEAD ATTORNEY 
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED 
represented G Brazil 
(See above for address) 
L!'AD ATTORNEY 
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED 
Carol Ann Humiston 
LEAD ATTORNEY 
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICEJJ 




ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED 
represented by Fiona G Luke 
Roberts & Morgan 
1770 Iowa Ave 
Ste 210 





An'ORVEY TO BE NOTICED 
represented by J E Holmes , Ill 
(See above for address) 
LEAD ATTORlvEY 
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED 
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AnORNEY TO BE N011CED 






03/l lil 994 
03/11/1994 
03111/1994 
03/l 1/l 994 
(See above for 
TERA1INATED: 07/21/1994 
LEAD AnORNEY 
ATTORNEY TO BE' NOTICED 
RETURN OF SUMMONS and proof of service executed upon defondant 
03/1411994) 
RETURN OF SUMMONS and proof of service execuied upon defendant Eve Chaplin on 
2/10/94 (krpa) (Entered: 03/14/1994) 
RETURN OF SUMMONS and proof of service executed upon defendant Advanced 
Cardiovascu on 2/10/94 (krpa) (Entered: 03/14/1994) 
9 ·RETURN OF SUMMONS and proof of service executed upon defendant Riverside Cty of 
on 2/10/94 (krpa) (Entered: 
' RETURN OF SUMMONS and proof of service executed upon defendant Karen Kadyk on 
'2!!0i94 (krpa) 03/14/1994) 
RETCRN OF SlJ\1MONS and proof of service executed upon defendant Patricia 
on 2116194 (krpa) 03114/ 1994) 
03/11/1994 l 2 . RETl;R;-.; OF SLI.\1MO?\S and 
0311411994) 
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13 RETURN OF SUMMONS arid proof of service executed upon defendant Connie 
on 2/9/94 03/\4/1994) 
upon defencant ~krrelin Bland on 
15 EX PI\RTE APPLIC.k.\TI01'i by plaintiff llolli LundahL plaintiff Donald R Johnson! plaintiff 
Mission Trail Medica, plaintiff - Mission Trail Medica, plaintiff Lundahl Chiropractic to 
continue hrg on dfts' rntn to dism ; LDGD ORD (krpa) (Entered: 03/2811994) 
6 MEMOR.t\NDUM of Pl A by plaintiff Holli Lundahl, plaintiff Donald R Johnson, plaintiff 
Mission Trail Medica, plaintiff - Traii Medica, plaintiff Lundahl Chiropractic in support of 
motion to continue hrg on dfts' mtn to dism [15-1] (krpa) (Entered: 03/28/1994) 
ex parte 
plaintiff Holli Lundahl, plaintiff Donald R Johnson, .,.~........ Trail Medica, 
- Mission Trail Medica, plaintiff Lundahl (ruiz) (Entered: 04/l 
24 Rply mem of p/a in suppt ntc by defendant Eli Lilly & Company, defendant Advanced 
Cardiovascu, defendant Connie Elliano, defendant Karen Kadyk, defendant Eve Chaplin to 
motion to dismiss [3-1] (ruiz) (Entered: 04/21/1994) 
25 MINUTES: granting motion to continue hrg on dfts' mtn to dism [15-1], GRANT in part 
DENY in part motion to dismiss w/lv to amd, as the fraud elm & th denial of ext of contract 
Gary L. Taylor 
26 
+: 1 ~- l!!ru1 r.~.<1VlhomtTl,.d<1rm/1 YSllC-94%20CVo/"2002 !%'20DockeLhtm[l!JJ/20!3 l t:33:3 l PM] 
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ORDER DISMISSING CASE 
"""',,..,..,,,,,..., Ymcieoomg No. 03-2402 
Case No. 2:04 cv 88 PGC 
to withdraw the reference to the on 
January 28, 2004. The Bankruptcy Court ruSJrmssea Ms. Lundahl's underlying bankruptcy case on 
the matter to t.1-ie Fourth District Court in Utah. The court will interpret these pleadings as an 
appeal of the Bankruptcy Court's ruling dismissing this case without prejudice. 
Ms. Lundahl filed a notice of appeal on January 5, 2004, and on February 3, 2004, the 
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel dismissed her appeal for failure to prosecute. 
On January 28, 2004, Ms. Lundahl filed the pending motion to withdraw the reference. 
The court dismisses this proceeding for three reasons: (1) failure to properly complete service; 
(2) failure to properly prosecute her appeal; and (3) because the Bankruptcy court correctly 
dismissed this adversary proceeding. 
Case 2:12-cv-00280-SWS Document 20 Filed 03/18/13 Page 63 of 118-
Case 2:04-cv-0~8-PGC Document 7 Filed 09/01/0~age 3 of 4 
Bankruptcy Court's Ruling 
The Bankruptcy Court properly dismissed Ms. Lundahl's adversary proceeding in this 
case. Once the Bankruptcy Court dismissed the underlying bankruptcy proceeding, it lacked the 
jurisdiction to hear this adversaryproceeding.3 Notably the Bankruptcy Court dismissed this 
proceeding without prejudice, and this court does as 
to 
court 
the motion to at the Tenth 
The court DENIES the 
The court DEN1ES cmut case 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED this Jfr_ day of ~;004. 
BY THE COURT: 
T2ft) 
ParliG:'Cassell 
United States District Judge 
3 See Smith v. Commercial Banking Corp., (In re Smith), 866 F.2d 576, 580 (3ro 
1989); in re Statistical Tabulatin Corp., 60 F.3d 1286, 1289 (7th Cir. 1995); Quemer v. Quemer 
(Jn re Querner), 7 F.3d 1199, 1201-02 (5th Cir. 1993). 
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United States District Court 
for the 
District of Utah 
September 3, 2004 
* * CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF CLERK * * 
Re: 2:04-cv-00088 
tsh 
True a..~d correct copies of the attached were either mailed, faxed or e-mailed 
by the clerk to the fellowing: 
Holli Lundahl 
PO BOX 833 
L:l!i.d:I, trr 84043 
• Curtis J. Drake 
SNELL & WILMER LLP 
15 W SOUTH TEMPLE STE 1200 
GATEWAY TOWER W 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101 
Andres' Diaz 
313 BOSTON BUILDING 
EX~GE PL 
SALT LAKE UT 84111 
Helene Huff 
US BANKRUPTCY COURT 
84101 
EMAIL 
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CvL'ECF California Cemral District 
,REFER 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT for the CENTRAL 
(Eastern Division - Riverside) 
CALIFORNIA 
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE#: 5:94-cv-00021-RT -CT 
Case in court: Santa 
Cause: 42: 1983 Civi! 
Plaintiff 




Date Filed: l 0/18/1994 
Date Terminated: l 0/06/1998 
C Pizzum 
Francis C Pizzul!i Law Offices 
718 




ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED 
Jerry L Steering 
Jerry L Steering Law Offices 
4063 Birch Street, Suite 100 





ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED 
represented by Donald R Johnson 
IN PRO PER 
27365 Jefferson Ave 
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CM!ECF California Central District 
06/09/1995 
06/20/i995 
146 ' ORDER on Appll to Withdraw as Cnsl of Record l Timlin (mco) 
06/2 
to by plaintiff 
145 ORDER - It is ord that GTE preserve til her final concluion the telephone records of 
Merrelin Bland for months 1/1191to4/4/91; GTE may file obj to this ord by 6/22/95; if 
GTE files no obj by 6/ this ord becomes final by Robert J. Timlin (mco) 
06/21 /1995) 
147 MINUTES: Defis ACS, Inc., Eli Lilly & Co., Connie Elliano, Connie Harrison, Merrelin 
Blank, Joyce Johnson, Beverly Gilsdorf, & Patricia Wayman's mot to declare Holly Lundahl 
a VEXATIOUS LITIGANT is DENIED. Crt GRANTS the ACS defis' req to take judicial 
ntc of certain docs; Crt denies pltfs oral argument on mtn by Robert J. CR: n/a 
Modified on 09/20/ ! 996 06/21/1995) 
Lundahl to 
MEMORANDUM by plaintiff Holli Lundahl in support of motion for 
reconsideration of compelled prod of income tax retns [132-1] (le) {Entered: 07/05/1995) 
157 SUPPL MEMORANDUM by plaintiff Holli Lundahl in support of motion for 
of 5/8/95 discv ord [ 129-1] (le) (Entered: 07/05/1995) 
LODGED/PROPOSED Order remot fr and reconsideration by plf (FWTI TO CRD) 
(le) (Entered: 07 /05/1995) 
LODGED/PROPOSED Order re osc hid 4/10/95 by plf (FWD TO CRD) (le) (Entered: 
07/05/1995) 
AMENDED COMPLAINT [29- l] by plaintiff Holli Lundahl, plaintiff Donald R 
Johnson, plaintiff Mission Trail Medica, plaintiff - Mission Trail Medica, plaintiff Lundahl 
Chiropractic; Co of Riverside Micheal jury '"'"''"'""''"' 
07/06/1995) 
Lundahl not to engage in 
l 1:33:31 PM] 
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Document 5 Filed 09/01/04 Page 1of4 
F!LcD 
co uiwnos 
UF?r, D1sm1~'f.TtS D1sr;; 
. . · . OF IJiAH ICT 
. o '?: 5 u S£p - 1 
... ,i, r_:: - \ i - M 2rxJ+ 
,. ,> "-· . a1• 'AR,10 rs El 
.. . . r . ZIMMER CL 
IN THE UNITED STATES co~~-~s. TIIB DISTRICT~ 
.. . :CEN'IRA:LDIVISION 
HOLLI LUNDAHL, 
Plaintiff, 
CNA FINAl.'JCIAL Case No. 2:04 cv 84 PGC 
on 
28,2004. The 
December 2003, adversary proceeding on December 22, 2003, remanding 
the matter to the Fourth District Court in Utah. The court will interpret Ms. Lundahl's pleadings 
as an appeal of the Bankruptcy Court's ruling dismissing this case without prejudice. 
Ms. Lundahl filed a notice of appeal on January 5, 2004, and on February 3, 2004, the 
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel dismissed her appeal for failure to prosecute. 
On January 28, 2004, Ms. Lundahl filed the pending motion to withdraw the reference. 
The court dismisses this proceeding for three :reasons: (1) failure to properly complete service; 
(2) failure to properly prosecute her appeal; and (3) because the Bankruptcy Court correctly 
dismissed this adversary proceeding. 
Case 2:12-cv-00280-SWS Document 20 Filed 03/18/13 Page 70 of 118 
~ 
Case 2:04-cv-00084-PGC Document 5 Filed 09/01/04 Page 3 of 4 
Bankntptcy Court 's Ruling 
The Bankruptcy Court properly dismissed Ms. Lundahl's adversary proceeding in this 
case. Once the Bankruptcy Court dismissed the underlying bankruptcy proceeding, it lacked the 
jurisdiction to hear this adversary proceeding. 3 Notably the Bankruptcy Court dismissed this 
aswe1L 
to Continue or 




court DE~'IBS the 
SO ORDERED. 
$..pf# 
DATED this~ dayof~t, 2004. 
BY THE COURT: 
k!O~ 
Paul G. Cassell 
United States District Judge 
3 See Smith v. Commercial Banking Corp., (In re Smith), 866 F.2d 576, 580 (3'd Cir. 
1989); in re Statistical Tabulatin Corp., 60 F.3d 1286, 1289 ('f'h Cir. 1995); Querner v. Querner 
(Jn re Querner), 7 F.3d 1199, 1201-02 (5"~ Cir. 1993). 
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United States District Court 
for the 
District of Utah 
September 3, 2004 
* * CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF CLERK * * 
Re: 2:04-cv-00084 
True and correct copies of the attached were either :mailed, faxed or e-mailed 
the clerk to the 
Holli Lundahl 
PO BOX 833 
LEHI UT 84043 
Brent O. 
HATCH JAMES & DODGE 
10 W BROADWAY STE 400 
SALT LAXE CITY, UT S4101 
Huff 
US BA:NKRUPTCY COURT 
' 84101 
W.A.IL 
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.Case-2.:12-cv-Q028D-SWS Document 20 Filed 03/18/13 Page 75 otll-8. .. 
~ 
of Idaho (LIVE 
CIVJL DOCKET FOR 
Lundahl et al v NAR Inc. et al 
Assigned to: Richard C. Taliman 
Case in other court: Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 06-
56436 












Date Filed: 04/08/2005 
Date Terminated: 08/01/2006 
Jury Demand: Plaintiff 
Nature of Suit: 470 Racketeer/Corrupt 
Organization 
Jurisdiction: Federal Question 
Hom Lundahl 




68 West 1 00 North 
Defendant 
Ronald Price represented by Ronald Price 
6/17/2012 
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Price. (AttRchments: # l Exhibits A-B# ~Exhibit _ :! Exhibit 
!-0# l Declaration of Ronald F. Price)(ja,) (Entered: 04/28/2005) 
2 ORDER denying l Motion Leave to Prcceed in forma pauperis. Plaintiffs 
shall pay the filing fee of $250 within 30 days of the date of this Order before 
this matter shall be allowed to proceed further. Signed by Judge Larry M. 
Boyle. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses 
listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by ja,) 
lO RETIJR.~ MAIL undelivered as to S. Walker re: 2 Order (ja,) 
ORD ER that this matter is ref erred to the Clerk of Court for reassignment to a 
District Judge. Signed by Judge Larry M. Boyle. (caused to be mailed to non 
Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic 
by ) 
is 
Tallman, United States Circuit Judge, for the Ninth Circuit Court 
resolution of the entire case. Ail motions shall be decided on t'1e 
record. B. Wirunill. (caused to be mailed to Holli~---"" ..... "' 
Box 833, Utah 84043. (non at l'1c addresses listed 
on the Notice of Electronic Filing 
~ RETUR.i"J MAIL undelivered as to S. Walker re: 17 Order (ja) 
1.2 ORDER Show Cause Hearing set for 5/19/2006 0 l :00 PM in Boise, 1D before 
Honorable Richard C. Tallman .. Signed by Judge Richard C. Tallman. (caused 
to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice 
of Eiectronic Filing (NEF) by jg,) (Entered: 04111/2006) 
20 DOCKET ENTRY ORDER- AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING - Please 
be advised that the date and time of die Order to Show Cause hearing has been 
changed from May 19, 2006 at l :00 p.m. to Monday, May 15, 2006 at 1:30 
p.m. at the James A. McClure Federal Building and U.S. Courthouse in Boise, 
Idaho. Please make note of the new date and time. Signed by Judge Richard C. 
Tallman. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses 
listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by shh) Modified on 4/14/2006: 
served by certified mail retrun receipt requested on Holli Lllndahl PO Box 
Lehi, UT 84043, Article #7099 3220 0004 6891 7137(jlg, ). 
fi ic:///C:/Users/Elham/Desktop/DktRpt. pl.hlm 6/17/2012 
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Show Cause Hearing set for 5/15/2006 l :30 A:Vf in 
ID before Honorable Richard C Tallma.'1. (caused to be mailed to non 
Participants at the addresses listed on the :i\ctice of Electronic 
0,iEF) by dkh,) (Entered: 04/1412006) 
R.ETUR.i\i MAIL ur.delivered as to S. Walker re: 19 Order, Set 
Deadlines/Hearings,, (jg,) Additional attachment(s) added on 4/20/2006 Gg, ). 
RESPONSE TO INV IT A Tl ON TO SUBMIT INrOIUJATION REGARDING 
HOLLI Ll.NDAHL'S VEXATIOUS LITIGATJONb~(dkh,) 
(Entered: 04/2112006) 
RETUR."l\! MAIL undelivered as to S Walker re: 2l Notice of Hearing (jig,) 
(Entered: 04/24/2006) 
as to S Walker re: 20 
\\Tong p<lf image was attached. Attorney to re-file the correct document. Clerk 
sealed the document because h contained infon1,ation not related 10 
this case. (jlg, ) 
~iE?v10R.bu"JDUtv1/BRlEF re Set Deadlines/Hearings,,, 20 
Notice of Hearing filed by Jef~Q(mpton The Compton Defendants', the 
Strong & Hanni Defendants' an~oint Memorandum in Support of 
Entry of Vexatious Litiganl Order Against Holli Lundahl (REFERENCE CASE 
NOS. 06-14 and 05-145). (Attachments:# l Affidavit of Joseph N. Pirtle in 
Support of Entry of Vexatious Litigant Order Against Holli Lundahl & Ex. A 
& B#;? Affidavit Exhibits C-G)(Evett, Joshua) 
MEMORAi'\JDUM/BRlEF re l2 Order. Set Deadlines/Hearings,,, 20 Order,,, 
28 Memorandum/Brief (generic), Memorandum/Brief (generic), 
MemorandumJBrief (generic), Notice of Hearing filed by Jeffrey Compton 
The Elam & Burke Defend.ants' Memorandum in Support of Enfly of Vexatious 
Litigan! Order Against Holli Lundahl (REFERENCE CASE NOS: 06-14 and 
05-145). (Evett, Joshua) 
AFFlDA VIT of J. Kevin West re 12. Order, Set Deadlines/Hearings,, filed by 
Paul C. Hess, Amber Allen and Beehive Credit Union. (Werth, Randall) 
fiJe:///C:/Users/Elham/Desktop/DktHpt.pJ.htrn 6/17/2012 
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2006 W~J'i'HM1~ll. "f>C. 
Mt.;di) 
Law 
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._,.,, 
FINA:.'\"CIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT 
Page 5 of 8 Tanrnan, R:.:hard C 
\ 7II. r.:.rv~STME~TS and 1'R USTS -income, YfJfue~ trans1.1c:icms (inc!1td(.>; :hcs::.:;fth.: .'lptJit,";(: iJ!ld :ltpc:ufe!If c/ti!;Jren. See ,"Ip. 3.J-6/J!iffi!iJrg ins!r:;r.::itn:s.) 
NONE (iVo reportable income) assets1 or trar.sacticns.) 
A. 
Description of Assets 
{including tr'J:St assets} 
Place IM{X)" after ea.:h a-sset 
exempt from prior dis.cfosure 
( ~ tJ/ 4/ Prudential Retirement Funds: 
- ' GJ)1JCJO (JP .,f PiMCO Tota! Retum lnsil. Fund 
, 
1:1.ffrhfJ(J?J -P1N1 l1~ 
, 3. - Dodge & Cox Stock Fund 
1 
14. - Hotchkis & Wiley Small- Cap Value Fund 
! 
5. ~Euro Pacific Growth Fund 
! Union Bank of California. checking &. , 6. 
savings a<:cts i 
J 1. Seattle City Credit Ur.ion, checking and 
! savings accounts: .. j s. Washington Mutual Bank checking & 
! savings accts 
I 9. Vanguard Group Funds: 
I 
lO. - V •ngu.arrl 500 lf1de:< 
l l. .. Vanguard Explorer 
12. - Vanguard Socia! index 
I '3. - Vanguard GNMA 
i 
l I !4. • Vanguard High-Yield Corporate 
I I is. • Vang:.iard lntemational Growth 
I 
I !6. - Vanguard Total Bond Marl<ef Index 
I I !7. Aetna Univel'Sll! Life lns (See Note, Part 
! 
i. Income Gain Coda: A"'$ t.000or1<3$S 
(Su Cuh.1mns Bl antl: 04} F "'-"S.50~00: - l I00,000 
.2. Va!u~ CO>Gi:t J "'$ l 5JJOO or les:s 





J. Value M:c1hOO Coaes n ""ru,ooo.mH .. sso.000,000 
{Sec Column Q) 0"'App.rainl 
U""B®k V;llm.• 





A foterest I J 
A Interest I J 
A !nterc.";t K 
None 0 
i 
I I M 




I L I 
M 
None J 
B •S 1,00 I • $2,500 
G •Sl!lC,001 - Sl,000.000 
K •!15.001 • Sl0,000 
0 •llOQ,COI • ll.000.000 
R -.(:m:t {Re:i.l Esl:i.tc Only} 
v .... O!h1:r 
T I I I I I 1 I 
T I I I I ! j i I 
T I I I I I 
I ' T j i i I 
' i i T I I i i 
' I I T 
T I I i 
T I r I I ! 
I T I I I I I 
T I I I 
I 
I T I I I 
T I I 
T I ! 
T I I I I 
T I I I I 
T I ! I 
v 
I I I 
C =S2,$01 • Sl,000 0 ~ss.001 -Sll.OUO E •lll,001 • ll-0,000 
HI •Sl ,000,001 • $3.,00D.000 H2 "'M~ !htm s.s.ooa.noo 
L•SlMO! • $100.0W M ... stco,oo 1 • sz:m,ooo 
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F'INANC!AL DISCLOSURE REPORT 
Pagr: 8 of S 
IX. CERTIF1CATION . 
TaHm:'m, Rich;ml C 
! certify ihal s!l inform:ttion give.~ 2bove (includlng \nformotton ptrt2lnin~ to my spouse and minor or dependent childr~u. if ~ny) is 
4/6/20G7 
accurntc, t."'lJe_ anc! enmplcte :o th~ btSt o!m)I knowledge and beli,f, and that 2ny Information not reported ,.as witbhtld becouS<e it met ippiioblc statutory 
proYi:loru permitting aQIHi!sclosur~. 
! further ;;ert!fy th:at earned lnenme from ont5i1e emplayment nnd hoM~ri11 and tll~ ai:i:tplantc ~f ~lfti whidi have been repurtcd 2re in 
compliance with the provbion• ofS {J,S,,C. app. § 50! et. 1"4, 5 U.S.C. § 73$3, ~ nd Judl~Jai Cant.rent< rtg;ibti<m5. 
NOTE; A.NY IND!YIDUAL V.110 KNOWINGLY AND WTLFUU. y l!ALSfFTf:'.5 OR FAILS T.O FILE rnrs REPORT MAY BE SUBJECT TO CIVIL 
ANJ;) CRIMINAL SANffiONS (S U.S.C. app, § 104) 
,---=: .. ~:::::::'::::~ ropi~ w 
I
i Ccmmircee on Financial Disc;iom:ire 
I Administrative Office of the Urjted States Courts Suite 2·301 I One Columbus Circle, NE 
L_--~~hingtmi, D.C. 20544 
I 
' t ----------~----_! 
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Servicer Evaluation: Pacific Life 
Insurance Co. 
Servicer Analysts: 
Thomas Merck. New Yon: (1 l z 12-438· 2547: mcrnas_merck®srandardandpoors_com 
Mark! Goldberg, New Yoi: (1i212-438· 77:19: marfu;oldbe;g@standardand:-0ors,corn 




Management And Organization 
Loan Administration 
Financial Position 
Related Criteria And Research 
www.standarda11t!poors.com/ratingsdirect 
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Pacific Life Background Information 
Pacific Ute was founded in i 868 :n San Francisco. Its first president was Leia rd Slanfora. who was later a 
Cei1fomia Sen;:itcr. Stanford also founded Stanford Universlry, Vii1it:h was bailed cut financially by his widow 
SOC/\ alter his death. 
·-----.,-~~~~-·,,,,..,_.,.,., ,-.__,, __ Pacific Ufe sur;ived San Francisco's great earthquake in 1 &09 when an office manager thought to remove the 
firm's bearer bonds as he left ttle bvikling. The structure was then :eveletl by fireflghlert as a firebreak. ,A Les 
Angeles based life insurance compa ny had jusl been acquired arid lh!! firm's headqu2fters were ihJs muve;i tc 
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tJna11ttlom md Trndl11g 
As ctict ott:er such fums for iax breaks. Pacific Life became a ·mutual' lite company, owned bY its shareholders . 
After celeb'1!f111g its 1 O-Oth arm i11ersar1, ·Nitrl a keynote sp eoch by GO\l!l;!nor Ron al::! Reagan. ttie company soon 
relocated to Newport Beach. Its seashore image is now built aroonc a m\!ing humpback wha!e. in 1997, P2d!c 
Life ronverteti back from a mutucl to a corporate structure bf issuing steel< lo !)<llicyhok:lem. Unlike many other 
life Insurance lirrns wh1cl'l have reverter: form the mutual structure. Pacific Life it has not at this time gone ;M:llic . 
[ 
!97l, Pacific life !aunelled PIMCC as an ln:::§:§trn§lnt mat~l!lillll subsidiary wh1Cll Offers services ttJ 
mp1.cyee. , bene fi! p!ans, erniowmenis'.ami 10~11cations. Through a reverse. mer~er in 1!!9~ •. PiMCO A~iS<.Jre 
became a pubiiay tr.icied company. pnmali!y managmg !1xea·m(;l)me secuntcs; wrrer.t!y •t 1s lotli! of mm~t 
alt¥triihon dollars . 
Padf.c.Ufe has acquired a m.1mber.of se"..vrilies broker-dealer firms, includir.g Florida-nas1:c Muh1a! SeNica 
· Corpcrnlion, ser11!cing Oller .:MOO moresentatlves, Les Angalel!--based Associated Securities Corp., 
wilh 340 representatives aNJ Beverly Hills-based M. L Stem I?< Company with 140. it also acquired majority 
interest in Unite-:i Planners' Financial Ser11ices of America, an Arizona-based broker-dealer with 3~0 
representatives. in 19911, ii acquired Tower Asset Management, il fee-based investinent advisory ~rm. Sorrento 
Pacil\c Financial ber...ame ye! another piece of 1hl! puzzle 
These, arid tither sewrities firm $Ubsldiar!es. came to be operated under common management through P~cit:c 
Sel8ct Group LLC. a alvisicn of Pacific Ute. However. in March 2C07, ilwas an11<Junced 11\ai rapic:ly growing LPL 
financial Services. a nearby La Jolla tiasati Tirm, was acquiring three of Pacific Life insurance Company's 
broker~alers--Muil.lal Ser; ice Cotp-0rati0n, .Associated Flr<ar<Cial Groop, and Waterstcme Financial Group. 
Coliective!y, !hese three broker-deal~ have 2,200 1'inancial advisors s<ervirg retail clients and $353 mlHon in 
revenues. It was said this would Increase LPL to 1 O,OOO ]?.;'.Q,~&!:l;. lM company's gc.al prior lo an !PG. 
Shepherd Smith Edwards & Kantas LTD LLP Law Firm 
Our la-w firm represents lnstitvtior:"1 <mct individual investors nationwide Wirh slgn !tlamt losses in tlieir ;:icrifolios, 
retirement plai\S and irweatmenl aa:oor.J;>. Our attorneys am:! staff nave more tt>.an 100 years or ccml)ffied 
e:x ~}0r\ence in the securities industry and i~t ~urifes iaw, Se"Veta! of our fawye~ served for yea!'$ at Vice 
Pre'Sident or Gompli<!nce Officer af brokerage firms. 
Each !;,wyer and staf! memwr of our fam is devoted to assisting investors to recover losses caused by 
unsuhabi!ity, over-wncentratian, fraud. misrepresentation, $1lll-dea!ing, unauthorized lradei: or other wrongful 
acts. whether intentional or neg !igenl Each attorney at ouI firm has experience representing !rwestcra in 
secur!faas arbi!iatkm clairns andfor!awsuits. We have handled more than lhous<rnd cases against hundreds of 
large and smell brokerage f.rm$. including .igains! He lns urance sutisidiaries. 
Cail us at {!lOO )259·901 o or comact u> tr:rough owr Website la arrange a 1refl con fldenii<ii consultat:cn with an 
attomey to discuss your ex;:~e nces Will', an investment advisor e< t:rancial llrm which res~tted in losses. 
Additional Information: 
Pacific Life Sued over Variable Annuities 
..... ,..,,,..,..,....,. _____ ,,_,cas-e-2:'12=cv~-oo28&SWS Document 20 Filed 03/18/13 Page 86 of 118 
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Outfook 
The outlook is stable for the prirnary and special senicing ra;:kings. The company's rdatively steady operations and 
µroceclu:-es and loan management practices support our opinion that the company will 1ike!y remain a competet:t 
commercial mortgage service!'. and asset manager. 
The outlook is negative for the master servicing ranking reflecting a lack cf any master servicing activity involving 
imcractions with a subservker for nearly a 24-month period. Should this trend continue it may be necessarf to bring 
the ranking more inline wirli those of similarly arranged platforms. 
Profile 
Pacific Life provides commercial real estate finance and investment expertise to its life insurance, investmem, and 
annuities businesses, as well as to its private-party and securitized mortgage loan-servicing clients. As of June 30, 
2011, the company .h.ad 77 employees involved in primary, master, and special servking operations monitoring 
roughly 50{) loans in its commercial real estate portfolio with an unpaid principal balance (UPB) of approximately 
$7.8 biHion. 
[Paci~i~ Life is ~n active mo~gage .l.oan servicer of both CMBS and r_rivate '.n.vestment portfolios. The company began servicmg for thml-party private cllents in the 1970s and was an early pamcipam m the CMBS market . 
:~1>> 
Table 1 
Total Primarv And Master Servicing l'crtfolia Statistics 
6/36Pil11 12/3112IJ10 12/3'!/200l} 12131/2008 12/31/2007 
. Tar.al vo!ume (mil S} 7.76-UQ 5.612.30 
iatol loans !mt) 483 468 
16.1 14.1 
M1111Wilr Mmci~ only 
Tcrtal \!Olume lrnit $) 0 0 
Total leans (no.) 0 0 
A>y. loan size !mil. Sl 0 0 



















iotaJ maste;tptima!1jortfo1JE_ delin~encies (% nf llO. of leans} 
3H'i0~ ·• Cl.41, a O . 
5Hl9 cays o 0.43 O 
0 D.43 









!vianagement And. Organization 
Our subranking for 1mmagement and organization is STRONG. 
3 
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Case 2:12-cv-00280-SWS Document 20 
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Filed 03/18/13 Page 90 of 118 
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l'~C..l.~ Docket She.ci fo: 97-8C·:::S! 
..... •<" :· ..... ,;~- . ..:..1 
.. ,.: .' . • • • 0 
Genera I Docket 
US Court of AppEals for the Ninth Circuit 
::-: c:! .::.p;,e~ls Dc:;ket ~: Si-SC2.!.S 
•i ':: c.. 
dahl v. 





~strict: 0973-2 : 
a~e Fiied: ••1••1•• 
~te order/judgment: ••1••1•• 
tt8 NOA tiled: ••1••1•• 
tus: not applicable 
cases: 
-·-·-:-\ ·J!oll.i Lundahl ~~N'.l'Cpni 
1 P.O. !Soll 13?1 · 
· Orem, U'I' !1'405'1-137 :;' 
Case 2:12-cv-00280-SWS Document 20 Filed 03/18/13 Page 91of118 
_, 
l"SC.4~ Dcd:el Snee: fer 9:'-80:5& 
Fi:ed c.:Cer .. , . __ . _, <~•I:;.. · < ., 
Hcl:i Lundat.l, js c:::dered to re£Fc~d and Ehow cai:se witilin 
:4 cays of tte e.1try of this erder why this ct ~hould nor 
enter the fcllcwi!l9 pre-filing review cnier •••• (see.c•file 
!o::: l'llCl"ll in!o.) ..•. respon11111 to o:rr:!er T.o show t:ai:.511l due 
6/26/97; I HC'?l'CNS) [97-802311] h:k;>) 
Order filed (HOt.iona .Aty; SG) ••. i\e.spnc:lt. l:uu; fll:iled to 
re.spend to the c:r:der to 111bov calll!e. Punrw11:1t to the 6fl2 
order, the !ollc.'11'.ing Pll:-Fll.Im; Jlnll"I Oii.tl!!l IS EEJU2f 
Dl'!'llED •••••• (SH csf.ile)....... ! Proeedl:lnlly 'l'1:u:m.nat.ed 
Without. Judicial Action; l)ltfault. ) l97-SC2581 lclq>) 
Case 2:12-cv-00280-SWS Document 20 Filed 03/18/13 Page 92 of 118 
Filed 
l07/i711997 l 
Selected docket entries for case 97-80258 
Document Descri tion lpage! Docket Text J 
1
'10rdcr filed (Motions Aty: SG) ... Respn<lt has failed to 
espond to the order to show cause. Pursuant to the 6il 2 
rder, the following PRE-FILING REVIEW ORDER lS 
,HEREBY E'l\/TERED ...... (see csfile) ....... (Procedurally 
I 
!Terminated Without Judicial Action; Default. ) [97-80258] 
1(CKP) 
vleuse- 1e at\Ji!:.~ -Th~+-- Clltu.d C91rl&- ts no+ tf\ 
~Wi fT-f- ~ l.t~~cw:r buJ- Is tep[)fteJb ~ 
vD-M~ Ofth;vt, t&+er fzi-r ~ (hrtu.d-. 
fhie-+1!~ ()(tier /).)ct..$ ac.+lW-ily efl.kY,ei:{ lo{ Mi0t1s 
atlof'~ ~tt41. fu-l 'IA.lc;., 
Case 2:12-cv-00280-SWS Document 20 Filed 03/18/13 Page 93 of 118 
..- ..., 
Case 2:12-cv-00280-SWS Document 20 f'.=iled 03/18/13 Page 94 of 118 
REAL PROPERTY OWNER NAME SEARCH 
Owner Name Serial# Tax District Years Valid Property Address 
LUNDAHL, HOLLI 2c-05g-cn~o (110) 1994-1996 2748 N 930 EAST- PROVO 
LUNDAHL, HOLU 20:05~.00~C (110) 1994NV 2748 N 930 EAST· PROVO 
LUNDAHL, HOLLI 2C·G59.GD: r; (110) 1992-1993 2748 N 930 EAST- PROVO 
LUNDAHL, HOLLI T :O:OS9-.0003 (110) 1985-1991 2748 N 930 EAST· PROVO 
LUNDAHL, HOLLI T '.20:C59: 0003 (110) 1984 2748 N 930 EAST· PROVO 
LUNDAHL, HOLLI T 20:059:00~ 1 (110\ 1992·2003 
This page was created on 3!1412013 6:53:54 AM 
Case 2:12-cv-00280-SWS Document 20 Filed 03/18/13 Page 95 of 118 
._., ....,, 
· · :·( Case 03-02082 
,t:.C,,unty Online Records 
~ Filed 06/27/03 
..... mental Document 
REAL PROPERTY OWNER INFORMA TJON 
Serial: 52:029:0071 
~ LUNDAHL, HOLLI TELFORD 
Malling Address: 27 48 N 930 EAST PROVO UT 84604 
Property ••· 4139 N DEVONSHIRE cm PROVO UT 84604 
T~OQ. ~scrlptiqi_~n~ for. lftgJl..Q.99.ol~ 
LOT 71, PU\7 a, SHERWOOD HILLS SUBD. AREA .30 ACRES. 
3 Year Tax History 
Year Market Assessed Value 
1999 227,367 1?9,0$2 
1oos 227.367 ~25,Q5Z 
1997 227,367 1Z5.052 










Comments or Concerns on Value/Appraisal ~r'' Pfflce 
Documerrtl/OWne-r/Pam:~ Info Reoorder' ir. Offi('.;e 
Add~~hMgef9rTall NO!ioe ·-· . -
This page wag ~led on O'i/OJ.12000 at 7:48:-12 
Entered ~3 11 :57:43 Desc 
Page 19 o 
Pagel of I 
Years Valid: 2000 
Tax District.: 1.10 
Acre$: 0.30 
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Case 2:12-cv-00280-SWS Document 20 Filed 03/18/13 Page 96 of 118 
52:029:0071 
lJ¥ H COUNTY TAX NOT~ 
-fAH COUNTY 1REASURER '.,_; 
DUPUCATE TAX NOTICE 
Pay Online@utah..gov/propta:t 
D 
Q,cd<J>i:c lO =-=iYe I 
JWZ~bcm:I. D 
(firm (111:1- ftlle) 
Pin # 0820440 
Serial # 52:029:0071 
Tax District# 110 
Property Class RS 
LUNDAHL, HOW TELFORD 
2748 N930E 
2001 Amout Due l.------$0.,...,......@_, 
PROVO VT 84604-4378 
~ 1liis pcrliao willi JCl"l"maU J*)'rl>!2IL 
llm.m tis portian 1la-yom-J11Ctt'lio1. YClll' c:a:elod cl!ed<will he your-~ 
. UTAH COUNTY TAX NOTICE 
SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR IMPORTANT INFORMATION 
UAKEamat PAY ABLE TOUJ.'AH rooNTY'IllAWi1.ml 
100 EAST CHNl'ER. St1l'IE 1200. n.ovo. urAH Wl06-3159 Pin# 0820440 
DUPLICATE TAX Nona: 
~-- fli'lAN. l, 2001 
LUNDAHL, HOW TELFORD 
2748 N930E 
PROVO UT 84604-4378 
J>ropor!yDes<ripiion(Dal. w 1q;p11 ~) 
OT 71. PLAT B,. t>HERWOOD HlLLS SUBD. AR.RA..30 ACll.ES. 
~ Addrea 4139 N DEVONSHIRE OR.PROVO UT 84604 
V alne of Property *Effective 
Type Ttµ:able V rune Market Value Tax Rate 
Res Real Est 38,972 70,859 0.000193 











Serial # 52:029:0071 
Tax District# 110 
Property Class RS 
2001 TAXES $1,508.54 
Adjustments -$1,259.05 
Total Payments $249.49 
2001 Amout Due .... , ----$0,..---.@-. 
Distribution of Genend Tues 
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OLD HWY 191 
MALAD ID 83252 
MALAD ID 83252 
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~ ~ 
mus .. ~RJ><~TioN ;s FOR OFFlOAL AND MEDICALLY cp, Yi:J'lllAL usE nN', -----\
1 r---------'--~---" 'IT'-L NOT llE RELEASED TO L'NAUWORtU:D. wsf. . 
/ 1- LAST NAME-FIRST NAME-MIDJ::LE NAM:O j :l. !U:G"iSTB .. ow.is .- ~ -----------\ 
1 (u.;..JJ)IJ-J..fL. f/o[...Lf I 1 -_651'!:1_.~/2-, 
'URPOSEOF EXAMIN>.TION 14. D I LUNDAHL 
1----- J HOLLI TELFORE 





I L ____ _ 
17. HA VE YOO EVER (!'kiu, rhu:A: tt>di I_,) 
IJSPL\'N 
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W' ~ 
FD<~02 (Rtv. 10-6-95) 
FEDERAL BU.READ OF I\'VESTIGATION 
Date of investigation 12/H/2006 
----· ---~-
On December 11, 2006, detective Schwartz was 
telephonically interviewed at his place of ei."ltployment, Oneida County 
Sheriff's office regarding Holli Lundahl's claimed residence at 10621 
S. Old Highway 191, Malad City Idaho 83252. After being advised of 
the identity of the interviewing Agent and the purpose of the 
interview, Detective Schwartz provided the following information: 
Detective Schwartz advised that he had visited Holli ,·s 
alleged residence at 10621 s. Old Highway 191, 11.alad City Idaho to 
verify any occupancy of the residence for purposes of the upcoming 
bail appeal hearing and to support the competency of an earlier filed 
contempt judgment entered against Holli by federal judge Richard 
Tallman in June of 2006 barring Ho11i from filing any cases in the 
state of Idaho on the. alleged grounds that Bolli did not own or 
reside at the real property situs address 10621 S. Old Highway 191, 
Malad City Idaho. Judge Tallman had asked us to investigate into 
perjury charges against Ms. Lundahl. 
Detective Schwartz admitted that he interviewed the 
county tax assessor who reported that no residence existed at this 
address, and further, that no hornesteaq_exemption had ever been 
recorded to obtain property tax benefits for a residence property. 
Detective Schwartz then visited the property in support of a 
prospective perjury· prosecution prompted by Judge Tallman. Detective 
Schwartz reported that there Wa:s indeed an old farm hoUBe and ham 
located at Lundahl's claimed residence address but that Lundahl could 
not have been residing at the property because there ~as no power to .-
the building. Detective Schwartz reported that he could not enter 
or see into the residence because the windows were completely covered 
and all accesses were locked. Based on detective Schwartz's report 
that no power existr.ed t,o the. building, an additional perjury charge 
was submitted. . ' ·, · 
lnvestigation on 12/14/2006 Salt Lake Utah · 
. ____ -----al ----------- ------------
49-SU-62776 12/14/2006 
Sonja Sorenson:eva 
~~~ ............... -......._. •• ng:~~~m11Q•ms~ 
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US District Court Electronic Case Filing System 
District of Utah (Central) 
CRJMINAL DOCKET FOR CASE#: 2:06-cr-00693-WFD-1 
Case title: USA v. Lundahl 
Assigned to: Judge William F. Downes 
Defendant (1 J 
Hom Lundahl 
TERM/NA TED: 01121/2009 
Pending Counts 
None 
Highest Offense L.~ve! {Q~ 
None 
Terminated Counts 
18: 152(3) CONCEAL ASSETS, FALSE OATH AND 




RCDS FED INVESTIGATION/False Bankruptcy 
Document 
(3-5) 
Date Filed: 1010412006 
Date Terminated: 01121i2009 
represented by D. Bruce Oliver 
180 s 300 w #210 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101-1218 
(801) 328-8888 
TERM/NA TED: 0411012007 
LEAD ATTORNEY 
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED 
Designation: Retained 
Mary C. Corporon 
VAN COTT BAGLEY CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
(SLC) 
36 S STATE ST STE 1900 
PO SOX45340 




ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED 
Designation: CJA Appointment 
Robert L. Steele 
UTAH FEDERAL DEFENDER OFFICE 
46 W BROADWAY STE 110 





ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED 




Al! counts dismissed without prejudice per 
government motion 
All counts dismissed without prejudice per 
government motion 
CM/ECF - U.S. Distriti~§rfjJJ2-cv-00280-SWS 
w 
2 of 2 
18: 152(2) CONCEAL ASSETS, FALSE OATH AND 
CLAIMS BRIBERY/Faise Bankruptcy Oa:h Ail counts dismissed without prejudice per government mction (6-7) 








# Docket Text 
Disposition 
represented by Barbara Beamson 
US ATTORNEY'S OFFICE (UT) 





ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED 
Cy H. Castle 
US ATTORNEY'S OFFICE (UT) 




ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED 
Mark Y. Hirata 
US ATTORNEY'S OFFICE (UT) 




ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED 
238 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge William F. Downes: Competency Hearing as to Hom 
Lundahl held on 6/23/2008. Ms. Lundahl is present, with counsel. The court meets with counsel, in 
chambers. The court takes the bench @ 9:30 a.m. and hears statements from counsel. Fv1,rt"''~""'_.....-...,__ 
received, testimony is taken. Ms. Corporon requests access to defendant's medical records 
Orange County, California. Ms. Corporon is directed by prepare and submit an order. The 
defendant be transported (via direct flight) to Carswell, Texas for a ful! medical exam, with a report due 
thirty days after defendant's arrival. Mr. Castle to prepare order. After an outburst, Ms. Lundahl is removed 
from the courtroom. The court finds defendant is not presently competent to stand trial. (Audio CD of 
proceedings is retained in the Clerk's Office.)Attomey for Plaintiff: Cy Castle, AUSA, for 
Defendant: Mary Corporon, Esq. Court Reporter: Laura Robinson. (tab) (Entered: vo••.t:01Lu•voJ 
PACER Service Center 
Case 2:12-cv-00280-SWS Document 20 Filed 03/18/13 Page 106 of 118 
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US District Court Electronic Case Filing System 
District of Utah (Central) 
CRIMINAL DOCKET FOR CASE#: 2:06-cr-00693-WFD-l 
Case title: USA v. Lundahl 




Date Filed: 10/04/2006 
Date Terminated: 0 l/21/2009 
represented by D. Bruce Oliver 
180 s 300 w #210 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 
84101-1218 
(80 l) 328-8888 
TERJvflNATED: 0411012007 
LEAD ATTORlvEY 
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED 
Designation: Retained 
Mary C. Corporon 
VAN COTT BAGLEY 
CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
(SLC) 
36 S ST A TE ST STE 1900 
PO BOX 45340 





ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED 
Designation: CJA Appointment 
Robert L. Steele 
UTAH FEDERAL 
DEFENDER OFFICE 
46 W BROADWAY STE 110 





https://ecf.utd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?44617016883483-L_ 1_0- l 




Highest Offense Level (Opening) 
None 
Terminated Counts 
18:152(3) CONCEAL ASSETS, FALSE OATH AND 
CLAIMS BRIBERY/False Bankruptcy Declaration 
(1-2) 
18:1519 
DESTRUCTION,AL TERNA TION,FALSIFICATION 
RCDS FED INVESTIGA TION/Fa!se Bankruptcy 
Document 
(3-5) 
18: 152(2) CONCEAL ASSETS, FALSE OATH AND 
CLAIMS BRIBERY/False Bankruptcy Oath 
(6-7) 




ATTOILYEY TO BE NOTICED 
Designation: Public Defender 




All counts dismissed without 
prejudice per government 
motion 
All counts dismissed without 
prejudice per government 
motion 
All counts dismissed without 




USA represei;ited by Barbara Bearnson 
, US ATTORJ.'JEY'S OFFICE (UT) 





ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED 
Cy H. Castle 
US A TIOR.t"l\JEY'S OFFICE (UT) 
https://ecf.utd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?44617016883483-L _ l _ 0-1 













ATTORNEY TO BE JVOTICED 
Mark Y. Hirata 
US A TTORl"\JEY'S OFFICE (UT) 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 00000 
(80 l )325-3239 
Email: Mark.Hirata@usdoj.gov 
LEA.DATTORNEY 
ATTOR1VEYTO BE NOTICED 
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge William F. Downes: Motion 
Hearing as to Holli Lundahl held on 1/2112009 re 264 MOTION to Dismiss 
Case Without Prejudice filed by USA. The Court questioned the USA on the 
timeliness and reasoning behind the motions. The Court also expressed 
concern over any of the defendant's property seized by the government. The 
USA stated that any property seized from the defendant was NOT done at the 
request of the USA. The government also reported that it believed the 
property was seized by the state ofidaho.The Court will issue an order for the 
defendant's release later today, and will also enter, sua sponte, an order 
directing the USA to pay for the return of the defendant to Salt Lake City via 
commercial airline. The Court also requested M. Corporan to advise the 
defendant's family of her release and to remind the defendant of Court orders 
in place that restrict her filing any Court documents w/out permission in the 
District of Utah, and possibly the District of Idaho. There are no such 
restrictions in Wyoming at this time. Attorney for Plaintiff: Cy H. Castle, 
Attorney for Defendant: Mary Corporon, CJA. Court Reporter: Jamie 
Hendrich.(Time Start: 9: 11 a.m., Time End: 9:31 a.m., Room Judge Downes 
Chambers.) (ce) Modified on l/21/2009 to modify whom the attorneys 
represent ( ce). (Entered: 01/21/2009) 
PACER Service Center II 
Transaction Receipt I 
PACER Client 
Login: Code: 
2:06-cr-00693-WFD Starting Docket Search IDescr1ptwu Report Criteria: with document: 266 Ending with 'rlnrp~a~+· 266 
Billable 12 :c :0.20 Pages: 
https://ecf.utd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?446l7016883483-L _ l _ 0-1 
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Case 2:06-cr-006~WFD Document 267 Filed 01i21i~Page 1of2 
United States District Court 
------ For The District of Utah, Central Division -----














ORDER DISMISSING CHARGES WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND ORDERING THE 
IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF THE DEF EN DANT 
This matter comes before the Court on the Government's Motions to Dismiss 
filed in each of the captioned cases. Having considered the motions, and having heard 
argument on the matter, the Court FINDS and ORDERS: 
The Government's motions to dismiss are GRANTED; the charges against Ms. 
Lundahl are hereby DISMISSED without prejudice. The Government is instructed to 
immediately release Ms. Lundahl from custody and provide her with access to any 
property which may have been seized pursuant to her federal indictments. 
The Court further orders that Ms. Lundahl's counsel, Mary Corporon, shall take 
all reasonable steps to notify Ms. Lundahl's family members of her release. Ms. 
Corporon shall remain appointed as counsel pending Ms. Lundahl's successful release 
Case 2:12-cv-00280-SWS Document 20 Filed 03/18/13 Page 112 of 118 
Case 2:06-cr-OOG~vVFD Document 267 Filed 01/21/~Page 2 ol 2 
from custody and return of property seized pursuant to her federal indictments. Ms. 
Corporon shall move this Court to be dismissed from her obligation at such time as her 
appointment is no longer necessary. 
lt is so ORDERED. 
DATED this 21st day of January, 2009. 
-2-
Honorable William F. Downes 
Chief United States District Judge 
Sitting by Special Designation 
Case 2:12-cv-00280-SWS Document 20 Filed 03/18/13 Page 113 of 118 
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Notice of Docketing Appeal Letter from USCA Tenth Circuit Re: [6-1] appeal 
USCA NUMBER: 04-4236 (asp) (Entered: 10/21/2004) 
Certified and transmitted record on appeal to U.S. Court of Appeals: [6-1] 
appeal ; transmitted original court record Consisting of documents l-10. (asp) 
(Entered: 10/28/2004) 
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BRIAN ROBBINS, et al., 
Defendants. 
. ~-·:·CENTiui·oivJsION 
ORDER DISMISSING CASE 
Bankruptcy Case No. 03-21660 
Adversary Proceeding No. 03-2401 
Case No. 2:04 cv 89 PGC 
Ms. Lundahl filed this motion to withdraw the reference to the Bankruptcy Court on 
January 28, 2004. The Bankruptcy Court dismissed Ms. Lundahl's underlying bankruptcy case on 
December 19, 2003 and this adversary proceeding on December 22, 2003, remanding the matter 
to the Fourth District Court in Utah. The court will interpret these pleadings as an appeal of the 
Bankruptcy Court's ruling dismissing this case without prejudice. 
Ms. Lundahl filed a notice of appeal on January 5, 2004, and on February 3, 2004, the 
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel dismissed her appeal for {ailure to prosecute. 
On January 28, 2004, Ms. Lundahl filed the pending motion to withdraw the reference. 
The court dismisses this proceeding for three reasons: (1) failure to properly complete service; 
(2) failure to properly prosecute her appeal; and (3) the Bankruptcy Court correctly dismissed this 
adversary proceeding. 
Case 2:12-cv-00280-SWS Document 20 Filed 03/18/13 Page 117 of 118 
Case 2:04-cv-0~9-PGC Document 5 Filed 09/01/0~age 3 of 4 
Bankruptly Court's Ruling 
The Bankruptcy Court properly dismissed Ms. Lundahl' s adversary proceeding in this 
case. Once the Bankruptcy Court dismissed the underlying bankruptcy proceeding, it lacked the 
jurisdiction to hear this adversary proceeding.3 Notably the Bankruptcy Court dismissed this 
proceeding without prejudice and this court does as well. 
Conclusion 
The court DENIES the motion to withdraw the reference in this case as untimely (#2-1 ). 
The court DISMISSES this case without prejudice. 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED this li±_ day of g2004. 
BY n:.E ~OJT: 
WI 
Paul G. Cassell 
United States District Judge 
3 See Smith v. Commercial Banking Corp., (Jn re Smith), 866 F.2d 576, 580 {3rd Cir. 
1989); in re Statistical Tabulatin Corp., 60 F.3d 1286, 1289 (7th Cir. 1995); Querner v. Quemer 
(In re Querner), 7 F.3d 1199, 1201-02 (51n Cir. 1993). 
Case 2:12-cv-00280-SWS Document 20 Filed 03/18/13 Page118ofll.8-____ _ 
Case 2:04-cv-0~9-PGC Document 5 Filed 09i01/0~age 4 cf 4 
United States District Court 
for the 
District of Utah 
September 3, 2004 
* * CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF CLERK * * 
Re: 2:04-cv-00089 
tsh 
True and correct copies of the attached were either mailed, faxed or e-mailed 
by the clerk to the following: 
Holli Lundahl 
PO BOX 833 
LEHI, UT 84043 
Helene Huff 
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Highest Offense Level (Opening) 
None 
Tenninated Counts 
18:152(3) CONCEAL ASSETS, FALSE OATH AND 




RCDS FED INVESTIGATION/False Bankruptcy 
Document 
(3-5) 
Date Filed: 10/0412006 
Date Tenninated: 01/2112009 
represented by D. Bruce Oliver 
180 s 300 w #210 
i( I, 
~6 




ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED 
Designation: Retained 
Mary C. Corporon 
VAN COTT BAGLEY CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
(SLC) 
36 S STATE ST STE 1900 
POBOX45340 




ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED 
Designation: CJA Appointment 
Robert L. Steele 
UTAH FEDERAL DEFENDER OFFICE 
46W BROADWAY STE 110 





ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED 




All counts dismissed without prejudice per 
government motion 
All counts dismissed without prejudice per 
government motion 
• ' CM/ECF - U.S. District Court:utd https://ecf.utd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.p1?7351307 44491139-... 
2 of 2 
18: 152(2) CONCEAL ASSETS, FALSE OATH AND 
CLAIMS BRIBERY/False Bankruptcy Oath 
(6-7) 






All counts dismissed without prejudice per 
government motion 
Disposition 
represented by Barbara Beamson 
US ATTORNEY'S OFFICE (UT) 





ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED 
Cy H. Castle 
US ATTORNEY'S OFFICE (UT) 




ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED 
Mark Y. Hirata 
US ATTORNEY'S OFFICE (UT) 




ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED 
~iled ---T-i-Tl:;ci:et r;id ... 
I oo;;;noQ8···· ! 238 I Minute Ent_ry_f-or_p_ro_c_e_e_d-in_g_s_h_e-ld-be-fo_r_e Ju.dge W111iam.F. Downes: Competency Hearing as to Holli , ! i Lundahl held on 6/2312008. Ms. Lundahl is present, with counsel. The court meets with counsel, in 
i i ! chambers. The court takes the bench@ 9:30 a.m. and hears statements from counsel. EvidencP~· ~-...... : I j i received, testimony is taken. Ms. Corporon requests access to defendant's medical records fro HCA in I i i Orange County, California. Ms. Corporon is directed by prepare and submit an order. The court o 
i l I defendant be transported (via direct flight) to Carswell, Texas for a full medical exam, with a report due 
! ! i thirty days after defendant's arrival. Mr. Castle to prepare order. After an outburst, Ms. Lundahl is removed ! 
! ! I from the courtroom. The court finds defendant is not presently competent to stand trial. (Audio CD of j 
ll i proceedings is retained in the Clerk's Office.)Attorney for Plaintiff: Cy Castle, AUSA, Attorney for · L-----~--· i Defendant: Mary Corporon, Esq. Court Reporter: Laura Robinson. (tab) (Entered: 0612_312008) ____ J 
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HOLU LUNDAHL DOB:·-· 
1havebeenasked10 do !U1 aviluation on Holly Lundahl because of high blood~ 
heart is.socs, and maligna[rt lryparteasio.u. 
An EKG was per:fomled. She has left atrial enlargancnt and~ mial 
contractions. 
l was also authoriud to do a stn:ss test on the treadmill if it W118 CO!ltrahldicated. Ber 
blood pressure today contniindic:ates this fi:om baing done. 
This is a woman who ha a put medical history of a m}~al iu:fmUio:niu 1995. 
Allegedly a drug caused it She had CV A •s in2007 and.20081• She has bad breast 
and skln C11llccr as wen. Su also has a histoiy of ph)Siall 1m1ma wbieh ~~ hfl1" 
spinal cord and gave be:tpar:alysis for awhile. 
She 1ias had a masu:ctmny, two back smgc08*. two hip w:rgeliea, and acme~ of 
gastric surgery. 
She doe:s have qBsodes of clu:st discomfort. This is 1ooated. in tho~ sabstema.1 
ami. with zadiatio.u towards the 'left aido of tho chest mi into tho ld arm. The sewrity of 
this varies.. The strongest feds like lactic acid wouJd fccl Wilm yon haw ovtr wmted a 
muscle. It will last sommerc between 10 and 30 minutes. Nitroglycerin may tdievc it . 
after about 20 minutes. - · · · 
If sho waila quickly, she will get out ofb.reatb. mllly fiat. Sho wW. lwvo • n qxi$0deG ot 
orthopnea. She has a few episo&s of PND. She does not. l:.a've a supine c:ongb. 
Slic dDes have episoc'U:s of palpitatiOils. 
AddilioMl s;mptoms are that she does have bad eyes and h« vision tslda to be bluay. 
She always fccl3 cold. It almost sounds like abo l:uls some foon o(hypoglyce:mi&. lf she 
eats cvmy couple ofbou:rs me does much better. She develops charlie horses at Digbt. 
She has difficulty .in gencml with sleeping. · 
She has had high blood pn:ssuro fur a fair period oftim8. One of the lowest~ 
was about 190/115. 
Her cum:ot medications incl:ade li.slnoprJ 10 mg bid. aml.odipine 10 mg bid, and aspirhl 1 
tablet tid. At one time aho was on h)'d.roclilorotbiazide and clonidine. She 1:w not been 
on hydralazine. She has not been an !l betA-bloc.ker. Other than the amlodipine. she has 
not b«n llll a.cal~ blocker. 
On exam±tlatio:n. her wcigtt is 143 pi:nmCs. s~ i:J 5 fu<rt ~\-,,-:.hes tar!. H.!'!tblood pr~ 
'W!S230/l 10. H~ pulse ''W3S 140 ~~t ~with ~es. She sb.(l";)ed no CMl~osis 
ey::i have :no comea1 arcus. Tnere is an abtomla1 light tcfla :from the mta:ics.. They arc 
all visibly narrowed with si~ AV nicking. I do r.ot ace hemc:ic::ha,p or emdates. 
Tb.ere is no jugular venous disb:ntion ~# Supine it is 4 an. Hem:spha:llo:cs ~ 
unlalx:ired and cleerto !':1-,r,ultation. Sb~ docs bKve an S4 gillop. No rub. no bruit3. 
The femcral3 and pedals axe 1-2+ bilaterally. 'l'hen is nee BDkle ~ Her left foot :is 
cooler than the right. GI eum was um:crnmbble with no masses m tmdcrncsa, and no 
hepatosplenomegaly. Her gait is unremmtable. The digits and nails show no clubbing or 
cyanosis. The skin is warm and dry although tho lcdt root is cooler. No signs ofvetlOUS · 
st.ams. She is alert and orl«rted. No dysartl:iria. She comprehends and understands. Mood 
i!Ild affect arr. calm. 
EVALUATION AND MANAGEMENT: 
1. Hypertec.sion. She cectai:nly bas high blood pressmc. Today her blood pressure is 
230/110. At 1h!.t 1~, I think it is unsafe for her to undergo and exercise stracis 
test. 
2. Shorf:ru:.ss of breath. She has sigoiiicam shortness of breath whee she erxerts 
herself veiymuch. She also has some subtle symptoms when she is mpino. She 
will get a little bit of orthopoea and PND from time to time. She does not have 
much pcriphcral edema. It ia mostly at the llOCk line. I think hta' shortness of 
~th is related _to cardia<? factot3. V~Y.with ~le wi~ aev~ hypert~Oti., 
tbctr t.nd masrolic prc:ssurcs ;ue so hign that tlllS ~e 18 trails:tcm:d Dacit tO the 
lungs and a pulmonary capillary wedge pte8SUf$ ~. mi it causes significant 
~:1.!il.bratb 'fhusltmllldlllm.m~h.er_~ ffimug~YP~ .. 
fuilure. I bc1iave this is diastolic heart £Ulurc. 
3. Status post CV A. It seems like the major problem that she ball with this is related 
to he.r visu81 system. 
4. Frequent pnmature l!:l:rial contractiutts. 
To sm::nnarizc I bt.i:ieve she do~ heve congestive heart fD.ililre related to diastolic ~function, 
and is FunctiOllal Class .!!-Ill She contim.ws to have ~ere hypertension. 
Ji4~·W,fAGc Kim.I. FACC · 
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106215 OLD WIY 191 
MAI.AO CITY, ID 83252 
To the clerk of the court: 
Plea5e find attached the wire transcript of America First Credit Union identifying the wire transfer to the 
law offices of UnebargerGoggan Blair Sampson, UP ofTyler, Texas in March of 2011 in the amount of 
$4,214.n as credited from the Loan Proceeds of America First Credit Union Member, Holli Telford. 
If YoU have any further questions please feel free to call. 
~~ 
Lead Teller 
America First Credit Union-North Logan 
(435}792· 7520 
P.O. Box 9199 •Ogden. Utzoh 84409 • 1.800.999.3961 • www.emericetirst.com 
r .l./- f/ 
Un:uUI -~ unpuw uw or :swc 
Holl Telford <hollltelford@glhaR.ll'OllP 
-----------------··---·--·-
the original deed 
4 messages 
Deborah MHlng cDeborah.Mllllna@ltbs.com> 
To: HolTelfoof <hollitelford@gmai.com> 
Hi Holli, 
Tue,Apr19,201'l at 11:37 AM 
l did adually mail the original bill of sale and Dd on propmy 'jou pwciwed at the Mardi sale. 




Linebarger, Goggan, Blair and Sampson, LLP 
1517 W. Front street, Ste. 202 
Tyler, TX 75702 
903;697-2897 x.2121 
903..§il-2402 fax 
~rah mllJingO!gbs com 
-----------~--- ----·----- -··-
CONflDENJJAUJY STATEMENT 
This transmission may be: (1) 8Ubjed to the A!fMleY-Cllent Privtlege, (2) an attorney worlc product. or (3) 
striclly confidential. If you a111 not the intended recipient of this massage, you rmy not disdose, '°11. copy « 
dlsseminale this information. If you have recelWld this in error, please reply and nolify lhe sender (only) and 
delete the message.. Unauthorized inten;eptlon of this e-mail is a violation of federal c:rill'inal law. 
HoNI Telford <hollltefford@umall.com> Tue, Apr 19, 2011 at 3:32 PM 
To: Deborah Mllltng <Oeborah.Milllng@lgbs.com> 
send to: 106~1 s. Old Hwy 191 
Malad City Idaho 83252 
what address dld'you mail it to? Please brward me the returned envelope so lhat I mtf/ take Issue wilh the 
postal l'll!fYice if.they are reb.lmlng mall di!eded to mB. Also I have not niceived 1he executed deed of trust 
on Ille Kelley Sr. !nt that I purchased, and 1he county slil shows ttiat 1he p!Opel'ty Is in the name of 1he 
original owner. Can you see where this is too? Thanks. Hell 
IO""'"'i "'11-i 
Holl! Telford <hollttalfonl@gmall.com> Tue, Apr 19, 2011at10:14 PM 
To: Deborah Miffing <Deborah.Ml!ling@lgbs.com> 
·: .. ,' . . : · ...... 
.· .. 
document for insurance 
2 messages 
Dellorah ...... <~1111111 ....... 1.c;om> T-, ... 2011 .t 12;3S ... 
To: Holli Telford <holl~com> 
Holli, 
The document will be c:oming ftom Charlene Fugler at our office and when you acknowledge that you have 




lilebqet. Goggan. Blair and Sampson. LlP 
1517 W. FR>rt Street, Ste. 202 




--- ·-· ~---·· --...... __ ~ --...... --~ ,. --....~ _,,...,,-... -.. , ....__,_ __ .... --
CONPP"!'T'ALITY ITAD"''HT 
This transmission may be: (1) subject IO lhe Allorney-Cl'lent Pri11!1ege, (2} an attomey wen product, « (3} &tridly confidential. If 
you are not the intended recipient of this message, you may not disclose, print, copy «~le 1his inl'«malion. If you 
haw receM!d ttlis in emir, please reply and notify the sender (only} and delete the message. Unaulhortzed intereeptlon of 1hi$ 
e·mai is a violation of federal aiminal law. 
-----·--· -----··. ---
Holll Ttllt'onl <hollBlllrertlellftlllLC9111> .,.., ,., .. 2011 Ill 2.'17 ... 
Draft To: Deborah Milling <Oeborah.Millng@lgbs.eom> 
Please do not pul lhe original In the mal I.JI 
7 
3 2011 00031847 
THE STATE OF TEXAS § REDEMPTION DEED 
COUNTY OF SMITH § 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS that SMITH COUNTY, TYLER 
INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, CITY OF TYLER, AND TYLER JUNIOR 
COLLEGE, by and through its duly elected officials ("GRANTOR") as authorized by 
Section 34.05, Texas Property Tax Code, for and in consideration of the sum of 
TWELVE THOUSAND, SIX HUNDRED, EIGHT DOLLARS AND 36/100 
($12,608.36) AND OTHER GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, in hand 
paid by PA UL W. KELLY (GRANTEE") the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged 
and confessed, has conveyed and quitclaimed and by these presents do convey and 
quitclaim unto said grantee all right, title and interest of the SMITH COUNTY, TYLER 
INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, CITY OF TYLER, AND TYLER JUNIOR 
COLLEGE, in the property herein conveyed, acquired by tax foreclosure sale heretofore 
held in Cause No.22,107-C, styled Tyler Independent School District vs. Paul Kelly, Et 
Al, said property being described as: 
BEING 0.43 ACRES PART OF THE J. CAUBLE SURVEY, AS DESCRIBED IN 
DEED RECORDED IN VOLUME 1551, PAGE 735, ON INSTRUMENT FILED 
OCTOBER 30, 1975, AND FINAL DECREE OF DIVORCE FILED FEBRUARY 19, 
1993, CAUSE #92-2532F, SMITH COUNTY TEXAS, AND BEING FURTHER 
IDENTIFIED ON THE TAX ROLL AND RECORDS OF SMITH COUNTY UNDER 
ACCOUNT NUMBER 100000020600013090. 
This conveyance is made and accepted subject to the following matters to the 
extent that the same are in effect at this time: any and all rights of redemption, 
restrictions, covenants, conditions, easements, encumbrances and outstanding mineral 
interests, if any, relating to the hereinabove mentioned County and State, and to all 
zoning laws, regulations and ordinances of municipal and/or governmental authorities, if 
any but only to the extent that they are still in effect, relating to the hereinabove described 
property. 
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD said premises, together with all and singular the 
rights, privileges and appurtenances thereto in any manner belonging unto the said PAUL 
W. KELLY, his heirs and assigns forever, so that neither SMITH COUNTY, TYLER 
JUNIOR COLLEGE, AND TYLER INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, and any 
person claiming under it shall at any time hereafter have, claim or demand any right or 
title to the aforesaid premises or appurtenances, or any part thereof. 
- 1 -
Grantee accepts the property in "AS IS" condition and subject to any 
environmental conditions that might have or still exist on said property. 
Post judgment taxes and taxes for the current year are assumed by Grantee. 
IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, the taxing authorities erein have caused these 
presents to be executed this the I ;i, day of _ , 2011. 
SMITH COUNTY for itself and the STATE OF 
TEXAS ~ -Joels;µ._ 
SMITH COUNTY JUDGE 
STATE OF TEXAS 
COUNTY OF SMITH 
BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, on this day personally appeared The 
Honorable Joel Baker, County Judge, of the State of Texas, County of Smith known to 
me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the foregoing instrument, and 
acknowledged to me that he executed the same for the purpose and consideration therein 
expressed and in the capacity therein stated. 
Given under my hand and Seal of Office this / ~ day of 9M~ 
l_tJlt . 
~Aa,/t~c( 
NOTARY PUBLIC, in and forthe STATE 
OF TEXAS, my commission expires: 
(Seal) 
- 2 -
Grantee: PAUL W. KELLY 
1618 WOLFORD 
TYLER TX 75702 
Return to: Perdue, Brandon, Fielder, Collins & Mott, L.L.P 
P.O. Box 2007 
Tyler TX 75701 
- 3 -
Filed For Record in: 
S.ith Count\11 Texas 
On Jul 20r2011 
at 11:09A 
ReceiPt ~: 58~711 
Recording: 24.00 
Doc/Hui. : 00031847 
Doc/T\tPfi!I Recordinss - Lnnd 
OePUh - Cher!!l Clll'dind 
l hereb!I certih tho.t this 
instru.ent WGS filed and dul!I 
recorded in the Official 
Records of S•ith CountYr Texas 
Ko.ren Phi 11 i PS 
Coonh Clerk 
Smith County Appraisal District -Account Detait 2012 Pagel ofl 
· Click to Yiew Miw Electronic Online Protest C!jck to Print Thjs Wjndqw 
2012 ownership Data 
PIN#: [)43056 
iAcconnt: 100000020600013090 
Owner: iCRLlYPAUL W 
Address: 1618 WOLFORD 
~itv: TYLER tl.inl: 175702 





Recd. Info: !DEED 31847 
Jurlsdicttons/2012 Est Taxes 
SMIIB COUNTY $45.2~ 
TYLERISD $191.9~ 
SCESD#2 $11.8 .. 
For Actual Tax Levy contact Gary Barber Tax Assenor/Collector at (903> 590-2920. Tax amounts shown 
are Estimates Dl'l!Dared bY Smith Countv Annralsal District 
8 
Facsimile (254) 399-0160 
April 1ih, 2010 
JUSTIN LYNN 
RET AILEH/B ROKEH,/INST ALLER 
TDHCA LICENSE# MHDRET00035729 
5215 SANGER A VENUE 
Post Office Box 7067 
Waco, Texas 76714-7067 
Telephone (254) 399-0399 
Re: Purchase of Manufactured Home 
1994 Patriot/Heritage Park 
TEX0503873/7 4 
PTX1966A/B 
Dear Ms. Teleford: 
Email justin@lvnnprop.com 
Please accept this letter as receipt of payment for the manufactured home described above. Your wire 
transfer has been received and applied. Attached you will find an Application for Statement of Ownership 
& Location, which needs to be signed & notarized. Please scan and e-mail back signed document, retain 
a copy for your records and return the original to the Post Office Box listed above so it can be properly 
recorded with the State of Texas. Also attached, is the signed purchase agreement by both parties, as 
well as the Texas Title Detail Information Sheet, giving you information about the home that is vital to your 
insurance company. If you should happen to have any questions, please give me a call or e-mail me at 
your convenience. Thank you for your time and concern in this matter. Your business is greatly 
appreciated. 
Justin Davis Lynn 





AFCU MEMBER WIRE TRANSFER 
MEMBER COPY 
MEMBER NAME. ______ TELFORD ACCOUNT#7322829 
IDENTIFICATION (PICTURE}#STEVE.________ OTHER -'C'-'T-'-1 ______ _ 
WIRE TO {Institution name)INDEPENDENT BANK IS BANK ONLINE?_Y __ _ 
BANKABA# 1119 1632 6 
$AMOUNT ' _ ____.,.___ FEES$ _,,8=.o=o __________ _ 
BY ORDER OF .. _ ·(eG·ORD- PHONE# 469-522-9725 --"'"'~~~~----~ 
TELEGRAPHlC ABBREVlATlON.-"JN""D"'"P'-"'Bl.>.K ..... M .,Coi.:~w.IN.,.i,N,_,.E._,_Y ___________ _ 
DESTINATION BANK INFORMATION (CREDIT TO) _____________ _ 
N<lme & Acaiunt Number 
JUSTIN DAVIS LYNN 1000049450 
Address 
PURCHASE PATRIQT/HERITAGE PARK MANUFACUJRED tJO,,_,_M=EJ=---~~---
AddrSl>S 
AddNlSs 
(FOR FURTHER CREDIT TO) ___________________ _ 











SUFFIX ' AMOUNT FOLt 
7 , WRTSF 
i 1----~---+~~----+---~~---i 
SHARE TRANSFER 
DECREASE ACCT. 4120 IFE~ 
TRANSACTION ACCT.# I AMOUNT DESC. 
1 OTHER 
! GENERAL 
I LEDGER I OTHER 
GENERAL 
I LEDGER 
I 4610 j 110100 
I 
4610 1440900 ~ 1-- f 10010 I 
11i~111111111111~1m 11m rn1 
'IRWIR' 
